Chapman Law Review
Volume 14 | Issue 1

Article 1

2010

“Surplus Humanity” and the Margins of Legality:
Slums, Slumdogs, and Accumulation by
Dispossession
Tayyab Mahmud

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review
Recommended Citation
Tayyab Mahmud, “Surplus Humanity” and the Margins of Legality: Slums, Slumdogs, and Accumulation by Dispossession, 14 Chap. L. Rev.
1 (2010).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol14/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chapman Law Review by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.

Do Not Delete

12/12/2010 7:34 PM

“Surplus Humanity” and the Margins of
Legality: Slums, Slumdogs, and
Accumulation by Dispossession
Tayyab Mahmud*
Marooned on the outskirts of the law, more than one billion
people worldwide live in urban slums and squatter settlements,
mostly in the global South. Law, extra-legality, and illegality
commingle in urban slums to produce spaces and subjects at the
margins of legal orders and formal economies. Three enduring
and inter-related features of capitalism—accumulation by
dispossession, a reserve army of labor, and an informal sector of
the economy—produce and sustain urban slums. The genesis and
persistence of slums and slum-dwellers testify to the iron fist of
the state working in concert with the hidden hand of the market
in the service of accumulation of capital. Over the last thirty
years, neoliberal restructuring of economies and reordering of the
responsibilities of states have accentuated this process. As a
result, slums in the global South have grown exponentially. An
examination of public policy and pronouncements of the judiciary
in India, as they related to slums and slum-dwellers, calls into
question traditional understandings of the law, citizenship, and
responsibilities of the state. Mainstream remedial prescriptions
for housing for the urban poor increasingly rely on market forces,
falling woefully short of their goal, and often accentuating the
problem. The incipient right to the city provides a productive
framework to re-imagine the concept of citizenship, and to guide
public policy and popular action to ensure adequate housing with
dignity for the urban poor and marginalized.

* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Global Justice, Seattle University
School of Law. I want to thank Jaswinder Brara, Richard Delgado, Carmen Gonzalez,
Hamid Khan, Victoria Kill, Henry McGee, Audrey McFarlane, Bob Menanteaux, Charles
Pouncy, and Meenakshi Rishi for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. Research
librarians at Seattle University School of Law provided invaluable assistance with this
project.
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One’s ideological perspective is likely to be shaped by one’s housing
status.1
—Peter Ward
[T]here is a politics of space because space is political.2
—Henri Lefebvre

INTRODUCTION
From Cabrini-Green in Chicago to the Mau Forest in Kenya,
the housing of the poor is threatened by predatory forces
unleashed by global capitalism in its neoliberal incarnation.3
Formal housing markets in the global South4 rarely supply more
than twenty percent of new housing needs, turning people to selfbuilt shanties, informal rentals, pirate subdivisions, or the
streets.5 The population of slums and shantytowns on the urban
peripheries often outnumbers that of the city, leading some to
suggest that “[t]hese compounds are called ‘peri-urban’ but in
reality, it is the city proper that is peripheral.”6 Planning experts
warn that if this trend continues, “we will have only slums and
no cities.”7 Urban slums are seen as warehouses of “surplus
humanity,”8 and slum-dwellers as a “surplus population.”9 A

1 PETER M. WARD, MEXICO CITY: THE PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION OF AN
URBAN ENVIRONMENT 193 (Richard Peet ed., 1990).
2 Henri Lefebvre, Reflections on the Politics of Space, in RADICAL GEOGRAPHY:
ALTERNATIVE VIEWPOINTS ON CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL ISSUES 339, 345 (1978).
3 See generally Megan Cottrell, At the End of her Rope: Cabrini-Green Resident
Faces Eviction Tomorrow, TRUE/SLANT (Nov. 16, 2009, 10:00 AM), http://trueslant.com/
megancottrell/2009/11/16/at-the-end-of-her-rope-cabrini-green-resident-faces-evictiontomorrow/; Jeffrey Gettleman, Forest People May Lose Home in Kenyan Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2009, at A6.
4 The terms “global South” and “global North” are used here not necessarily to
describe distinct geographical regions, but to indicate what have been termed the “twothird” and “one-third” populations of the world that occupy broadly different
positionalities within the global economy. See Eric Sheppard & Richa Nagar, From East–
West to North–South, 36 ANTIPODE 557, 557–58 (2004).
5 A. S. OBERAI, POPULATION GROWTH, EMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY IN THIRD-WORLD
MEGA-CITIES: ANALYTICAL AND POLICY ISSUES 13 (1993). See also ROBERT NEUWIRTH,
SHADOW CITIES: A BILLION SQUATTERS, A NEW URBAN WORLD 7–9 (2005); MARK KRAMER,
DISPOSSESSED: LIFE IN OUR WORLD’S URBAN SLUMS 3–4 (2006). Accurate statistics are
difficult to come by because poverty estimates are often obfuscated and slum populations
are under-counted. See, e.g., JONATHAN RIGG, SOUTHEAST ASIA: A REGION IN TRANSITION
119, 143–46 (1991).
6 K.C. Sivaramakrishnan, Urban Governance: Changing Realities, in PREPARING
FOR THE URBAN FUTURE: GLOBAL PRESSURES AND LOCAL FORCES 225, 229 (Michael A.
Cohen et al. eds., 1996).
7 Gautam Chatterjee, Consensus versus Confrontation, 8 HABITAT DEBATE 11, 11
(2002).
8 Mike Davis, Planet of Slums: Urban Involution and the Informal Proletariat, 26
NEW LEFT REV. 5, 23 (2004).
9 Henry Veltmeyer, Surplus Labor and Class Formation on the Latin American
Periphery, in THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT: MODES OF PRODUCTION OR DEPENDENCY? 212
(Ronald H. Chilcote & Dale L. Johnson eds., 1983).
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global study finds that “[t]he primary direction of both national
and international interventions during the last twenty years has
actually increased urban poverty and slums.”10 In a world where
“2.7 billion struggle to survive on less than two dollars per day,”11
urban poverty may well be the “most significant, and politically
explosive, problem of the . . . century.”12
The ongoing global recession and the popularity of the
Academy Award winning film Slumdog Millionaire13 furnish a
unique opportunity to reexamine the question of slums. The
2007–2009 deep recession and the global financial crisis are
lifting the fog of neoliberal market ideologies that have
dominated global and national public policies for over a
generation.14 This has opened up the possibilities for clear-eyed
analyses of how market forces and the law come together to
produce questionable distributions of gain and pain. Slums and
urban poverty are ripe for such an analysis.
Set in Dharavi, the infamous slum of Mumbai, Slumdog
Millionaire is an acerbic snapshot of law and illegality tangled in
a brutal drama of power and resistance in the life of slumdwellers. We see an urban space that radically departs from the
original meaning of “city,”—which is derived from civ’tade,
civitat-em, and civitas, and “its primary sense was therefore
‘citizenship’; thence concretely ‘the body of citizens, the
community.’”15
Neither does the modern “public sphere,”

10 UN-HABITAT, THE CHALLENGE OF SLUMS: GLOBAL REPORT ON HUMAN
SETTLEMENTS 2003, at 6 (2003) [hereinafter UN-HABITAT, THE CHALLENGE OF SLUMS].
11 Fast
Facts:
The
Faces
of
Poverty,
UN
MILLENNIUM
PROJECT,
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/resources/fastfacts_e.htm (last visited Sept. 22,
2010).
12 Anqing Shi, How Access to Urban Potable Water and Sewerage Connections Affects
Child Mortality 14 (World Bank Dev. Res. Group. Finance, Working Paper No. 2274,
2000).
13 Slumdog
Millionaire—Official
Site,
FOX
SEARCHLIGHT,
http://www.foxsearchlight.com/slumdogmillionaire/. The term “slumdog,” borrowed from
this film, can be seen as an offensive characterization of those who live in slums. I use it,
as I believe the film does, by combining the words “slum” and “underdog” to signal the
subordinated and marginalized state of those constrained to make slums their abode. The
meaning of a slum has evolved over time, substantiating that “(spatiolegal)
representations are imbricated with elements of the (spatiolegal) material world.” David
Delaney, Tracing Displacements: Or Evictions in the Nomosphere, 22 ENV’T & PLAN. D:
SOC’Y & SPACE 847, 851 (2004). For a critique of the deployment of the term, see
generally, Alan Gilbert, The Return of the Slum: Does Language Matter?, 31 INT’L J. URB.
& REGIONAL RES. 697, 697 (2007).
14 See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE
SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010); PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION
ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 (2009); RICHARD D. WOLFF, CAPITALISM HITS THE
FAN: THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC MELTDOWN AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2010); ROBERT
SKIDELSKY, KEYNES: THE RETURN OF THE MASTER (2009).
15 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 252 (2d ed.1996).
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saturated by legality, contemplate a slum like Dharavi.16 Rather,
slums emerge as liminal spaces17 where law, extra-legality, and
illegality are braided to produce the other side of universality—
“moral and legal no man’s land, where universality finds its
spatial limits.”18
This article examines the production and persistence of
urban slums in order to explore and evaluate remedial strategies
that could ensure adequate housing for the urban poor. This
inquiry is informed by the spatial turn in social inquiry that
deems spatial factors crucial to social phenomena,19 and the
renewed interest in urban sociology and “the city.”20 It takes
cognizance of the mutually constitutive roles of law and space,21
and of the fact that “[w]e live in a time of porous legality or of
legal porosity, multiple networks of legal orders forcing us to
constant transitions and trespassings.”22
First, the article
presents a picture of Dharavi to underscore the complexity and
gravity of the problem of urban slums. Second, it articulates a
theoretical framework to argue that urban slums are produced by
16 See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC
SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 74–75 (1999). See
generally HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Craig Calhoun ed., 1993); AFTER
HABERMAS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Nick Crossley & John Michael
Roberts eds., 2004).
17 According to Victor Turner:
The attributes of liminality or liminal personae (‘threshold people’) are
necessarily ambiguous, since this condition and these persons elude or slip
through the network of classifications that normally locate states and positions
in cultural space. Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt
and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention,
and ceremonial.
VICTOR TURNER, THE RITUAL PROCESS: STRUCTURE AND ANTI-STRUCTURE 95 (1969).
18 Denise Ferreira Da Silva, Towards a Critique of the Socio-logos of Justice: The
Analytics of Raciality and the Production of Universality, 7 SOC. IDENTITIES 421, 422
(2001).
19 See generally DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY
INTO THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE (1990); EDWARD W. SOJA, POSTMODERN
GEOGRAPHIES: THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY (1989); SPACE &
SOCIAL THEORY: INTERPRETING MODERNITY AND POSTMODERNITY (Georges Benko & Ulf
Strohmayer eds., 1997); PLACE AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY (Michael Keith & Steve
Pile eds., 1993).
20 See, e.g., EDWARD W. SOJA, POSTMETROPOLIS: CRITICAL STUDIES OF CITIES AND
REGIONS xi, xii (2000); ASH AMIN & NIGEL THRIFT, CITIES: REIMAGINING THE URBAN 2–4
(2002); POSTMODERN CITIES AND SPACES 1 (Sophie Watson & Katherine Gibson eds.,
1995).
21 See generally Nicholas K. Blomley, Text and Context: Rethinking the Law-Space
Nexus, 13 PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY 512 (1989); NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW,
SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER (1994); Desmond Manderson, Beyond the
Provincial: Space, Aesthetics, and Modernist Legal Theory, 20 MELB. U. L. REV. 1048
(1996); Chris Butler, Critical Legal Studies and the Politics of Space, 18 SOC. & LEGAL
STUD. 313 (2009).
22 BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE
AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION 473 (1995).
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three inter-linked and enduring features of capitalism that have
been accentuated by neoliberalism: accumulation by dispossession, the labor reserve army, and an informal sector of the
economy. Third, using the history of slums in India as a case
study, it applies this framework to demonstrate how colonial
stratagems, misguided post-colonial development policies, and
mandates of neoliberalism have produced and sustained slums in
the global South. Fourth, it shows how material and discursive
changes spawned by neoliberalism transformed India’s
judiciary’s response to the problem of slums and slum-dwellers
from humane treatment to hostility.
Fifth, it evaluates
alternative models for the eradication of urban slums in the
global South, and finds the “state as developer” model23 to be
most promising. Finally, it argues that the incipient right to the
city provides a productive framework to reimagine the concept of
citizenship, and to guide public policy and popular action to
ensure adequate housing with dignity for the urban poor and the
marginalized.
I. DHARAVI: MAXIMUM SLUM IN MAXIMUM CITY
In India, the number of people living in slums grew
approximately twenty-five percent in the last decade.24 In
Mumbai, over twenty million people cram into 169 square miles,
with population density exceeding one million per square mile in
some parts of the city.25 With twelve million squatters and
tenement-dwellers, Mumbai is also the global capital of slumdwelling.26 While real estate prices in Mumbai compete with
those of Manhattan,27 every second person in Mumbai lives in
slums, which collectively occupy just six percent of all the land in
the city.28 In Mumbai, a typical tenement chawl—which makes
up seventy-five percent of the city’s formal housing stock—is a
dilapidated, one-room rental dwelling that on average crams a
See infra notes 431–459 and accompanying text.
Bibhudatta Pradhan, India’s Number of Slum-Dwellers Surges as Economy Draws
People to Cities, BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 3, 2010, 5:06 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2010.09.03/india-s-number-of-slum-dwellers-surges-as-economy-draws-people-tocities.html.
25 Seamus
Murphy,
Bombay:
Maximum
City,
VIIPHOTO.COM,
http://www.viiphoto.com/detailStory.php?news_id=1086 (last visited Sept. 22, 2010).
26 UN-HABITAT, Slums of the World: The Face of Urban Poverty in the New
Millennium? annex 3 (Monitoring the Millennium Development Goal, Target 11-Worldwide Slum Dweller Estimation Working Paper, Nairobi 2003).
27 Gayatri Ramanathan, Dharavi Redevelopment Plan is Robbing Us of Space:
Residents, LIVEMINT.COM (Sept. 5, 2007, 7:07 AM), http://www.livemint.com/2007/09/
05002021/Dharavi-redevelopment-plan-is.html.
28 Komal Panchamatia, Every Second Person in Mumbai Resides in Slum: UNDP
Report, BUSINESS STANDARD (Sep. 4, 2009, 11:25 AM), http://www.business-standard.com/
india/news/every-second-person-in-mumbai-resides-in-slum-undp-report/72631/on.
23
24
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household of six people into fifteen square meters, with a latrine
usually shared by six families.29
Pavement and sidewalk
dwellers in Mumbai reach approximately one million.30 Of these,
seventy percent have been in the city for at least six years, and
one-third have been evicted from a chawl or a slum.31 While
Mumbai’s estimated annual housing deficit of 45,000 units
translates into a corresponding increase in slum dwellings,
400,000 units lie empty because owners loath the mandated
regime of fixed rents and the resulting propensity of tenants to
become permanent occupiers.32 Homelessness and slum growth
in Mumbai is directly related to job losses associated with
industrial restructuring. In 1921, textile mills hired 16.2% of the
males and 9.5% of the females of the city’s population.33 In 1931,
the Census Commissioner stated that “‘[s]ave for its textile
manufacture’, . . . ‘Bombay has really little claim to be called an
industrial city. . . .’.”34 Until 1980, 250,000 textile mill workers
lived in Mumbai; today the number has fallen below 30,000.35
This is part of a broader contraction of the formal sector of the
economy that has forced the urban poor to fend for themselves in
the so-called informal sector.
Life in Dharavi demonstrates that, for the urban poor,
housing is a verb.36 Dharavi, a 175-hector (0.67 square miles)
maze of dark alleys and corrugated shacks, compacts 18,000
people per acre into 10-by-15 foot rooms stacked on top of one
another.37 Here, slum-dwellers juggle housing cost, tenure
security, quality of shelter, distance from work, and personal
safety. Even pavement-dwelling, much less an extra-legal shack,
is not free; regular fees have to paid to the police, crime
29 ALAIN R.A. JACQUEMIN, URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND NEW TOWNS IN THE THIRD
WORLD: LESSONS FROM THE NEW BOMBAY EXPERIENCE 89 (1999).
30 Minar Pimple & Lysa John, Security of Tenure: Mumbai’s Experience, in HOLDING
THEIR GROUND: SECURE LAND TENURE FOR THE URBAN POOR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
75, 76, 78 (Alain Durand-Lasserve & Lauren Royston eds., 2002).
31 JACQUEMIN, supra note 29, at 90.
32 SUKETU MEHTA, MAXIMUM CITY: BOMBAY LOST AND FOUND 117 (2004).
33 R. CHANDAVARKAR, THE ORIGINS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM IN INDIA: BUSINESS
STRATEGIES AND THE WORKING CLASSES IN BOMBAY, 1900–1940 77 (1994).
34 Id.
35 Sharit K. Bhowmik, The Politics of Urban Space in Mumbai: ‘Citizen’ versus the
Urban Poor, in CONTESTED TRANSFORMATIONS: CHANGING ECONOMIES AND IDENTITIES IN
CONTEMPORARY INDIA 149, 151 (Mary E. John et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter CONTESTED
TRANSFORMATIONS]. The decline of the textile industry in Mumbai resulted from the
global shift of textile production to comparatively low-wage settings like Bangladesh,
China, and Vietnam. See Sanjaya Lall, India’s Manufactured Exports: Comparative
Structure and Prospects, 27 WORLD DEV. 1769, 1769–70 (1999).
36 John F. C. Turner, Housing as a Verb, in FREEDOM TO BUILD: DWELLER CONTROL
OF THE HOUSING PROCESS 148, 151 (John F. C. Turner & Robert Fichter eds., 1972).
37 KALPANA SHARMA, REDISCOVERING DHARAVI: STORIES FROM ASIA’S LARGEST SLUM
18 (2000).
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syndicates, or both.38 Furthermore, squatters are required to pay
sizable amounts of money as bribes to the police, politicians, or
criminal gangs to gain access to the sites, and continue to pay
informal “rent” in money, loyalty, and votes.39 The unavoidable
costs of an un-serviced location add to the bill. Slum-dwellers
who have been in the city since before 1995 pay a monthly fee to
the city for a “photo-pass”—an identity card with the photograph
of the head of the household on it.40 While holders assume that
this pass gives them a right of permanent residency, the small
print on the back side states that the holder is an encroacher who
has to pay a monthly fine.41
In Dharavi and other slums of Mumbai, death rates are fifty
percent higher than in adjoining rural areas, with forty percent
of the mortality being a product of infections and parasitic
diseases due to contaminated water and inadequate sanitation.42
“Breathing the air in [Dharavi] now is the equivalent to smoking
two-and-a-half packs of cigarettes a day.”43
Clean water,
sanitation, and toilets are rare commodities, which puts special
burdens on women.44 The few public toilets run by the municipal
corporation charge for each use.45 A study of twenty-two slums
in India found nine with no latrines at all; in another ten, only
nineteen served 102,000 people.46
Dharavi is also a hub of small-scale industries, with an
estimated annual turnover between $50 and $100 million.47
Against all odds, Dharavi has developed into a “kind of selfsufficient, self-sustaining ‘village,’” one with a “vibrant
38 Erhard Berner, Learning from Informal Markets: Innovative Approaches to Land
and Housing Provision, in DEVELOPMENT AND CITIES: ESSAYS FROM DEVELOPMENT
PRACTICE 226, 233 (David Westendorff & Deborah Eade eds., 2002) [hereinafter Berner,
Learning from Informal Markets].
39 MIKE DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS 38 (2006) [hereinafter DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS].
40 Bhowmik, supra note 35, at 148.
41 Id.
42 JACQUEMIN, supra note 29, at 90–91.
43 MEHTA, supra note 32, at 29.
44 See
generally UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, SUMMARY HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006: BEYOND SCARCITY: POWER, POVERTY AND THE GLOBAL
WATER CRISIS (2006), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR2006_English_
Summary.pdf.
45 Kalpana Sharma, Mumbai’s Other Half (Countercurrents.org, Kerala, India), Oct.
17, 2004, available at http://www.countercurrents.org/gender-sharma171004.htm.
46 Chatterjee, supra note 7, at 12. In Mumbai “half the population doesn’t have a
toilet to shit in, so they shit outside . . . that’s two and a half million kilos of shit each and
every day.” MEHTA, supra note 32, at 127. Such lack of privacy presents particular
problems for women, who often have to wait for the dark of the night to relieve
themselves. See Loes Schenk-Sandbergen, Women, Water and Sanitation in the Slums of
Bangalore: A Case Study of Action Research, in LIVING IN INDIA’S SLUMS: A CASE STUDY
OF BANGALORE 187, 198 (Hans Schenk ed., 2001).
47 Mitu Sengupta, Slumdog Millionaire’s Dehumanizing View of India’s Poor,
COUNTERPUNCH (Feb. 20/22, 2009), http://www.counterpunch.org/sengupta022009.html.
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community and economy,” which “has achieved a unique informal
‘self-help’ urban development over the years, without any
external aid.”48 While bereft of adequate housing, the slumdwellers have established “close to 5000 industrial units,
producing textiles, pottery and leather, and performing services
like recycling, printing, and steel fabrication.”49 The economic
activity in Dharavi is “decentralized, human scale, home-based,
low-tech and labor-intensive . . . pedestrianized, communitycentric, and network-based . . . . A simplistic re-zoning and
segregating of these activities . . . would certainly hurt this very
unique urban form.”50
Polluting, toxic, and often illegal industries find Dharavi,
where “Darwin beats Keynes,” attractive.51
Sweatshops
profitably mine cheap labor under the radar of regulatory
oversight.52 Writers analogize Dante’s Inferno to portray the
struggle for survival in slums where poverty, filth, crime, and
marginalization stalk the daily life of human beings.53 Slumdwellers trade away physical security and public health for
minimal shelter, and suffer environmental degradation including
filthy water, polluted air, and toxic industrial waste.54 They
contend with the “garbage dump syndrome,”55 which is “a
concentration of toxic industrial activities such as metal plating,
dyeing, rendering, tanning, battery recycling, casting, vehicle
repair, [and] chemical manufacture.”56 Dharavi, like most slums,
is located in a disaster-vulnerable, ecologically fragile area, so
that even a heavy rain can wipe out shelters.57 An omnipresent

48 Prakash M. Apte, Dharavi: India’s Model Slum, PLANETIZEN (Sept. 29, 2008,
5:00 AM), http://planetizen.com/node/35269.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Hans Schenk, Urban Fringes in Asia: Markets versus Plans, in REALIGNING
ACTORS IN AN URBANIZING WORLD: GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONS FROM A
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE 117, 131 (I. S. A. Baud & J. Post eds., 2002).
52 SHARMA, supra note 37, at xxxv, 106.
53 MICHAEL TAUSSIG, LAW IN A LAWLESS LAND: DIARY OF A LIMPIEZA IN COLUMBIA
114–15 (2003); DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS, supra note 39, at 49.
54 ELLEN BRENNAN, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, POPULATION,
URBANIZATION, ENVIRONMENT, AND SECURITY: A SUMMARY OF THE ISSUES 12–14 (1999).
See also DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS, supra note 39, at 128–29.
55 GITA DEWAN VERMA, SLUMMING INDIA: A CHRONICLE OF SLUMS AND THEIR
SAVIOURS 16 (2002); DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS, supra note 39, at 129.
56 DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS, supra note 39, at 129.
57 See Mohamed Hamza & Roger Zetter, Structural Adjustment, Urban Systems, and
Disaster Vulnerability in Developing Countries, 15:4 CITIES 291, 291 (1998) (explaining
that “urban areas are not disaster prone by nature;; rather . . . the structural processes
which accelerate rapid urbanisation . . . increase the disaster vulnerability of the mass of
low-income urban dwellers”). During the twentieth century, more than one hundred
million homes were destroyed by earthquakes, mostly in slums, tenements districts, and
poor rural areas. DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS, supra note 39, at 126.
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threat is fire, accidental or as the result of “hot demolition”—
arson used by landowners to clear out squatters.58
Recently, the Mumbai city government approved a plan,
styled “Vision Mumbai,” to create a “world-class city” by 2013.59
Dharavi, where the land occupied by the slum is estimated to be
worth $2 billion,60 is a particular target of this plan.61
Demolitions by bulldozers, supervised by the police and with
little notice to the residents, is the modus operandi.62 The
dwelling of the lead child-actor in Slumdog Millionaire proved
not to be immune to demolition.63 Besides being a violation of
many international conventions and covenants to which India is
a party,64 these actions betray class divides, and “the constitutive
and mutually defining relations between corporeality and the
metropolis.”65 As one Dharavi resident put it:
Why wreck the homes and lives of people who have built the city and
lived in it for decades? . . . Because from your luxury high-rise
apartment you don’t want the humiliation of India’s poor in your line
of vision as you make money and succeed. Forcing them out is the
only option. You simply can’t wish them away.66

58 See ERHARD BERNER, DEFENDING A PLACE IN THE CITY: LOCALITIES AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR URBAN LAND IN METRO MANILA 144 (1997); HANS SCHENK, Living in
Bangalore’s Slums, in LIVING IN INDIA’S SLUMS: A CASE STUDY OF BANGALORE, supra note
46, at 17, 34.
59 See generally BOMBAY FIRST & MCKINSEY & CO., VISION MUMBAI: TRANSFORMING
MUMBAI INTO A WORLD-CLASS CITY (2003), available at www.bombayfirst.org/pdf/
McKinseyReport.pdf.
60 David Harvey, The Right to the City, 53 NEW LEFT REV. 23, 35 (2008) [hereinafter
Harvey, The Right to the City].
61 Henry Chu, Where Every Inch Counts, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2008, at A1.
62 Habitat Int’l Coal., NGO Appeals Against Slum Demolitions in Mumbai,
http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article2242 (last visited Sept. 11, 2010).
63 Hiram Lee, Home of Slumdog Millionaire Child Actor Destroyed by Mumbai
Authorities, WORLD SOCIALIST (May 15, 2009), http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/
may2009/slum-m15.shtml.
64 See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Articles 2 &
11, Jan. 3, 1976, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cescr.pdf; Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Comments No. 4 on the right to adequate
housing, and No. 7 on forced evictions, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/
cescr/comments.htm; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Articles 16, 27 and 39,
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm; Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Article 14, available at http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm; Basic Principles and Guidelines on
Development-based Evictions and Displacement, UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate
Housing of the UN Commission on Human Rights, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/issues/housing/docs/guidelines_en.pdf.
65 Elizabeth Grosz, Body–Cities, in THE FEMINISM AND VISUAL CULTURE READER
507, 508 (Amelia Jones ed., 2003).
66 Dan McDougall, Waste Not, Want Not in the £700m Slum, GUARDIAN (Mar. 4,
2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/mar/04/india.recycling.

Do Not Delete

10

12/12/2010 7:34 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 14:1

An architect claims, “[t]here’s very little vision with this
plan. They’re more like hallucinations.”67 A Dharavi resident
asks: “Development for whom?
The government’s idea of
development doesn’t include us. I’ve seen the plans. Wonderful.
No room at all for ugly poor people.”68 A companion plan adopted
by the Maharashtra state government proposes to resettle slumdwellers of Dharavi into 225 square foot flats per family, if the
slum-dweller’s name appeared on the voters’ list in 1995 and he
or she was an actual occupant of the dwelling.69 Together,
Lehman Brothers and HDIL, one of the largest property
developers in India, were awarded a contract to implement the
plan, but they abandoned it citing a liquidity crunch and lack of
clarity of policy.70 Many earlier plans met a similar fate. In all,
slum upgrading plans in Mumbai promised to provide relief to
three million people, but the results remain dismal.71 An expert
review concluded that “the scheme for slum upgrading had fallen
well short of expectations and only nine percent of recipients
belonged to low-income groups . . . .”72 In the meantime, the
global real estate price-escalation has also reached Dharavi,
making even the slum beyond the reach of the destitute.73 A
Dharavi real estate broker explains:
Ten years ago, poor people were my only clients and huts my only
properties . . . . My only line was: ‘Poor people can afford it.’ Now I
sell to businessmen, investors and speculators. I tell them, ‘This place
is a commercial center. It’s slap in the middle of the city. Its [sic]
development is approved. It’s a sure thing! It’s golden! Get in now!’74

This picture of Dharavi in Mumbai suggests that most cities
of the global South are less made of glass and steel soaring
toward the sky, than of crude brick, straw, scrap wood, and
plastic in the midst of squalor, pollution, and excrement. It also

Id.
Alex Perry, Life in Dharavi: Inside Asia’s Biggest Slum, TIME (Asia), June 19,
2006, available at http://www.time.com/time/asia/covers/501060619/slum.html.
69 See Slum Rehabilitation Authority, Dharavi Redevelopment Project, SRA.GOV,
http://www.sra.gov.in/htmlpages/Dharavi.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2010). See also
Kalpana
Sharma,
A
Reprieve
for
Dharavi,
INFOCHANGEINDIA.ORG,
http://infochangeindia.org/Urban-India/Cityscapes/A-reprieve-for-Dharavi.html
(last
visited Sept. 22, 2010) (outlining recent history of the Dharavi Redevelopment Project,
including a Maharashta government compromise increasing dwelling size to three
hundred square feet and extending the voters’ list cut-off date to January 1, 2000).
70 Dharavi: ‘Slum’ping Developments, ECONOMIC TIMES (Apr. 2, 2009, 12:07 AM),
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ (click “news” above search box;; enter search term
“Slum’ping developments”).
71 Greg O’Hare et al., A Review of Slum Housing Policies in Mumbai, 15 CITIES 269,
278 (1998).
72 Id. at 279.
73 Perry, supra note 68.
74 Id.
67
68
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suggests that Dharavi, like other urban slums of the global
South, is not a space invested with formal legality. Dharavi
emerges as a liminal zone of a regulatory vacuum, where
predatory entrepreneurs, corrupt politicians, and state
functionaries operate unfettered by law or public scrutiny.
II. SLUMS, CITIES, AND CAPITALISM
A. Accumulation by Dispossession and “Surplus Humanity”
Slum-dwellers have been characterized as “outcast
proletariat.”75
They are the “disincorporated” and “unincorporatable” of capitalism.76 They stand “condemned to the
world of the excluded, the redundant, the dispensable, having
nothing to lose, not even the chains of wage-slavery. . . . [They
are] the shadowy figures of the rejected, the marginal, the
leftovers of capital’s arising, the wreckage and debris . . . .”77 All
this renders them “structurally and biologically redundant to
global accumulation and the corporate matrix.”78 Any productive
inquiry of slums and slum-dwellers must take account of the
conditions of their production. Three interlinked historical
features of capitalism furnish the contours of this process:
accumulation by dispossession, the reserve army of labor, and the
informal economy.
David Harvey coined the term accumulation by dispossession
to signify that accumulation facilitated by legal and extra-legal
non-economic means is an enduring condition of capitalism,
rather than just its historical precondition.79 The construct
signals that markets always rely on non-market forces,
particularly legal orders and extra-legality, to disproportionately
allocate power and resources to owners of capital.80 The concept
builds on that of primitive accumulation—appropriation of value
by force—seen as the pre-history of capitalism and critical to the
development of free labor and free markets.81 As a prerequisite to
the desired positioning of bodies and spaces, legal and extra-legal
75 Mike Davis, The Urbanization of Empire: Megacities and the Laws of Chaos, 81
SOC. TEXT 9, 11 (2004) [hereinafter Davis, The Urbanization of Empire].
76 Id. at 11, 13 (quoting UN HUMAN SETTLEMENT PROGRAM, THE CHALLENGE OF
SLUMS: GLOBAL REPORT ON HUMAN SETTLEMENTS 2003) (internal citations omitted).
77 KALYAN
SANYAL,
RETHINKING
CAPITALIST
DEVELOPMENT:
PRIMITIVE
ACCUMULATION, GOVERNMENTALITY & POST-COLONIAL CAPITALISM 53 (2007).
78 Davis, The Urbanization of Empire, supra note 75, at 11.
79 See DAVID HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM 137–38, 145–46 (2003) [hereinafter
HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM].
80 Id.
81 See MICHAEL PERELMAN, THE INVENTION OF CAPITALISM: CLASSICAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY AND THE SECRET HISTORY OF PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION 13 (2000); Jim
Glassman, Primitive Accumulation, Accumulation by Dispossession, Accumulation by
‘Extra-Economic’ Means, 30 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 608, 610 (2006).
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coercion made capital accumulation possible.82
Coercion
triggered the genesis of capitalism—availability of “free” labor
with no other means of livelihood except their labor to be sold in
a nascent “free” labor market, and the availability of capital to be
deployed in the incipient manufacturing industries. Historically,
the process turned on “ex-novo separation between producers and
means of production.”83
The key issue here involves the
“conditions, circumstances and contexts in which this separation
is enforced.”84 Contrary to the mythologies of classical economics,
this is a realm outside the market governed by pure economic
laws—a zone where this separation is effectuated through direct
extra-economic forces residing in the coercive power of the state
and the law.85 Two domains of extra-economic power were
critical to this process: coercive laws that forced subsistence
producers into the “free” wage labor market, and colonial plunder
that made capital available for investment.
Colonialism, facilitated by an elaborate reordering of
international law, filled the coffers of the fledgling mercantile
class of Europe and generated the financial resources to engage
the “freed” labor in production governed by profit maximization.86
Besides direct plunder of resources in the colonies, agricultural
lands in the Americas and plantation colonies in the Caribbean
82 As Polanyi reminded us, “[t]he road to the free market was opened and kept open
by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled
interventionism.” KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 146 (2001). Jessop adds:
[N]either capitalism as a whole nor the capital-labor relationship on which its
contradictory and conflictual dynamic depends can be reproduced purely
through market relations. Both require supplementary modes of reproduction,
regulation and governance[,] including those provided in part through the
operations of the state.
BOB JESSOP, THE FUTURE OF THE CAPITALIST STATE 11 (2002).
83 Massimo De Angelis, Separating the Doing and the Deed: Capital and the
Continuous Character of Enclosures, 12 HIST. MATERIALISM 57, 63 (2004).
84 Id. at 66.
85 Polanyi focuses on the role of state power in the commodification of land and
labor, what he terms “fictitious commodities.” POLANYI, supra note 82, at 71. He points
out that capitalism “was submerged in general social relations;; markets were merely an
accessory feature of an institutional setting controlled and regulated more than ever by
social authority.” Id. at 70.
86 For example, silver from the “New World” roughly tripled Europe’s supply.
FERNAND BRAUDEL, II CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM, 15TH–18TH CENTURY: THE WHEELS
OF COMMERCE 198 (Sian Reynolds trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1992) (1979). For the
relationship between colonialism and international law, see Antony Anghie, Francisco de
Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law, in LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL 89,
89–91 (Eve Darian-Smith & Peter Fitzpatrick eds., 1999); Antony Anghie, Finding the
Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in the Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40
HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 2–5 (1999); ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 116–17 (2004); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE
CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960, at 98–178
(2002).
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were the “ghost acres” that relieved output pressures and threats
of diminishing returns that confronted European agriculture.87
The genesis of capitalism in un-free labor is reflected in the fact
that the word capital first came into vogue in the era of capitalintensive but slave-hungry Antillean sugar plantations.88 The
Enclosure Acts89 and Game Laws90 in England are examples of
coercive use of law to dispossess rural farmers, hunters, and
other subsistence producers, forcing them to seek a livelihood in
the “free” wage market. Primitive accumulation thus entailed
two interlinked processes: direct expropriation of people’s means
of providing for themselves, and forcing people into wage labor.
Canonical critical political economy had relegated primitive
accumulation to the pre-history of capitalism.91 However, later

87 See NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE
WORLD 285 (2008).
88 See BRAUDEL, supra note 86, at 232. Braudel credits the 1770 publication of Anne
Turgot for the first use of the word capital in the sense of bases for capitalism as a new
mode of production. See ANNE ROBERT JACQUES TURGOT, REFLECTIONS ON THE
FORMATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF RICHES (William J. Ashley trans., Augustus M.
Kelly ed., 1898) (1770).
89 See 6 SIR JOHN BAKER, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1483–
1558, at 650–52 (2003).
90 Modern Game Laws that began in England in 1671, severely restricted hunting
and were part of the effort to cut off large masses of the rural people from one traditional
means of their livelihood. E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE
BLACK ACT 94, 99, 207, 261 (1975). The Waltham Black Acts of 1722 were among the
earliest of the severe measures to punish poachers. Id. The scope of the Game Laws
expanded rapidly. Id. As a result, by the end of the eighteenth century “[m]eat virtually
disappeared from the tables of the rural poor.” PHYLLIS DEANE, THE FIRST INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION 42 (1979). The British courts enforced these laws with shocking ferocity, and
many poachers were executed under the Black Acts. E. P. T HOMPSON, WHIGS AND
HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 68 (1975). Between 1820 and 1827, in
Bedfordshire, “nearly a quarter of those committed were in prison for poaching offences.”
A. G. L. SHAW, CONVICTS AND THE COLONIES 155 (1966). Blackstone acknowledged this
connection, observing: “the only rational footing, upon which we can consider it [violation
of Games Laws] as a crime, is that in low and indigent persons it promotes idleness, and
takes them away from their proper employments and callings . . .” 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 174–75 (Univ. of Chicago Press
2002) (1766). The Game Laws also prohibited the rural poor from keeping weapons,
thereby diminishing their ability to resist the onslaught on their means of subsistence.
Blackstone noted that “[f]or preventing of popular insurrections and resistance to the
government, by disarming the bulk of the people: which last is a reason oftener meant,
than avowed, by makers of forest or game laws.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 412 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2002) (1766). Research confirms
that the level of exploitation was greatest against those who lacked access to weapons.
John S. Pettengill, Firearms and the Distribution of Income: A Neo-Classical Model, 13
REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 1, 1–10 (1981). One the earliest acts of the French Revolution
was to repeal the hated Game Laws in France. Michael Perelman, Primitive
Accumulation from Feudalism to Neoliberalism, 18 CAPITALISM NATURE SOCIALISM 44, 54
(2007).
91 See PERELMAN, supra note 81, at 2. The portrayal of primitive accumulation by
critical political economists was marred by historicism, Eurocentricism, and anti-peasant
prejudice of their milieu. Glassman, supra note 81, at 610–12.
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scholarship on endemic crises of capitalism,92 the political
economy of growth,93 dependency theory,94 world systems
theory,95 accumulation on a world scale,96 and articulation of
modes of production,97 establishes that primitive accumulation is
“a basic ontological condition for capitalist production, rather
than just a historical precondition.”98 As a result, “production of
value that enters into the circuits of capitalist accumulation
through parasitization of formally non-capitalist processes is a
deeply embedded feature of capitalism.”99 These interventions
underscore the continuing role of coercive political forces in
underwriting the purportedly extra-political realm of the market.
They also alert us that capitalism, since its origins is a global
phenomenon that often co-opts rather than displaces noncapitalist modes of production, and results in uneven
development of different geographical zones within its ambit.
The global geography of capitalism enables this accumulation by
extra-economic means through a myriad of legal and extra-legal
regimes that range from global to local, and from formal to
customary. These insights highlight that primitive accumulation
does not lead to complete proletarianization and that nonproletarian and semi-proletarian labor remains integral to
capitalism.100
92 Rosa Luxemburg argued that “the accumulation of capital, seen as an historical
process, employs force as a permanent weapon, not only at its genesis, but further on
down to the present day.” ROSA LUXEMBURG, THE ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL 351 (Agnes
Schwarzschild trans., Routledge 2003) (1913). Hannah Arendt emphasized that crises of
capital necessitate that “the original sin of simple robbery, which centuries ago had made
possible the ‘original accumulation of capital’ . . . had eventually to be repeated lest the
motor of accumulation suddenly die down.” HANNAH ARENDT, IMPERIALISM: PART TWO OF
THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 28 (1968). David Moore noted that colonized societies
could not “protect themselves against the ravaging international trade and imperialism
that destroys precapitalist communities of kinship, neighbourhoods, profession and
creed . . . all forms of indigenous, organic society.” David Moore, The Second Age of the
Third World: From Primitive Accumulation to Global Public Goods?, 25 THIRD WORLD Q.
87, 93 (2004).
93 See generally PAUL A. BARAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH (1957).
94 See generally ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN
LATIN AMERICA (1969).
95 See generally IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE CAPITALIST WORLD-ECONOMY (1979)
[hereinafter WALLERSTEIN, THE CAPITALIST WORLD-ECONOMY].
96 See, e.g., SAMIR AMIN, ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD SCALE: A CRITIQUE OF THE
THEORY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT 38 (1974); SAMIR AMIN, UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT 93
(1976).
97 Aidan Foster-Carter, The Modes of Production Controversy, 107 NEW LEFT REV.
47, 51 (1978); Harold Wolpe, Introduction, in THE ARTICULATION OF MODES OF
PRODUCTION: ESSAYS FROM ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1, 5, 9–10 (1980).
98 Glassman, supra note 81, at 615.
99 Id. at 617.
100 WALLERSTEIN, THE CAPITALIST WORLD-ECONOMY, supra note 95, at 276–78. As a
result of articulation of dependent economies with global accumulation and coexistence of
modes of production, “no matter how universal the process of proletarianization, the
result is not the creation of a homogeneous proletariat.” HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM,
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The enduring nature of accumulation by dispossession can be
seen in the various forms of social capital that are required by
capital but not paid by it.101 David Harvey initially used the
phrase “accumulation by dispossession” to signify that global
primitive accumulation is an enduring “spacio-temporal fix” for
cyclical crises of capital.102 In this global frame, accumulation by
dispossession emerges as central to the exercise of colonial and
imperial domination that has moved from the background to
become the dominant form of accumulation in the current
neoliberal era.103 The entire panoply of forms of value extraction
by means other than commodified or “free” wage labor makes for
accumulation by dispossession.
Examples drawn from various contexts should help us
appreciate this enduring phenomenon.
Publically funded
infrastructure, subsidies for research and development, public
education, and public health are canonical instances of nonmarket processes that sustain the market. Gendered and often
racialized household labor, both productive and reproductive, is
another pervasive field of such appropriation.104 The history of
supra note 79, at 147. See also IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE ESSENTIAL WALLERSTEIN
142–43, 240, 363 (2000).
101 Social reproduction entails “the social processes and human relations associated
with the creation and maintenance of the communities upon which all production and
exchange rest.” Nancy Hartsock, Globalization and Primitive Accumulation: The
Contributions of David Harvey’s Dialectical Marxism, in DAVID HARVEY: A CRITICAL
READER 183, 183 (Noel Castree & Derek Gregory eds., 2006).
102 The cyclical crises of under-consumption, over-accumulation, and falling rates of
profit, endemic to capitalism, necessitate spatial and temporal solutions. Spatio-temporal
fix is “a metaphor for a particular kind of solution to capitalist crises through temporal
deferral and geographical expansion.” HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM, supra note 79, at
115. The spatial fix derives from capitalism’s drive to resolve its crisis tendencies by
geographical expansion and geographical restructuring.
This includes developing
external markets, exporting surplus capital, and expanding the labor-pool available for
engagement in accumulation of capital. The temporal fix involves expropriation of
resources from a commons for short-term profit where the rate of economic exploitation of
a given resource exceeds its natural rate of renewal and/or the absorptive capacity of the
environment. See Bob Jessop, Spatial Fixes, Temporal Fixes and Spatio-Temporal Fixes,
in DAVID HARVEY: A CRITICAL READER, supra note 101, 142, 142–43.
103 HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM, supra note 79, at 140–42, 149–50, 153, 172.
104 See Claude Meillassoux, From Reproduction to Production: A Marxist Approach to
Economic Anthropology, 1 ECON. & SOC’Y 93, 100–02 (1972); CLAUDE MEILLASSOUX,
MAIDENS, MEALS AND MONEY: CAPITALISM AND THE DOMESTIC COMMUNITY xii–xiii (1981);
Nona Y. Glazer, Servants to Capital: Unpaid Domestic Labor and Paid Work, 16 REV.
RADICAL POL. ECON. 61, 61 (1984); Carmen Diana Deere, Rural Women’s Subsistence
Production in the Capitalist Periphery, 8 REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 9, 9 (1976); Lourdes
Beneria, Reproduction, Production, and the Sexual Division of Labour, 3 CAMBRIDGE J.
ECON. 203, 203 (1979); J. K. GIBSON-GRAHAM, THE END OF CAPITALISM (AS WE KNEW IT):
A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 33–34 (1996); ALTHA J. CRAVEY, WOMEN
AND WORK IN MEXICO’S MAQUILADORAS 6–7 (1998); Cindy Katz, On the Grounds of
Globalization: A Topography for Feminist Political Engagement, 26 J. WOMEN CULTURE &
SOC’Y 1213, 1219 (2001); Cindy Katz, Vagabond Capitalism and the Necessity of Social
Reproduction, 33 ANTIPODE 709, 710–13 (2001).
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agricultural labor in California, saturated by the instrumental
use of race, class, and nationality in immigration and landownership laws that consolidated agro-capital, is also a story of
accumulation by dispossession.105 Finally, trade regimes that
entail “neoliberal rescaling of governance to escape national-scale
environmental constraints,”106 and new appropriation of the
commons for private profit whereby “the global commons are
being enclosed,”107 are instances of accumulation by dispossession.
One specific result of accumulation by dispossession that is
central to the production of slums is the emergence of a reserve
army of labor.
While dispossession destroys traditional
entitlements and subsistence economies and estranges direct
producers from their means of labor, all those dislocated are not
absorbed in the new production process.108 This unabsorbed
labor may be “free,” but it is suspended between the shrinking
subsistence economy and the volatile formal markets. This
unabsorbed labor is the so-called surplus humanity and includes:

105 Agricultural employers “used one group after another, in a vast, repetitive cycle of
recruitment, employment, exploitation, and expulsion.” RICHARD A. WALKER, THE
CONQUEST OF BREAD: 150 YEARS OF AGRIBUSINESS IN CALIFORNIA 66–74 (2004). Since
the Civil War, California’s agricultural labor was recycled and displaced with the bulk
furnished serially by European immigrants, the Chinese, the Japanese, Filipinos,
Mexicans, and undocumented workers. Id. The cycle of labor rotation prevented workers
from securing better wages and more rights. The extra-economic measures to orchestrate
this cycle included the Chinese Exclusion Acts of 1882, 1892, and 1902, the 1917
Immigration Act, the bracero program, and the 1965 Immigration Reform Act. One
should include here other extra-economic developments like breakdown of the late Q’ing
era regime in China, the U.S. colonization of the Philippines, and the Mexican Revolution.
Id.
106 James McCarthy, Privatizing Conditions of Production: Trade Agreements as
Neoliberal Environmental Governance, 35 GEOFORUM 327, 330–32 (2004). McCarthy sees
this as a reinforcement of the neoliberal “regulatory takings” thesis “that completely
unencumbered, asocial private property is the norm and that the state must pay its
citizens for any exercise of its governance powers.” Id. Legal regimes of agreements, such
as NAFTA, inscribe private rights to surplus value by reinforcing public responsibility for
externalities generated by private appropriation. Id. One specific instance is global legal
regimes that force governments to reimburse capital interests for any costs that
environmental protection legislation may entail. Id. In this schema, environmental
protection is construed as a barrier to trade and penalized or struck down. Id.
107 Hartsock, supra note 101, at 176.
At play here is the enforcement of everexpanding intellectual property rights, depletion of global environmental commons,
privatization of public assets and services, and rollback of regulatory frameworks
governing the commons. HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM, supra note 79, at 146–48.
108 It is the foundation of Keynesian critique of classical economics that capitalism
does not produce any automatic tendency toward full employment. See JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY (1936); Thomas I.
Palley, From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism: Shifting Paradigms in Economics, in
NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL READER 20, 20–23 (Alfredo Saad-Filho & Deborah Johnston
eds., 2005) [hereinafter Palley, From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism]; SKIDELSKY, supra
note 14.
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People who have lost their subsistence outside the cash
economy . . . [who] are neither members of the economy, nor are they
capable of living, feeling and acting as they did before they lost the
support of a moral economy of subsistence. The new category of
economic cripples, thus defined, may in fact survive, but they do not
fully partake of the characteristics of homo economicus . . . any choice
between alternative satisfactions, which is implied in the concept of
economic need, is ruled out for them.109

What do those who cannot fully partake of the characteristics of
homo economicus do while suspended in the “imaginary waiting
room of history?”110 They tend to their subsistence needs as best
as they can by exchanging needs and capacities in networks of
barter, petty trade, and casual employment under the radar of
the law. The result is the emergence of a “need economy”111—a
zone outside the formal legal frames of contract and regulation,
signifying
“[i]nformalization
within
the
accumulation
economy.”112 This is the zone of the so-called informal economy.
While ostensibly “‘discovered’ in Africa in the early 1970s,”113 the
informal economy has been a perennial and enduring companion
of the formal capitalist economy.
Its emergence was
contemporaneous with the emergence of capitalism, and it
endures as capitalism persists. This is the context of the
emergence of a reserve army of labor—populations separated
from their non-capitalist means of subsistence but not integrated
into the productive circuits of wage labor on a stable basis. The
reserve army
arises out of the very nature of capitalist accumulation, and the
surplus population that constitutes the reserve army resides within
rather than outside the domain of the capitalist mode of production.
Unemployment and pauperism is the mirror image of
employment . . . —an appendage that is brought into being and
reproduced by the capitalist mode of production itself.114

Economists recognize that some measure of unemployment
plays a crucial role in a market economy.115 They speak of the
109

1997).

Ivan Illich, Need, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY 88, 94 (Wolfgang Sachs ed.,

110 DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND
HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE 8 (2000).
111 SANYAL, supra note 77, at 208–15.
112 Id. at 237.
113 Martha Alter Chen, Rethinking the Informal Economy: Linkages with the Formal
Economy and Formal Regulatory Environment 1–2 (Expert Grp. on Dev. Issues, Research
Paper No. 2005/10, 2005).
114 SANYAL, supra note 77, at 54.
115 The unemployed serve as an instrument of economic and political control over the
working class. They can serve as a backlog of strikebreakers during boom times, be
expelled during downturns, and then are reabsorbed in the next upward cycle. When a
capitalist economy grows rapidly and the reserve army of the unemployed is depleted,
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“natural rate” of unemployment, and its offspring—the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment,”116 and the “labor
force reserve.”117 The reserve army of labor helps to contain
significant wage increases and corresponding decline of profits.118
This dovetails with disciplinary uses of the poor and the
underclass in the market system.119 Formation of the reserve
army is often augmented by regional inequalities, racial divides
and rural-urban migration.120 Economists of all stripes recognize
that the question of employment is not simply a matter of a “free”
labor market, and that public policy plays a critical role in
calibrating and managing unemployment.121
Fiscal and
workers utilize their increased bargaining power to demand raises in wages and
distribution of income in their favor. Profits are put under pressure. This leads to
reduction in investment, a fall in employment, and a replenishment of the reserve army of
the unemployed. See Robert Pollin, The “Reserve Army of Labor” and the “Natural Rate of
Unemployment”: Can Marx, Kalecki, Friedman, and Wall Street All Be Wrong?, 30 REV.
OF RADICAL POL. ECON. 1, 4 (1998); Fred Magdoff & Harry Magdoff, Disposable Workers:
Today’s Reserve Army of Labor, 55 MONTHLY REV. 18, 21 (2004).
116 See WENDY CARLIN & DAVID SOSKICE, MACROECONOMICS AND THE WAGE BARGAIN:
A MODERN APPROACH TO EMPLOYMENT, INFLATION AND THE EXCHANGE RATE 5 (1990);
THE NATURAL RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT: REFLECTIONS ON 25 YEARS OF THE HYPOTHESIS
(Rod Cross ed., 1995).
117 The Labor Reserve Force is “an estimate of the deviation of the actual labor force
from the labor force that would be observed if the economy was continuously at full
employment.” Wayne Vroman, The Labor Force Reserve: A Re-estimate, 9 INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS: J. ECON. & SOC’Y 379, 379 (2008).
118 David M. Gordon, Six-Percent Unemployment Ain’t Natural: Demystifying the Idea
of a Rising “Natural Rate of Unemployment,” 54 SOC. RES. 223, 233–34 (1987); David M.
Gordon, The Un-Natural Rate of Unemployment: An Econometric Critique of the NAIRU
Hypothesis, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 117, 122 (1988).
119 See Herbert J. Gans, Positive Functions of the Undeserving Poor: Uses of the
Underclass in America, 22 POL. & SOC’Y. 269, 272–73 (1994); Miles S. Kimball, LaborMarket Dynamics When Unemployment is a Worker Discipline Device, 84 AM. ECON. REV.
1045, 1049 (1994).
120 See Doreen Massey, Regionalism: Some Current Issues, 6 CAP. & CLASS 106, 114
(1978); Richard Peet, Inequality and Poverty: A Marxist-Geographic Theory, 65 ANNALS
ASS’N. AM. GEOGRAPHERS 564, 567 (1975); Richard A. Walker, Two Sources of Uneven
Development Under Advanced Capitalism: Spatial Differentiation and Capital Mobility,
10 REV RADICAL POL. ECON. 28, 31 (1978). For mainstream theories of rural-urban
migration, see MICHAEL P. TODARO & STEPHEN C. SMITH, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 335–
37 (2006).
121 See KEYNES, supra note 108; Palley, From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism, supra
note 108. Michal Kalecki was the first to clearly state, in an appropriately titled chapter,
“Political Aspects of Full Employment,” that while a capitalist economy can be sustained
at full employment, this is the case only if challenges to capitalists’ social and political
hegemony can be contained by means of public policy. MICHAL KALECKI, SELECTED
ESSAYS ON THE DYNAMICS OF THE CAPITALIST ECONOMY 138–45 (1971). The “challenge”
was to devise a “solution,” even if a fascist one, to capitalism’s unemployment problem
whereby workers would have jobs, but they would not be permitted to exercise the
political and economic power that would otherwise accrue to them in a full-employment
economy. Pollin, supra note 115, at 5. Even Milton Friedman, the veritable advocate of
the “free market,” admitted that:
[B]y using the term “natural” rate of unemployment, I do not mean to suggest
that it is immutable and unchangeable. On the contrary, many of the market
characteristics that determine its level are man-made and policy-made. In the
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monetary policies are the primary instruments of this
calibration.122 Such instrumental use of policy does not mean
that concessions won by the working classes are not the results of
their struggles. For example, Keynesian welfare systems like the
New Deal in the United States were a response to the endemic
crises of capitalism and popular struggles for security of
employment and a better quality of life.123 As Polanyi eloquently
put it: “Laissez-faire was planned; planning was not.”124
Since the late 1970s, a neoliberal counter-revolution has
been afoot on a global scale. This has accelerated accumulation
by dispossession, enlarged the surplus army of labor, and
expanded the informal sectors of economies. Neoliberalism is an
ensemble of interconnected ideas and practices. It rests on a
theory of capitalist market fundamentalism—markets are
optimal and self-regulating, and if allowed to function without
restraint, they optimally serve all economic needs, efficiently
utilize all resources, and generate full employment for
everyone.125 It mandates tight fiscal and monetary policies,
unbridled private property rights, unencumbered markets, and
free trade.126 It is an ideology of the market and private interests
as opposed to state intervention to safeguard collective
United States, for example, legal minimum wage rates, the Walsh-Healy and
Davis-Bocon Acts, and the strength of labor unions all make the natural rate of
unemployment higher than it would otherwise be.
Milton Friedman, The Role of Monetary Policy, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 7, 9 (1968). In the
absence of state intervention, employment depended on the confidence of the capital,
which gave the latter
a powerful indirect control over Government policy: everything which may
shake the state of confidence must be carefully avoided because it would cause
an economic crisis. But once the Government learns the trick of increasing
employment by its own purchases, this powerful controlling device loses its
effectiveness.
KALECKI, supra note 121, at 139.
122 Calibration of unemployment has a parallel in the “[l]aw of [r]acial [t]hermodynamics,” in which law serves as a type of thermostat assuring that the system contains
just the right amount of racism: too much would be destabilizing; too little would forfeit
valuable pecuniary and psychic profits. Richard Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story:
Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95, 105–06 (1990).
123 POLANYI, supra note 82, at 23.
124 Id. at 147.
125 See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 64–65 (2007); SKIDELSKY,
supra note 14, at 105; Costas Lapavitsas, Mainstream Economics in the Neoliberal Era, in
NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL READER, supra note 108, at 30, 30–40; Gerard Dumenil &
Dominique Levy, The Neoliberal (Counter-) Revolution, in NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL
READER, supra note 108, at 9; William I. Robinson & Jerry Harris, Towards a Global
Ruling Class? Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class, 64 SCI. & SOC’Y 11,
41 (2000); DAVID HARVEY, THE ENIGMA OF CAPITAL AND THE CRISES OF CAPITALISM 10
(2010).
126 See Palley, From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism, supra note 108, at 25; Anwar
Shaikh, The Economic Mythology of Neoliberalism, in NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL
READER, supra note 108, at 41, 41–49.
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interests.127
It envisages the state as limited to minimal
executive and juridical functions that are necessary to secure
private property rights and to support freely functioning
markets.128 By extension, neoliberalism deems globalization of
free markets as the best way to extend these benefits to the
whole world.129
The neoliberal project aims to unfold a new social order
across the globe to reverse the setbacks that the economic power
and political hegemony of the wealth-owning classes had suffered
on account of Keynesian welfare in the West, socialism in
Eastern Europe, and nationalism in the global South.130
Neoliberalism makes increasing recourse to the law to displace
Keynesian welfare states through liberalization, deregulation,
and privatization, and uses the discipline of expanded markets to
remove barriers to accumulation that earlier democratic gains
had achieved.131 To secure unfettered rights to private property
and profits, it expands and deepens the logic of the market,
collapses the distinctions between culture and economy,
undermines state sovereignty and national autonomy, and links
local and global political economies to facilitate transnational
accumulation of capital.132 Through new regimes of trade,
finance, and property rights, the sovereignty of states transfers
to international institutions dominated by hegemonic states.133
127 David Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, 610 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 22, 22 (2007) [hereinafter Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction].
128 See Simon Clarke, The Neoliberal Theory of Society, in NEOLIBERALISM: A
CRITICAL READER, supra note 108, at 50, 50–59; Susanne MacGregor, The Welfare State
and Neoliberalism, in NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL READER, supra note 108, at 142–48.
129 See HA-JOON CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS: THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE AND THE
SECRET HISTORY OF CAPITALISM 28 (2008); HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER:
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 15 (2002); Matthew Sparke,
American Empire and Globalization: Postcolonial Speculations on Neocolonial Enframing,
24 SINGAPORE J. TROPICAL GEOGRAPHY 373, 379 (2003).
130 See DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE
BATTLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE THAT IS REMAKING THE MODERN
WORLD 10 (1998); Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, supra note 127, at 32.
131 For an articulation of the case for neoliberal global political economy and related
accounts of the law, see ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND
DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 237 (1984); Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The
Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 401 (2000).
132 See Boaventura De Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Towards a
Postmodern Conception of Law, 14 J. LAW & SOC’Y 279, 293–94 (1987); A. CLAIRE CUTLER,
PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE
GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 244–46 (2003); WILLIAM I. ROBINSON, A THEORY OF GLOBAL
CAPITALISM: PRODUCTION, CLASS, AND STATE IN A TRANSNATIONAL WORLD 101–03 (2004);
William I. Robinson, Capitalist Globalization and the Transnationalization of the State, in
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND GLOBALIZATION 210, 211–12 (Mark Rupert & Hazel Smith
eds., 2002).
133 See B. S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in
the Making, 15 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 1, 12–13 (2004). The exponential rise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in unilateral and multilateral forms has become an avenue to
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The hidden hand of the market continues to work in concert with
the iron fist of the state in the service of accumulation by
dispossession. Explosive growth of slums and slum-dwellers is a
direct result.
Neoliberalism does not displace the state as much as it
reformulates it and restructures its options.134 The neoliberal
project is to turn the “nation-state” into a “market-state,”135 one
with the primary agenda of facilitating global capital
accumulation unburdened by any legal regulations aimed at
assuring the welfare of citizens. Social formations in the global
South, situated in an asymmetrical relationship with global
capitalism, are a particular target of this project. The neoliberal

govern matters beyond international territorial boundaries by reaching deeply inside
domestic jurisdiction of states and enforcing the neoliberal agenda upon reluctant states
in the global South. The United States, for example, increasingly uses certification
mechanisms “to create law for other States and to monitor its observance, while the
United States itself remains unbound and unmonitored.” Nico Krisch, More Equal than
the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality and US Predominance in International Law, in UNITED
STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 135, 160–61 (Michael
Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003). This combines with “substantivism” in U.S. courts
where “a choice-of-law methodology . . . is to select the better law in any given case.”
Hannah L. Buxbaum, Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to Substance, 42 VA.
J. INT’L L. 931, 957 (2002). This results in “over-application of U.S. law” in international
disputes, and acts “as a lever of forcing convergence . . . outside the political process that
generally structures the harmonization movement.” Id. at 966, 972. See also JOHN
BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 475–77 (2000) (showing
how this has impacted the fields of banking, securities regulation, civil aviation, cyber
law). The multilateral form is exemplified by the WTO’s compulsory jurisdiction over
disputes that lie within its extensive regimes which opens the door for unilateral
prescriptions and measures related to trade and environmental policies of states in the
global South. See, e.g., World Trade Org., Report of the Appellate Body, United States—
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of
DSU by Malaysia (Oct. 22, 2001). See also B.S. Chimni, WTO and Environment:
Legitimisation of Unilateral Trade Sanctions, ECO. & POL. WEEKLY 133, 133–38 (2002)
[hereinafter Chimni, WTO and Environment]; B. S. Chimni, India and Ongoing Review of
WTO Dispute Settlement System, 37 ECON. & POL. WEEKLY 264, 265 (1999). Increasingly,
courts of the global South are deemed unsuitable for adjudicating claims against
multinational corporations, thus creating “new national frontiers of responsibility for the
conduct of global capital.” Upendra Baxi, Mass Torts, Multinational Enterprise Liability
and Private International Law, 276 RECUEIL DES COURS 297, 312 (1999). See also Hu
Zhenjie, Forum Non Conveniens: An Unjustified Doctrine, 48 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 143, 159
(2001); Michael Anderson, Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage: Is
Tort Law the Answer?, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 399, 402 (2002).
134 Many perceptive observers reject the “state shrinking and declining” argument as
political posturing of neo-liberals. In particular, they point to the expansion of the
coercive apparatuses of the state and the shift of the state from a managerial mode
befitting the Fordist era toward a neoliberal entrepreneurial mode. See, e.g., David
Harvey, From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban
Governance in Late Capitalism, 71 (B) GEOGRAFISKA ANNALER (SPECIAL ISSUE) 3, 9
(1989).
135 Anthony Carty, Marxism and International Law: Perspectives for the American
(Twenty-First) Century?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE LEFT: RE-EXAMINING MARXIST
LEGACIES 169, 170 (Susan Marks ed., 2008) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE
LEFT].
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regimes, with their bedrock principles of private property rights
and free trade, are a coercive mechanism to get states in the
global South to adopt neoliberal economic and social policy
frames conducive to global capital.136 The enabling mechanism is
“[t]he extension of the normative force of international standards
by the device of conditionality.”137 These regimes advance
particular understandings of development and poverty that
“disregard[] the social context of provision, the lived experiences
of the poor and dismiss[] and/or reinforce[] the way in which
deprivations are constituted.”138 The mandate is to privatize
public assets, roll back social services, and allow unbridled
mobility of capital.139 Now “[s]trait-jacketed within the global
logic of capital and market and the global regime of property
rights,” states in the global South “can no longer act as
developmental states and engage in management of poverty on
their own.”140 Instead, non-state actors representing interests of
global capital play an active role in designing legal orders that
circumscribe state sovereignty and autonomy.141 Mandates of
privatization make education, health, infrastructure, utilities,
housing, and a range of state enterprises available for private
appropriation.142 By its insistence on the rollback of the state,

136 These regimes include the WTO multilateral agreements including the Agreement
on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the Agreement on Trade Related
Investment Measures (TRIMS), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the
Agreement establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and
bilateral investment protection treaties (BITS). Together these regimes provide global
capital ease of entry and investment, protection from national performance requirements,
protection of expansive intellectual property rights, generous compensation in case of
expropriation, insurance against non-economic risks, and mechanisms to avoid national
laws and dispute resolution fora. See Chimni, WTO and Environment, supra note 133, at
138.
137 Vaughan Lowe, The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of
Norm Creation Changing?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 207, 212 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).
138 Richard Higgott & Heloise Weber, GATS in Context: Development, an Evolving lex
marcatoria and the Doha Agenda, 12 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 435, 436 (2005).
139 For a detailed account of how the interests of the global South are jeopardized by
concentration of finance capital and monetary regimes of the IMF, see JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 89–104 (2003).
140 SANYAL, supra note 77, at 77.
141 See generally GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE xiv–xv (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
The exponential expansion of international commercial arbitration has created a space for
private justice to serve global capital at the expense of the state. See Buxbaum, supra
note 133, at 938–39.
142 GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE, supra note 141, at 147–49, 159–60. See also
David A. McDonald, Environmental Racism and Neoliberal Disorder in South Africa, in
THE QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF
POLLUTION 255, 270–74 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 2005); Daniel R. Faber & Deborah
McCarthy, Neo-liberalism, Globalization and the Struggle for Ecological Democracy:
Linking Sustainability and Environmental Justice, in JUST SUSTAINABILITIES:
DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 38, 40, 51 (Julian Agyeman et al. eds., 2003).
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privatization becomes “[t]he [c]utting [e]dge of [a]ccumulation by
[d]ispossession.”143
Rapid urban growth triggered by globalized economic
circuits, along with diminished state capacities and resulting
civil strife, is the recipe for mushrooming slums in the global
South.144
The unprecedented urban expansion fueled by
deregulated financial capital produced another bout of “[c]reative
[d]estruction”145 where the marginalized and underprivileged
bear the brunt. Destruction of traditional rural economies,
restructuring of the agricultural sector, and deeper penetration
of market forces into rural societies, accelerated migration of
uprooted rural farmers to urban areas.146 As interests of global
finance capital took precedence over survival needs of the poor,
the impact on the vulnerable was quick, and the “main single
cause of increases in poverty and inequality during the 1980s and
1990s was the retreat of the state.”147 A United Nations Human
Development Report found that “[a]n unprecedented number of
countries saw development slide backwards in the 1990s. In
forty-six countries people are poorer today than in 1990. In
twenty-five countries more people go hungry today than a decade
ago.”148 While “burdens of survival” increased for all poor, “those
of women are even greater.”149

HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM, supra note 79, at 157–58.
For a detailed study of rapid urbanization over the last thirty years, see Frederick
van der Ploeg & Steven Poelhekke, Globalization and the Rise of Mega-Cities in the
Developing World, 1 CAMBRIDGE J. REGIONS, ECON. & SOC’Y. 477, 484–85 (2008).
145 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 82–84 (4th
ed. 1952).
146 See LORI ANN THRUPP WITH GILLES BERGERON & WILLIAM F. WATERS,
BITTERSWEET HARVESTS FOR GLOBAL SUPERMARKETS: CHALLENGES IN LATIN AMERICA’S
AGRICULTURAL EXPORT BOOM 1–5 (1995); JOHN MADELEY, HUNGRY FOR TRADE: HOW THE
POOR PAY FOR FREE TRADE 2–4 (2000); Terence J. Byres, Neoliberalism and Primitive
Accumulation in Less Developed Countries, in NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL READER, supra
note 108, at 83, 83–90; JAN BREMAN, FOOTLOOSE LABOUR: WORKING IN INDIA’S INFORMAL
ECONOMY 1–2 (1996); JAN BREMAN & ARVIND N. DAS, DOWN AND OUT: LABOURING UNDER
GLOBAL CAPITALISM 8 (2000); JAN BREMAN, WAGE HUNTERS AND GATHERERS: SEARCH FOR
WORK IN THE URBAN AND RURAL ECONOMY OF SOUTH GUJARAT 8–9 (1994); Carmen G.
Gonzalez, Genetically Modified Organisms and Justice: The International Environmental
Justice Implications of Biotechnology, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 583, 602 (2007).
147 UN-HABITAT, THE CHALLENGE OF SLUMS, supra note 10, at 43.
148 UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004 132
(2004).
149 See Sumati Nair & Preeti Kirbat with Sarah Sexton, A Decade After Cairo:
Women’s Health in a Free Market Economy, THE CORNER HOUSE (June 16, 2004),
http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/decade-after-cairo; U. Kalpagam, Coping with
Urban Poverty in India, 17 BULL. OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS 18 (1985); Fantu
Cheru, Debt, Adjustment and the Politics of Effective Response to HIV/AIDS in Africa,
23:2 THIRD WORLD Q. 299, 300–01 (2002); Jeemol Unni, Gender and Informality in Labor
Market in South Asia, 36:26 ECO. & POL. WKLY. 2360, 2360–63 (2001).
143
144
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Liberalization and deregulation of economies have also
accelerated urban occupational marginality, with the result that
those engaged in the informal sector now constitute two-fifths of
the economically active population of the developing countries.150
“The International Labour Organization estimates that informal
workers comprise over half the workforce in Latin America, over
70 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa and over 80 per cent in
India . . . .”151 Across the global South, mega-slums “have become
a dumping ground for a surplus population working in unskilled,
unprotected and low-wage informal service industries and
trade.”152 Rural and urban areas are being sutured in production
networks to accelerate siphoning of value.153 As outsourcing and
flexible production shrink the regulated formal economy, the
informal shadow economy becomes the only hope and source of
livelihood for the urban poor. The explosive expansion of the
unregulated informal sector, with its particular burdens on
women is “a direct function of liberalization.”154 Over the last
twenty years, both the informal economies and the number of
slum-dwellers have grown exponentially.155 In India, as in most
of the global South, significant employment growth has resulted
from subcontracting at a global scale and the use of casual or

150 UN-HABITAT, THE CHALLENGE OF SLUMS, supra note 10, at 46, 103–04 (2003).
Note here that many working in the informal sector are a hidden workforce of the formal
economy. Outsourcing and subcontracting networks enable the value created by the
informal sector to be funneled into the profit margins of the formal sector, while any
expectation of “upward mobility” in the informal sector remains a “myth inspire by
wishful thinking.” JAN BREMAN, THE LABOURING POOR IN INDIA: PATTERNS OF
EXPLOITATION, SUBORDINATION, AND EXCLUSION 173–74 (2003).
151 Jan Breman, Myth of the Global Safety Net, 59 NEW LEFT REV. 29, 29 (2009).
152 UN-HABITAT, THE CHALLENGE OF THE SLUMS, supra note 10, at 46. Women make
up ninety percent of the workers in Free Trade Zones, notorious for dismal working
conditions, low wages, and absence of workers’ rights. Id. at 40; WOMEN’S EDGE
COALITION, THE EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION ON JAMAICA’S POOR: AN ANALYSIS OF
AGRICULTURE AND SERVICES 31 (2004). Privatization and erasure of trade barriers led to
widespread deindustrialization and decimation of formal-sector jobs that traditionally
employed men. This has increasingly forced poor women into unregulated and low-paying
informal sector as pieceworkers, vendors, and providers of low-end services. See Caroline
O. N. Moser, Adjustment from Below: Low-Income Women, Time and the Triple Role in
Guayaquil, Ecuador, in ‘VIVA’: WOMEN AND POPULAR PROTEST IN LATIN AMERICA 173,
180–82 (Sarah A. Radcliffe & Sallie Westwood eds., 1993); Nazneen Kanji, Gender,
Poverty and Economic Adjustment in Harare, Zimbabwe, 7 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 37, 37,
39, 46–48 (1995).
153 See PETER J. TAYLOR, WORLD CITY NETWORK: A GLOBAL URBAN ANALYSIS 60–61
(2004); John Friedmann, Where We Stand: A Decade of World City Research, in WORLD
CITIES IN A WORLD–SYSTEM 21, 21, 33, 41 (Paul L. Knox & Peter J. Taylor eds., 1995);
Julie Skurski & Fernando Coronil, Country and City in a Postcolonial Landscape: Double
Discourse and the Geo-Politics of Truth in Latin America, in VIEWS BEYOND THE BORDER
COUNTRY: RAYMOND WILLIAMS AND CULTURAL POLITICS 231, 232–33 (Dennis L. Dworkin
& Leslie G. Roman eds., 1993).
154 UN-HABITAT, THE CHALLENGE OF SLUMS, supra note 10, at 40.
155 Id. at 6, 11.
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self-employed workers” in the informal sector.156 By curtailing
the already anemic role of the state in housing supply, neoliberal
policies have proven to be “an inevitable recipe for the mass
production of slums.”157 Analysts also find that “mega-slums
are . . . functional to neoliberal global capitalism and a product
not just of its turmoil but of its turmoil as organized by its
banking and financial market system.”158 As the warehouses of
workers of the informal sector, mega-slums facilitate “flexible
production,” a hallmark of neoliberal global economy.
If accumulation through dispossession—an enduring
ontological feature of capitalism—and its byproducts, the reserve
army of labor and the informal sector, produce and sustain
modern urban slums and slum-dwellers, what accounts for the
genesis of the spatial zones of their existence?
B. Cities of Capital and Liminal Zones
The spatial production of slums is a symbiotic companion of
urbanization under capitalism that has followed two models,
unplanned and planned growth, with differing measures of
overlap.
Historically, the unplanned urban growth model
unfolded parallel with industrialization and produced spaces
where labor and capital came together and goods and services
circulated rapidly. The process was far from orderly. The
“creative destruction” of capitalism forced rapid relocations of
habitation as rural populations moved to emerging centers of
extraction, manufacturing, and commerce.159 As urban centers
grew in a laissez faire regime, so did slums as the abode of the
destitute and the lumpenproletariate—the surplus humanity.160
Dublin,161 Manchester,162 London,163 and Naples164 furnished

156 Patralekha Chatterjee, Shadow Lives: Urban India’s Informal Economy, 5
HABITAT DEBATE 19, 20 (1999).
157 UN-HABITAT, THE CHALLENGE OF SLUMS, supra note 10, at 11.
158 Christopher Rude, The Role of Financial Discipline in Imperial Strategy, in THE
EMPIRE RELOADED 82, 105 n.10 (Leo Panitch & Colin Leys eds., 2004).
159 SCHUMPETER, supra note 145, at 83; Josef Gugler, Introduction, in CITIES IN THE
DEVELOPING WORLD 109, 109 (1997).
160 The first published definition of a slum in 1812 held it synonymous with “racket”
or “criminal activity.” JACINTA PRUNTY, DUBLIN SLUMS 1800–1925: A STUDY IN URBAN
GEOGRAPHY 2 (1998). By late nineteenth century, a slum was characterized as an area of
“dirty back streets, especially such streets as are inhabited by a squalid and criminal
population.” CARROLL D. WRIGHT, THE SLUMS OF BALTIMORE, CHICAGO, NEW YORK, AND
PHILADELPHIA 11–13 (1970). The definition adopted by the United Nations is restricted to
the “physical and legal characteristics of the settlement,” and eschews the more difficultto-measure “social dimensions.” UN-HABITAT, THE CHALLENGE OF SLUMS, supra note 10,
at 12–13.
161 See PRUNTY, supra note 160.
162 See STEVEN MARCUS, ENGELS, MANCHESTER, AND THE WORKING CLASS 3, 10–11,
184–85 (1974).
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early examples of this model of urban growth and the emergence
of slums.
Planned urbanization proves particularly attractive to
finance capital because this unavoidably state-sponsored and
debt-financed activity gives speculative capital security of
accumulation without getting directly involved with the
politically volatile terrain of industrial production. The first
prototype of planned urban development under capitalism was
furnished by the rebuilding of Paris in the 1850s and 1860s
under Georges-Eugene Haussmann.165 As a consequence of
state-sponsored urban reconstruction, Paris emerged as a center
of commerce and bourgeois life, and its emerging slums were
removed from the heart of the city to its outer rim.166 While
Haussmann’s designs “transform[ed] the capital city into the city
of capital,”167 they also demonstrated that “the root cause of
urban slumming seems to lie not in urban poverty but in urban
wealth.”168
The Haussmann model was replicated in the United States
after World War II; first in New York under Robert Moses, and
then in most metropolitan areas.169 While predominantly white
middle classes, ensconced in debt-financed suburbia, turned to
the pursuit of individual accumulation, protection of property,
and so-called family values, the darker under-classes and the
marginalized had to contend with removals, blighted inner-city
ghettos, and inhuman public housing projects. This phase of
finance capital’s deployment in urban reordering ended with the
property-market crash of 1973, and bankruptcy of New York City
in 1975, with global repercussions.170 The recipe of neoliberalism

163 GARETH STEDMAN JONES, OUTCAST LONDON: A STUDY IN THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN CLASSES IN VICTORIAN SOCIETY 209–10 (1971).
164 FRANK M. SNOWDEN, NAPLES IN THE TIME OF CHOLERA, 1884–1911 38–40 (1995).
165 For a detailed account, see MICHEL CARMONA, HAUSSMANN: HIS LIFE AND TIMES,
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN PARIS 149, 151–52, 155–56 (2002).
166 See id. at 9, 432–39; DAVID HARVEY, PARIS, CAPITAL OF MODERNITY 95–99 (2003).
167 Derek Gregory, Introduction: Troubling Geographies, in DAVID HARVEY: A
CRITICAL READER, supra note 101, at 13.
168 VERMA, supra note 55, at xix.
169 See Kenneth T. Jackson, Robert Moses and the Rise of New York: The Power
Broker in Perspective, in ROBERT MOSES AND THE MODERN CITY: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF NEW YORK 67, 70–71 (Hilary Ballon & Kenneth T. Jackson eds., 2007). In the process,
the scale and scope of urbanization was transformed by re-engineering not just existing
cities but whole metropolitan regions through suburbanization, highway systems, and
infrastructural transformations. Finance capital found a new outlet in public and private
debt, while urban geography and demography reconfigured class and race divides.
170 See ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW
YORK 615–16, 618–19, 795, 899–900, 902–04 (1974); Roger E. Alcaly & Helen Bodian,
New York’s Fiscal Crisis & the Economy, in THE FISCAL CRISIS OF AMERICAN CITIES 30,
30–33 (Roger E. Alcaly & David Mermelstein eds., 1977).
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emerged, in good measure, in response to this crisis of finance
capital.171
The reconfigurations of Paris and New York City furnished
two alternative models of urban development for the modern city
across the global North: the “donut-shaped” American cities, with
mostly poor people of color and immigrants “concentrated in
derelict cores and inner-city,” and “European ‘saucer’ cities, with
immigrant and unemployed populations marooned in high-rise
housing on urban outskirts.”172 In the global South, urban
growth has been a hybrid of both these models, turning urban
real estate into a high-profit sector “where political corruption,
capitalist development, and international finance [intersect].”173
Concentration of real-estate ownership and slum growth are the
dominant result.174 In this progression, “[t]he word ‘infrastructure’ is the new code word for the unceremonious clearance
of the fragile shelters of the poor.”175 As a result, fringes of megacities in the global South are “marked by unrelenting cycles of
settlement, eviction, and resettlement.”176 Counterintuitive as it
may be, the poor in most mega-cities of the global South have
come to dread high-profile international events like conferences,
festivals, and visits by dignitaries, as the attendant “clean-up”
and “beautification” drives target slums and slum-dwellers.177
Hiding poverty behind Potemkin-like facades tends to graduate
into sustained policy.178 Given these machinations, “[t]o date,
171 See WILLIAM K. TABB, THE LONG DEFAULT: NEW YORK CITY AND THE URBAN
FISCAL CRISIS 120, 122–24 (1982); Lapavitsas, supra note 125, at 30–33.
172 DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS, supra note 39, at 31.
173 Caglar Keyder, The Housing Market from Informal to Global, in ISTANBUL:
BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 143, 153 (Caglar Keyder ed., 1999).
174 For example, in sixteen Southeast Asian cities fifty-three percent of the land is
owned by the top five percent of landowners. HANS-DIETER EVERS & RÜDIGER KORFF,
SOUTHEAST ASIAN URBANISM: THE MEANING AND POWER OF SOCIAL SPACE 180 (2000). In
India, three-quarters of urban space is owned by “6% of urban households,” and ninetyone people control the majority of all vacant land in Mumbai. ROBERT-JAN BAKEN & JAN
VAN DER LINDEN, LAND DELIVERY FOR LOW INCOME GROUPS IN THIRD WORLD CITIES 13
(1992). For the drain on national savings, see KWADWO KONADU-AGYEMANG, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: GHANA’S
EXPERIENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO 1998 120–23 (2001); JEFFREY A. NEDOROSCIK,
CITY OF THE DEAD: A HISTORY OF CAIRO’S CEMETERY COMMUNITIES 42 (1997).
175 JEREMY SEABROOK, IN THE CITIES OF THE SOUTH: SCENES FROM A DEVELOPING
WORLD 267 (1996).
176 Ananya Roy, The Gentleman’s City: Urban Informality in the Calcutta of New
Communism, in URBAN INFORMALITY: TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES FROM THE MIDDLE
EAST, LATIN AMERICA, AND SOUTH ASIA 147, 159 (Ananya Roy & Nezar AlSayyad eds.,
2004) [hereinafter URBAN INFORMALITY].
177 See BEN OMIYI, THE CITY OF LAGOS: TEN SHORT ESSAYS 48 (1995); Erhard Berner,
Poverty Alleviation and the Eviction of the Poorest, 24 INT’L J. URB. & REG’L RES. 557, 559
(2000).
178 See ANN-MARIE BROUDEHOUX, THE MAKING AND SELLING OF POST-MAO BEIJING
162 (2004); MONIQUE SKIDMORE, KARAOKE FASCISM: BURMA AND THE POLITICS OF FEAR
84–85, 159–60 (2004).
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states have been far more effective in the destruction of mass
housing than in its construction.”179
Parallel with the neoliberal reordering of global production
and accumulation, cities are becoming a primary arena of the
convergence between the domains of economy and culture.180
Accordingly, a confluence of reconfiguration of urban space and
commodification of symbolic forms is underway.181 A remarkable
feature of post-Fordist production systems is the increasing
significance of production and consumption of cultural
products.182
In the new economic geography of capital
accumulation, Fordist mass production is increasingly moved to
low wage areas, usually away from urban centers, both globally
and nationally.183 As a result, the city becomes exclusively a zone
of the service and consumption economy, and urban space itself
turns into a cultural commodity to be consumed along market
principles.184 Skills suitable for the service sector and/or the
capacity to consume what this space has to offer become the only
grounds for eligibility to be in the city. Deindustrialization and
flight of the ineligible often leave in their wake “dead zones” that
become “developers’ utopias” or “privatopias.”185 The ineligible
who choose to stay back are eventually confined to the informal
economy and deprived of secure shelter. The commodification of
urban space, with culture and aesthetics at a premium,
disciplines the ineligible and the dispossessed through a range of
legal and architectural measures. These include “secure
architecture,” “zero tolerance policing,” and “preemptive crime
control,” in the neoliberal “post-justice” city.186
Berner, Learning from Informal Markets, supra note 38, at 295.
For transformative impacts of neoliberal globalization on urban spaces around the
world, see Swapna Banerjee-Guha, Introduction, in ACCUMULATION BY DISPOSSESSION:
TRANSFORMATIVE CITIES IN THE NEW GLOBAL ORDER 1, 1–5 (Swapna Banerjee-Guha ed.,
2010) [hereinafter ACCUMULATION BY DISPOSSESSION]; William Sites, Primitive
Globalization? State and Locale in Neoliberal Global Engagement, 18 SOC. THEORY 121,
128 (2000).
181 For a thoughtful survey, see generally Allen J. Scott, Capitalism, Cities, and the
Production of Symbolic Forms, 26 TRANSACTIONS OF THE INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 11
(2001), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1475-5661.00003/abstract.
182 Id. at 16.
183 Douglas S. Massey, Social Structure, Household Strategies, and the Cumulative
Causation of Migration, 56 POPULATION INDEX 3, 14–17 (1990), available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3644185.
184 See generally Timothy A. Gibson, Selling City Living: Urban Branding
Campaigns, Class Power and the Civic Good, 8 INT’L J. CULTURAL STUD. 259 (2005).
185 Gordon MacLeod et al., Negotiating the Contemporary City: Introduction, 40 URB.
STUD. 1655, 1656 (2003) (citation omitted). See also Henry W. McGee, Jr., Seattle's
Central District, 1990–2006: Integration of Displacement?, 39 URB. LAW. 167, 169–71
(2007).
186 See Don Mitchell, Postmodern Geographical Praxis? The Postmodern Impulse and
the War Against Homeless People in the ‘Post-justice’ City, in POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHY:
THEORY AND PRAXIS 57, 77, 82 (Claudio Minca ed., 2001); Don Mitchell, The Annihilation
179
180
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In the midst of all of this, urban groups do manage to
contrive cultural, economic, and political “spaces of escape,” or
“counter spaces.”187
Farmers markets, alternative lifestyle
enclaves, and the “underground economy” are some examples of
this phenomenon that engender “new identities and practices
that disturb established histories.”188 The resistive mode of these
counter spaces can and does take overt political forms as
demonstrated by the anti-WTO protests in Seattle in 1999, and
replicated in many major cities around the world.189 This
phenomenon is of particular significance for policy and
engagement options related to slums and slum dwellers.
Having laid out a theoretical framework of the historical
evolution of urban slums, we turn to the issue of slums and slumdwellers in India.
III. SLUMS, COLONIALISM, AND POSTCOLONIALITY
A. The Colonial Legacy
The roots of urban slums in the global South go back to
colonial policies aimed at reconfiguring existing cities, or
establishing new ones, in forms suitable for assertion of control
and incorporation of selected sections of the native society into
administrative and productive ensembles sutured with the
economies of empire.190
In India, British colonial designs

of Space by Law: The Roots and Implications of Anti-Homeless Laws in the United States,
29 ANTIPODE 303, 305–06, 316–17 (1997); Jamie Peck, Geography and Public Policy:
Mapping the Penal State, 27 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 222, 225, 228 (2003) (citation
omitted); MacLeod et al., supra note 185, at 1665.
187 MacLeod, et al., supra note 185, at 1657.
188 James Holston, Spaces of Insurgent Citizenship (1995), reprinted in MAKING THE
INVISIBLE VISIBLE: A MULTICULTURAL PLANNING HISTORY 37, 48 (Leonie Sandercock ed.,
1998). See also SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, OFF THE BOOKS: THE UNDERGROUND
ECONOMY OF THE URBAN POOR 17 (2006); Regina Austin, “An Honest Living”: Street
Vendors, Municipal Regulation, and the Black Public Sphere, 103 YALE L.J. 2119, 2120–
23 (1994). See generally Regina Austin, “A Nation of Thieves”: Securing Black People’s
Right to Shop and to Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 147 (1994).
189 See, e.g., NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO: NO SPACE, NO CHOICE, NO JOBS (10th ed.,
2009); GLOBALIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF RESISTANCE 3 (Barry K. Gills ed., 2000);
DAVID FEATHERSTONE, RESISTANCE, SPACE AND POLITICAL IDENTITIES: THE MAKING OF
COUNTER–GLOBAL NETWORKS 2, 121 (2008).
190 For fruitful engagements with the question, see Ronald J. Horvath, In Search of a
Theory of Urbanization: Notes on the Colonial City, 5 E. LAKES GEOGRAPHER 69, 75
(1969); ANTHONY D. KING, COLONIAL URBAN DEVELOPMENT: CULTURE, SOCIAL POWER,
AND ENVIRONMENT 281–84 (1976); ANTHONY D. KING, URBANISM, COLONIALISM, AND THE
WORLD-ECONOMY: CULTURAL AND SPATIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE WORLD URBAN SYSTEM
(1990); JAN MORRIS, STONES OF EMPIRE: THE BUILDINGS OF BRITISH INDIA 62–71 (1994).
It is useful to note here that ancient cities of India dating 2500 B.C., particularly those in
the Indus Valley, show detailed and functional urban planning including elaborate
sanitation systems. See VINCENT A. SMITH, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF INDIA 28–32
(Percival Spear ed., 3rd ed. 1958).
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reconfigured selected urban areas to serve these ends.191 A
defining feature of the designed colonial cities was the spatial
divide between the centers of gravity of colonial presence and the
native quarters. Zoning and institutionalized governance whose
jurisdiction is coextensive with the territory of the city, the
hallmarks of a modern city, were but rarely extended to the
native quarters.192 Natives not recruited into colonial security,
administrative, and commercial regimes, remained at or beyond
the spatial and social margins of reconfigured urban areas.193
Colonizers’ fears of racial contamination, dilution of imagined
tribal and ethnic divides, and the threat of anti-colonial
solidarities resulted in restrictions on urban land ownership,
pass laws, vagrancy ordinances, criminalization of urban
migration, and racially zoned areas.194 When vigorously enforced
encroachment laws targeted squatting and street vending,
municipal authorities removed so-called “plague spots” from
better residential and commercial areas, thereby enforcing
restrictive zoning around areas where the colonizers and
gradually enfranchised native elites lived.195 A policy of neglect
toward even minimal water and sanitation needs of native
neighborhoods graduated into a de facto housing policy of
reliance on local elites who built overcrowded and unsanitary,
but highly profitable, tenements that still house a bulk of urban
dwellers.196 For the story of Dharavi, it is important to note that
Mumbai, historically a coastal fishing village, emerged as an
urban center under colonial rule; a development rooted in the
colonial control of opium production and trade.197 The new city
was carefully segregated to separate colonial masters, the native

191 See generally MARIAM DOSSAL, IMPERIAL DESIGNS AND INDIAN REALITIES: THE
PLANNING OF BOMBAY CITY, 1845–1875 (1991); WILLIAM J. GLOVER, MAKING LAHORE
MODERN: CONSTRUCTING AND IMAGINING A COLONIAL CITY (2008); NARAYANI GUPTA,
DELHI BETWEEN TWO EMPIRES, 1830–1931 (1981); YASMIN LARI & MIHAIL S. LARI, THE
DUAL CITY: KARACHI DURING THE RAJ 58 (1996).
192 LARI & LARI, supra note 191, at 60–68 (1996).
193 KING, supra note 190, at 37–39.
194 See, e.g., Swati Chattopadhyay, Blurring Boundaries: The Limits of “White Town”
in Colonial Calcutta, 59 J. SOC’Y ARCHITECTURAL HISTORIANS 154, 157, 172–73 (2000);
Narayani Gupta, Military Security and Urban Development: A Case Study of Delhi 1857–
1912, 5 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 61, 64–66 (1971); A. J. Christopher, Urban Segregation Levels
in the British Overseas Empire and Its Successors, in the Twentieth Century, 17
TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 95, 95–102 (1992).
195 See NANDINI GOOPTU, THE POLITICS OF THE URBAN POOR IN EARLY TWENTIETHCENTURY INDIA 74, 82–88 (2001).
196 See id. at 91–102.
197 See AMAR FAROOQUI, OPIUM CITY: THE MAKING OF EARLY VICTORIAN BOMBAY xi–
xiii (2006).
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rich and emerging middle classes, and the dispossessed
natives.198
B. Postcolonial Developmental State
After decolonization in the global South, postcolonial elites
inherited and often reinforced the physical footprints and
exclusionary geographies of segregated colonial cities.199 They
became the custodians of the colonial designs of urban exclusion
and social divides, and rushed to embrace trickle-down
development models that were ubiquitous in the 1950s and
1960s, whereby “the poor were denied a place in civic life and
urban culture, and were seen as an impediment to progress and
betterment of society.”200 Postcolonial growth of slums in India
was first triggered by the greatest mass migration in recorded
history following the partition of colonial India, which drove
millions into urban slums of India.201 The slum-based refugees
quickly became dependent on corrupt political party machines,
and slum growth became notoriously synchronized with election
cycles.202 Subsequently, the fate of the slums reflected different
development models put in place and cycles of growth and
stagnation.
In India, as elsewhere, economic development entails
reallocation of resources and is thus a “conflictual process.”203
The critical role of the state in allocating and channeling
resources sets the parameters of political economy.204 In India,
the national capitalists, the rich farmers, and the bureaucracy,
instituted a “one-party democracy” under the umbrella of the
Congress Party,205 and claimed the moral high ground of national
198 Navtej Nainan, Building Boomers and Fragmentation of Space in Mumbai, 45
ECON. & POL. WKLY. 29, 29–32 (2008).
199 A study of the slums of Mumbai finds that “the inequalities that defined Bombay
as a colonial port town have continued. Investment is always available to beautify the
already well-endowed parts of the city. But there is no money to provide even basic
services to the poorer areas.” SHARMA, supra note 37, at 8.
200 GOOPTU, supra note 195, at 421.
201 Over seventeen million migrated as a result of the partition. Mumbai’s population
that had grown at less than two percent in the last decades of colonial rule, doubled in
less than ten years after partition. Sujata Patel, Bombay’s Urban Predicament, in
BOMBAY: METAPHOR FOR MODERN INDIA XIII, XVI (Sujata Patel & Alice Thornr eds., 1995).
See also OSKAR VERKAAIK, MIGRANTS AND MILITANTS: FUN AND URBAN VIOLENCE IN
PAKISTAN 1–2 (2004).
202 BAKEN & VAN DER LINDEN, supra note 174, at 30–31.
203 MATTHEW
MCCARTNEY, INDIA—THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH,
STAGNATION AND THE STATE, 1951–2007 5 (2009). See also ATUL KOHLI, DEMOCRACY AND
DISCONTENT: INDIA’S GROWING CRISIS OF GOVERNABILITY 25–26 (1990); BOB ROWTHORN,
CAPITALISM, CONFLICT AND INFLATION: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 148 (1980).
204 MCCARTNEY, supra note 203, at 22–23.
205 STANLEY A. KOCHNANEK, THE CONGRESS PARTY OF INDIA: THE DYNAMICS OF ONEPARTY DEMOCRACY 319–39 (1968).
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interest, modernity, equity, justice, and efficiency.206 Central
planning and an industrial policy designed by a statistician,
Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis, aimed at rapid industrialization
through import-substitution, and state control of heavy industry,
banking, and infrastructure. 207 The prime object was “to contain
class conflict within manageable dimensions, [and] to control and
manipulate the many dispersed power relations in society to
further as best as possible the thrust towards accumulation.”208
The Nehruvite consensus sutured development with welfare.
Poverty-alleviation was projected as the central concern of the
state; indeed, its raison d’etre.209 A permanent bureaucracy, the
inherited “steel frame” of colonial rule, was deployed to lead this
project.210
This was the phase when the development model of
modernization by diffusion enjoyed hegemony.211 Even though
206 For details, see Sudipta Kaviraj, A Critique of the Passive Revolution, 23 ECON. &
POL. WKLY. 2429, 2431–36 (1988); PRANAB BARDHAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA 33–34 (1984); ACHIN VANAIK, THE PAINFUL TRANSITION:
BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACY IN INDIA 3 (1990); LOYD I. RUDOLPH & SUSANNE HOEBER.
RUDOLPH, IN PURSUIT OF LAKSHMI: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INDIAN STATE 127–
29 (1987).
207 C. P. Chandrasekhar, Aspects of Growth and Structural Change in Indian
Industry, in INDUSTRIAL GROWTH AND STAGNATION: THE DEBATE IN INDIA 318, 322–23
(Deepak Nayyar ed., 1994); M. Bronfenbrenner, A Simplified Mahalanobis Development
Model, 9 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 45, 45–46 (1960).
208 PARTHA CHATTERJEE, Development Planning and the Indian State, in STATE AND
POLITICS IN INDIA 270, 290 (1997).
209 The Indian Constitution enshrined the national project of a welfare state charged
with the protection of a wide array of political, social, and economic rights. Attention to
the basic needs of the poor, even when deficient on account of limited resources, helped to
create a political alliance between the governing elites and the poor among the
predominantly rural population. This made for “one-party democracy” and uninterrupted
governance by the Congress Party for over twenty-five years with the help of an inherited
colonial bureaucratic frame. RUDOLPH & RUDOLPH, supra note 206, at 130–32. The
political alliance broke down as the development model collapsed in the 1970s. Id. See
also BARDHAN, supra note 206, at 38–39.; VANAIK, supra note 206, at 62–63; RAJNI
KOTHARI, STATE AGAINST DEMOCRACY: IN SEARCH OF HUMANE GOVERNANCE 23–25, 74
(1988); O.P. DWIVEDI & R. B. JAIN, INDIA’S ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 215–16 (1985); B. B.
MISRA, GOVERNMENT AND BUREAUCRACY IN INDIA 1947–1976 37–38 (1986).
210 RUDOLPH & RUDOLPH, supra note 206, at 2–3.
211 Viewing societies through the binary lens of modern/traditional, this model
prescribed diffusion of modern technologies, laws, and ways of life as the panacea for
underdevelopment. The resulting economic policies, crafted under the watchful eyes of
experts from the global North, focused on growth of leading sectors of the economy whose
trickle-down effect was supposed to, in time, take care of lagging sectors and poverty. The
capacity for effective control rather than representative nature of the state was deemed
the yardstick of an appropriate political order. See W.W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF
ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 26–28 (1962); BRUCE HERRICK &
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 68 (1983). For critiques of this
model, see SAMIR AMIN, UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT: AN ESSAY ON THE SOCIAL FORMATIONS
OF PERIPHERAL CAPITALISM 10 (Brian Pearce trans., 1976) (1973); SUSAN J.
BODENHEIMER, THE IDEOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENTALISM: THE AMERICAN PARADIGM–
SURROGATE FOR LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES 24–25 (1971); ARTURO ESCOBAR,
ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD 83–85
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tempered by nationalism and a commitment to a “mixedeconomy,” the result was a bloated state apparatus presiding
over top-down economic growth in concert with international aid
agencies.212 The pervasive nationalist promises of the 1950s and
1960s to rebuild slums and create new housing faltered quickly,
parallel with the early demise of plans to create an autonomous
economy resistant to global economic pressures.213 While megaprojects like hydroelectric dams, atomic energy, and heavy
industry thrived, education, health, and housing needs of the
poor and the marginalized got short shrift.214 Often this development model led directly to the swelling of the ranks of the
urban poor. For example, over fifty-six million, mostly “the
poorest of the poor,” have been displaced in India by large hydroelectric dams.215 By the late 1970s, any lingering faith in the
development through state-led growth was shattered by poor
growth rates, only marginal decline in poverty, and barely
appreciable improvements in the quality of life.216 As the nationalist development project derailed and took down with it the
Nehruvite consensus, populist adjustments were attempted.
Gharibi hatao (eliminate poverty), the slogan fashioned by Indira
Gandhi in 1975 as a rationale for declaring Emergency, was an
acknowledgement that benefits of development and growth had
not “trickled down” and that poverty needed to be tackled
through specific, dedicated programs.217 Indira Gandhi’s Emergency symbolized “the definitive demise of the Nehruvian
project . . . [and] the terminal crisis of the Nehruvian state.”218

(1995). This model of development was an extension of colonial designs of social
development. See VINAY GIDWANI, CAPITAL, INTERRUPTED: AGRARIAN DEVELOPMENT AND
THE POLITICS OF WORK IN INDIA 84 (2008). It was in this context that the “law and
development” project emerged as part of the ensemble of prescribed legal designs far
removed from the culture, practices and material needs of the vast populations of the
global South. See JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND
FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA 7–9 (1980); Laura Nader, Promise or Plunder? A Past and
Future Look at Law and Development, 7 GLOBAL JURIST 1, 1–3 (2007). See generally Issa
G. Shivji, Law’s Empire and Empire’s Lawlessness: Beyond Anglo-American Law, 1 SOC.
JUST. & GLOBAL DEV. J. (2003).
212 GIDWANI, supra note 211, at 84.
213 See GEORGE ROSEN, WESTERN ECONOMISTS AND EASTERN SOCIETIES: AGENTS OF
CHANGE IN SOUTH ASIA 1950–1970 15, 227 (1985).
214 See ROBERT-JAN BAKEN, PLOTTING, SQUATTING, PUBLIC PURPOSE AND POLITICS:
LAND MARKET DEVELOPMENT, LOW INCOME HOUSING AND PUBLIC INTERVENTION IN INDIA
56–59, 305–10 (2003).
215 AMITAVA KUMAR, BOMBAY, LONDON, NEW YORK 52 (2002).
216 See Surendra J. Patel, Goals of Planning in the Seventies: A Note, 6 ECON. & POL.
WKLY. 1565, 1567–68 (1971).
217 See James P. Grant, Development: The End of Trickle Down?, 12 FOREIGN POL’Y
43, 43–44 (1973), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1148094; Vijay Prashad,
Emergency Assessments, 24 SOC. SCIENTIST 36, 38, 53 (1996).
218 Ajaz
Ahmad,
Debating
the
Current
Conjuncture,
in
CONTESTED
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 35, at 34, 43–45.
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However, declining growth rates, escalating fiscal crisis of the
state, and fragmentation of the legitimacy of political elites ruled
out the implementation of refurbished welfare policies.
As the development project faltered in India, as elsewhere in
the global South, the World Bank started to question the
accumulation- and growth-centric approaches to development
and turned toward alleviation of poverty as a goal distinct from
growth.219 Funding patterns were recalibrated to target agriculture, education, infrastructure, and low-cost housing.220 In
the new approach, the developmental state was to address
poverty by direct intervention.221 Kalyan Sanyal argues that as a
result there emerged “governmentalization” of the state in
India—management of the social body through direct intervention of the state in terms of rationally-designed efficient
technologies of administration aimed at promoting the welfare of
society.222 This was combined with the rise of “entitlements”—a
relation connecting one set of ownership to another through
certain rules of legitimacy.223 In the sixth Five Year Plan of
1980, “a number of poverty eradication measures were introduced.”224 They proved easier to design than to implement.
Sanyal claims that the blows of primitive accumulation were
softened during this period by the emergence of “welfarist
governmentality.”225 He acknowledges, however, the exponential
growth of the informal sector and the fact that formal and
informal economies “are locked in an asymmetric relation . . . of
dominance and subordination,” which leaves the “need economy”

219 See ROBERT L. AYRES, BANKING ON THE POOR: THE WORLD BANK AND WORLD
POVERTY 1 (1983).
220 See id. The new approach
posed some serious challenges to the prevalent Bank ideology. The result was
a somewhat ambiguous pastiche of concepts and approaches. . . . The
result . . . was a rather tenuous gluing together of some markedly divergent
approaches. Poverty-oriented emphasis sometimes seemed to have been
pasted on the prevalent ideology, without, however, altering its fundamental
slant.
Id. at 75.
221 SANYAL, supra note 77, at 170.
222 Id. at 170–73. Sanyal’s claim is that “in a simultaneous process, the dispossessed
are rehabilitated through the ‘pastoral functions’ of international organizations and the
development state, [and that] governmentality is actively engaged in forming a needeconomy be reversing the process of dispossession.” Id. at 220.
223 Id. at 178. Sanyal deploys Amartya Sen’s notions of entitlement that “refer to a
set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a society using the
totality of rights and opportunities.” AMARTYA SEN, RESOURCES, VALUES AND
DEVELOPMENT 497 (1984).
224 SUKHAMOY CHAKRAVARTY, DEVELOPMENT PLANNING: THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 36
(1987).
225 SANYAL, supra note 77, at 221.
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subordinate to the “accumulation-economy.”226 In his rush to
apply the Foucauldian construct to conditions of postcoloniality,227 Sanyal elides the fact that at this stage the “oneparty democracy” had disintegrated, and that the collapse of the
developmentalist state combined with a backlash against
proposed aggressive affirmative action had produced a revolt by
the middle classes and religious fundamentalism in India.228 The
reordering of political power and deepening fiscal crisis of the
state precluded any sustained attack on poverty. None of this
was good news for the swelling ranks of the urban poor and their
housing needs.
In India, as the postcolonial state entrenched itself, state
largess focused on housing members of bureaucracies, the
military, and the emerging professional class, while lip-service
was paid to the needs of the marginalized.229 In the 1970s, for
example, public authorities promised the urban poor new homes
and jobs in a modern twin-city opposite the Mumbai peninsula.230
However, while local residents of the new site were displaced, the
bulk of new housing went to civil servants and professionals.231
A perceptive commentary noted:
Ultimately, the grand conception of urban transformation was
whittled down and domesticated to meet the immediate interests of
the propertied classes. Instead of unfolding as idealistic projects of
social regeneration, the town planning schemes evolved as avenues to
further the interests and aspirations of the propertied and the
instrument of the growing marginalization of the poor. The war
against slums came dangerously close to being a battle to control the
settlement and habitation of the poor, and indeed an offensive against
the poor themselves.232

Id. at 220–21.
See MICHEL FOUCAULT, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN
GOVERNMENTALITY 87, 87–104 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991).
228 MANDAL
COMMISSION, RESERVATION FOR BACKWARD CLASSES: MANDAL
COMMISSION REPORT OF THE BACKWARD CLASSES COMMISSION 255 (1980) (recommending
that the quota for “Scheduled Castes and Tribes” and “Other Backward Classes” in public
employment and universities be increased from 27% to 49.5%).
Steps toward
implementation of these recommendations triggered a backlash. See NEVEDITA MENON &
ADITYA NIGAM, POWER AND CONTESTATION: INDIA SINCE 1989 15–16 (2007); Jeemol Unni,
Contours of Conflict and Coalition: Rise of the Intermediate Classes and Castes, in
CONTESTED TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 35, at 257; Pradip Kumar Datta, Hindutva
and the Re-Formation of the Indian Middle-Class Subject, in CONTESTED
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 35, at 270–71.
229 DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS, supra note 39, at 66.
230 Id. at 65–66.
231 Id.; JACQUEMIN, supra note 29, at 196–97 (indicating that the development of the
New Bombay area led to the loss of land, jobs, and incomes to the majority of local
residents, which explained why the new housing went to civil servants and professionals).
232 GOOPTU, supra note 195, at 84.
226
227

Do Not Delete

36

12/12/2010 7:34 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 14:1

C. The Neoliberal Reordering
In this general context, India took a turn to neoliberal
restructuring in the early 1990s, ushering in an era of
“liberalisation-privatisation-globalisation,”233 marking “a fundamental transformation of India’s economic strategy.”234 It was
envisaged that the economy “would be transformed in its basic
orientation in a matter of a few years.”235 This entailed rapidly
instituted deregulation, privatization, curtailment of food subsidies, cost recovery of public services, and liberalization of
trade.236 Indian markets were opened up to an influx of capital,
goods, and services. Foreign capital investment soared, as did
the stock market and the real estate market. High, though
doubtful, growth rates, based largely on performance of the
service sector were sustained.237 A thorough empirical study
finds that these rates of growth are not associated with
liberalization of the domestic economy and international trade,
but are a case of sustained growth that began a decade earlier.238
This presents “an important counterexample to the dominant
orthodoxy.”239 In addition, accelerated remittances by skilled and
unskilled labor buoyed foreign exchange reserves.
With the neoliberal turn in public policies, corporate capital
assumed political and moral sway over the social formation. This
hegemony was deployed to influence governmental decisions “not
through electoral mobilisation of political parties and movements
but largely through the bureaucratic-managerial class, the
increasingly influential print and visual media, and the judiciary
and other independent regulatory bodies.”240 The bureaucraticmanagerial class now stands subordinated to corporate capital.241
The latter is now in a position to set the terms of the political
field to which other social groups are constrained to respond.
233 Mary E. John & Satish Deshpande, Theorising the Present: Problems and
Possibilities, 43 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 83, 84 (2008). See also Kamal Nayan Kabra, Indian
Planning and Liberalisation, 31 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2740, 2740–41 (1996); Kuldeep
Mathur, Neo-liberal Agenda and Study of Institutions, 1 REV. OF DEV. & CHANGE 167, 175
(1996).
234 Ashutosh Varshney, Mass Politics or Elite Politics? India’s Economic Reforms in
Comparative Perspective, in INDIA IN THE ERA OF ECONOMIC REFORMS 222, 230 (Jeffrey D.
Sachs et al. eds., 1999).
235 Jeffrey Sachs et al., Introduction, in INDIA IN THE ERA OF ECONOMIC REFORMS,
supra note 234, at 1, 13.
236 Id. at 13–16.
237 Prabhat Patnaik, The Meaning of Contemporary Globalization, in CONTESTED
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 35, at 7.
238 MCCARTNEY, supra note 203, at 236.
239 Id. at 235.
240 Partha Chatterjee, Democracy and Economic Transformation in India, 43 ECON. &
POL. WKLY. 53, 57 (2008).
241 Id. at 57–58.
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The well-heeled took the position that “our second independence
had arrived: we were going to be free from a rapacious and
domineering state.”242 The market emerged as the new messiah,
and the welfare and development state went into a decisive
retreat. Macroeconomic policy became obsessed with the specter
of fiscal deficits.243 The question of poverty and the poor went
through a fundamental reframing. Any expressions of the state’s
concern for the poor under the “current versions are clearly
framed in minimalist and palliative terms . . . politically dictated
afterthoughts forced on to the agenda by electoral
compulsions.”244
During the same time, the number of paupers in the country
increased by fifty-six million, and between 1991 and 1994 the
deregulated price for food grain grew by fifty-eight percent.245
Real wages of the poorest quintile in Delhi fell for the first time
since 1947.246 The assigned reasons are the increased cost and
increased use of privatized services, reduced access to subsidized
food supplies, and a simultaneous shift away from formal sector
waged work to self-employment and casual labor in the informal
sector.247 The impact on slum-dwellers has been particularly
acute.248 In Bangalore, the storied capital of the neoliberal hightech boom, slums grew twice as fast as the general population
with an estimated two million poor squatting in one thousand
filthy slums, and the city’s periphery became “the dumping
ground for those urban residents whose labour is wanted in the
urban economy, but whose visual presence should be reduced as
much as possible.”249 Urban dwellers are not the only
“beneficiaries” of the neo-liberal “Shining India.” Between 1997
and 2007, as WTO-mandated agricultural policies took root,
182,936 Indian farmers committed suicide; growing debt burden

242 GURCHARAN DAS, INDIA UNBOUND: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE GLOBAL
INFORMATION AGE xi (2002).
243 The high watermark of this obsession was the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget
Management Act of 2003, which binds the government to reduce the revenue deficit to
zero by 2009–2010. Mihir Shah, Structures of Power in Indian Society: A Response, 43
ECON. & POL. WKLY. 78, 80 (2008).
244 John & Deshpande, supra note 233.
245 DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS, supra note 39, at 171; SEABROOK, supra note 175, at 46.
246 Gautam Bhan, “This Is No Longer the City I Once Knew”: Evictions, the Urban
Poor and the Right to the City in Millennial Delhi, 21 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 127, 136
(2009).
247 Id.
248 See generally KALYANI MENON-SEN & GAUTAM BHAN, SWEPT OFF THE MAP:
SURVIVING EVICTION AND RESETTLEMENT IN DELHI (2008); A. Iyer and Gita Sen, Health
Sector Changes and Health Equity in the 1990s in India, in HEALTH AND EQUITY:
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES (2000). See also Minar Pimple & Madhuri Kamat, Struggle
for People’s Housing, 59 INDIAN J. SOCIAL WORK 357, 358–59 (1999).
249 Schenk-Sandberg, supra note 46, at 131.
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and the switch to cash-crops are cited as the primary reasons.250
In 2007, the Planning Commission candidly admitted that WTO
“compulsions” had induced removal of tariffs and subsidies for
the agriculture sector resulting in a “major crisis” in the 1990s.251
Indeed, Bertolt Brecht had observed accurately that “famines do
not simply occur; they are organised by the grain trade.”252
How does neoliberalism gain legitimacy in the face of its
track record? This is accomplished through “infiltration of
market logic into politics,”253 and the deployment of “an economic
logic in defining, evaluating, and protecting certain categories of
subjects and not others.”254 In this transition, the neoliberal
project is framed as “government of free individuals who are then
induced to self-manage according to market principles of
discipline, efficiency, and competitiveness.”255 Neoliberalism is
about “self-responsibilization.”256 Responsibilities and capacities
of the states, save perhaps for war and internal security, are
shrunk. Historic popular expectations from the state are folded.
Self-contained individuals, now “freed” from the state, are to take
responsibility to provide for themselves, optimize their
participation in the “free” market, and not look to the state for
any assistance or protection.257 For the wealthy, this may lead to
more wealth and consumption, but for the poor this just adds
another burden, the burden of responsibility, without any change
in their capacity to shoulder it. Inequality is naturalized, and
the differentiated opportunities of life that come with it are
deemed an inevitable part of the “free” market.
How do the Indian ruling elites square the heralded
economic miracle with increased vulnerability of the vulnerable?
How does neoliberalism displace historical commitments and
expectations of a caring and patrimonial state, particularly when
250 P. Sainath, Neo-Liberal Terrorism in India: The Largest Wave of Suicides in
History,
COUNTERPUNCH
(Feb.
12,
2009),
http://www.counterpunch.org/
sainath02122009.html.
251 In the 1990s, the rate of growth fell below the rate of population growth for the
first time since the 1960s. Shah, supra note 243, at 80. The rate of growth of dryland
crops that were grown and consumed by the poorest sections of the population dropped
below zero. Id.
252 Susan Marks, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE LEFT, supra note 135,
at 1, 13. See also AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND
DEPRIVATION 78–81 (1983); MIKE DAVIS, LATE VICTORIAN HOLOCAUSTS: EL NIÑO FAMINES
AND THE MAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD 26–27(2001).
253 AIHWA ONG, NEOLIBERALISM AS EXCEPTION: MUTATIONS IN CITIZENSHIP AND
SOVEREIGNTY 6 (2006).
254 Id. at 16.
255 Id. at 4.
256 See NIKOLAS ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM: REFRAMING POLITICAL THOUGHT 45
(1999).
257 Id. at 142.
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these stand enshrined in the Constitution? This is accomplished
by reconfiguring the social contract between the state and the
subject, by reconstituting the grounds of eligibility for full
citizenship, by redrawing expectations of collective responsibility,
and by changing the composition of the political power-bloc. In
India, as in many other places, over the last two decades
corporate capital has secured dominance of the ruling powerbloc.258 Representing the interests of elites and professionals of
the formal economy, the reconfigured power-bloc now holds
moral-political hegemony—“the capitalist class . . . has . . . acquired
a position to set the terms to which other political formations can
only respond.”259 To achieve such domination and hegemony in
India, a polity that is a representative democracy and has a
historical political alliance between the poor and the nationalist
elite, required recalibration of the democratic process.
This recalibration entailed turning electoral representative
democracy into a “free market democracy.”
For example,
between two and ten billion dollars were spent in the 2009
general election in India, ninety percent of independent
candidates lost, and the ruling coalition won a resounding
mandate to continue on the path of neoliberalism by securing
thirty-seven percent of the votes cast which work out to 10.3% of
the country’s population.260 Elections in India have been turned
into “heavily-sponsored, TV-friendly spectator sports . . .
[whereby] an electorate has been turned into a market, voters are
seen as consumers, and democracy is being welded to the free
market. Ergo: those who cannot consume do not matter.”261 In
line with exhortations of neoliberalism, governance was
increasingly turned into a matter of administration rather than
politics, with a government that is run by technocrats rather
than political representatives. At play here is the production of a
distinction between the concept of citizens and that of
populations. While the concept of citizen carried the notion of
participating in sovereignty of the state, now the population is
supposed to be a passive target of policies designed and
implemented by government functionaries. As part of this
process, an ideological reconstruction of poverty and inequality
258 See PARTHA CHATTERJEE, THE POLITICS OF THE GOVERNED: REFLECTIONS ON
POPULAR POLITICS IN MOST OF THE WORLD 136–44 (2004).
259 Partha Chatterjee, Democracy and Economic Transformation in India, supra note
240, at 61.
260 ARUNDHATI ROY, FIELD NOTES ON DEMOCRACY: LISTENING TO GRASSHOPPERS 14–
15 (2009).
261 Id. at 17. For a case study of political marketing in the 1989 parliamentary
election in India, see DILIP M. SARWATE, POLITICAL MARKETING: THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE
110–201 (1990).
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unfolded that furnishes the ethical grounds for the disavowal of
the rights of the poor. The Indian judiciary played a critical role
in this enterprise.
IV. “CITIZENS” TO “ENCROACHERS”: PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE
INDIAN JUDICIARY
A. Slums, Citizens, and Human Rights
The record of the Indian judiciary regarding slums and
housing needs of the urban poor is a checkered one.
It
demonstrates that the law is a historical force that has both
emancipatory and oppressive potential.262 Judges play their role
in cultivating the hegemony of the dominant social forces by
“creating a social conformism which is useful to the ruling
group’s line of development.”263 Judges help the law become an
effective social force by cementing society and economy together
and binding subordinate groups to the will of the dominant.
They emerge as “organic intellectuals” by constructing social
domination as an articulation of the public interest or common
sense.264
During the nationalist development phase, slum-dwellers,
squatters, and other marginalized groups had some expectation
of state protection. These expectations were grounded in an
amalgamation of claims based on needs, rights of citizenship, and
a recognition of the value of their participation in the economy–
expectations endorsed by stated public policy and pronouncements of the courts.265 For a brief period, the courts
tempered the violence of evictions and demolitions, ever-present
dangers for slum-dwellers, by requiring adequate resettlement
262 This is best captured by Gramsci who postulates the immanent unity of material
and ideational conditions. Law is seen here as operating dialectically, both coercively as
the arm of the state and consensually within civil society, “turning necessity and coercion
into ‘freedom.’” ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF
ANTONIO GRAMSCI 242 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith trans. & eds., 1971). For
a detailed treatment of Gramsci’s conception of the “double face of the law,” see Maureen
Cain, Gramsci, the State and the Place of Law, in LEGALITY, IDEOLOGY AND THE STATE 95,
98 (David Sugerman ed., 1983). For the tension between “determinate” and “responsive”
impulses of modern law, see PETER FITZPATRICK, MODERNISM AND THE GROUNDS OF LAW
70–71 (2001).
263 A. Claire Cutler, Gramsci, Law, and the Culture of Global Capitalism, 8 CRITICAL
REV. INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 527, 527 (2005).
264 See CHANTAL MOUFFE, Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci, in GRAMSCI AND
MARXIST THEORY 168, 187 (1979).
265 Holston terms the grounds of such expectations of the state a “hybrid of special
treatment rights, contributor rights, and text based rights.” JAMES HOLSTON, INSURGENT
CITIZENSHIP 253 (2008). For a detailed analysis of such expectations and their
recognition, see MENON & NIGAM, supra note 228, at 74; PARTHA CHATTERJEE, THE
POLITICS OF THE GOVERNED: REFLECTIONS ON POPULAR POLITICS IN MOST OF THE WORLD
135–37 (2004).
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schemes.266 The neoliberal turn triggered a rupture, leading to a
redefinition of poverty and the rights of the poor. Over the last
two decades Indian courts have cast aside any considerations of
humane treatment and adequate resettlement of squatters and
have adopted a discourse of the illegality of slums and
squatting.267
The link between public interest, urban
development, and housing for the poor has been reconstituted by
the erasure of any public responsibility for housing the urban
poor.
In the landmark Pavement Dwellers Case (1985), the
Supreme Court of India located the right to shelter within the
ensemble of fundamental rights while allowing the state to clear
streets and other urban spaces in the interest of order.268 It held
that “no person has a right to encroach, by erecting a structure or
otherwise, on footpaths, pavements or any other place reserved
or ear-marked for a public purpose.”269 However, it also recognized that the loss of “the pavement or the slum is to lose the
job,” and because the right to livelihood is an important facet of
the right to life, “the eviction of the [pavement dwellers] will lead
to deprivation of their livelihood and consequently to the
deprivation of life.”270 Significantly, the Court argued that the
urban poor do not “claim the right to dwell on pavements or in
slums for the purpose of pursuing any activity which is illegal,
immoral or contrary to public interest. Many of them pursue
occupations which are humble but honorable.”271 The Court also
noted that it was the failure of the state to implement master
plans for cities that had caused the problem in the first place.272
The Court approved removals on the grounds that there was no
absolute prohibition on the deprivation of life or liberty as long as
the procedure established by law was followed.273 However, it
articulated empathy for slum and pavement dwellers, and a
desire to minimize the harm in the process of relocation.274 It
instructed the government to provide alternative settlement sites
for slums that had existed for twenty years or more, and

MENON & NIGAM, supra note 228, at 74–80.
Id. at 75–80.
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun., (1985) 1 S.C.C. 545 (India). This case along with
most of the other cases discussed in this section involving eviction, demolition, and
resettlement, concerned Delhi, the capital of India. For detailed empirical data on the
subject, see generally MENON-SEN & BHAN, supra note 248.
269 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun., (1985) 1 S.C.C. 545 (India).
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id.
266
267
268
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reminded the government of the plans for slum upgrading and
low-income housing.275
In another decision, announced on the same day as the
Pavement Dweller’s Case, the Supreme Court mandated that
alternative housing must be provided before evictions can take
place, accepted a governmental assurance that “steps are being
taken for the purpose of improving the slums and wherever they
cannot be improved, alternative accommodation is provided to
the slum-dwellers” and expressed confidence that “the government will continue to evince the same dynamic interest in the
welfare of the pavement dwellers and slum-dwellers.”276 In 1990,
the Supreme Court went a step further to state that “reasonable
residence is an indispensible necessity” for human development
and the fulfillment of the “right to life.”277 In 1996, the Court
argued that the “right to life guaranteed in any civilized society
implies the right to food, water, decent environment, education,
medical care and shelter,” and held that Article 21 of the Indian
Constitution held within its ambit the right to shelter in order to
make the right to life more meaningful.278 The Court read the
constitution in the light of all civil, political, social, and cultural
rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
to hold that “[s]helter for a human being . . . is not a mere
protection of his life and limb. It is a home where he has
opportunities to grow physically, mentally, intellectually and
spiritually.”279 In 1997, the Court defined human rights to
include everyone’s “right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and wellbeing of himself and his family; it includes food,
clothing, housing, medical care and necessary social services.”280
It held that the right to life is not confined to physical existence
but includes the right to live with human dignity.281 Other
decisions continued to push the frontiers of fundamental rights to
include, for example, the right to education,282 the right to heath
and medical care,283 and

Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun., (1985) 1 S.C.C. 545 (India).
K. Chandru v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1985) 3 S.C.C. 536 (India), available at
http://www.judis.nic.in/supremecourt/citation1.aspx.
277 Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Gotame, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 630, 634
(India).
278 Chameli Singh v. State of Utter Pradesh, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1051, 1053 (India).
279 Id.
280 Ahmedabad Municipal Corp. v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 152,
158 (India).
281 Id. See generally Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, A.I.R 1981 S.C. 746 (India).
282 Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1858, 1864–92 (India). See
also J. P. Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2178 (India),
available at http://www. Indiankanoon.org/doc/1775396/.
283 Consumer Educ. & Research Ctr. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 940 (India).
275
276

Do Not Delete

2010]

12/12/2010 7:34 PM

“Surplus  Humanity”  and  the  Margins  of Legality

43

[t]he right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it,
namely, the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition,
clothing, shelter over the head and facilities for reading, writing and
expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing
and commingling with fellow human beings.284

Slum-dwellers and the marginalized had secured these
protections during the boom years of public interest litigation
(PIL) in India.285 This device initially emerged as a vehicle to
protect legal rights of a “person or determinate class of persons
[who] by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or social or
economic disadvantaged position [are] unable to reach the court
for relief.”286 Dubbed “judicial activism,” and even “judicial
excessivism,” PIL entailed dilution of the rules of standing,
expansion of epistolary jurisdiction, and relaxation of adversarial
procedural devices to provide access to those who by virtue of
their “socially or economically disadvantaged position are unable
to approach the court[s] for relief.”287 PIL opened the door for
anyone to approach the highest courts in matters of public
interest to “espouse the cause of the poor and oppressed
(representative standing) and those wishing to enforce performance of public duties (citizen standing).”288 The Supreme
Court of India saw itself as the “last resort for the oppressed and
bewildered,”289 assuming the mantle of a “Supreme Court for

284 Francis Coralie Mullin v. Adm’r, Union of Territory of Delhi, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 746,
753 (India).
285 See generally Jamie Cassel, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in
India: Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 495, 497 (1989); HANS DEMBOWSKI,
TAKING THE STATE TO COURT: PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN
METROPOLITAN INDIA 58 (2001); SAMPAT JAIN, PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION 12 (2002);
Jill Cottrell, Courts and Accountability: Public Interest Litigation in the Indian High
Courts, 1992 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 199, 199–200 (1992).
286 S.P. Gupta v. President of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149 (India), available at
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1294854. It should be noted that the PIL phase was ushered
in only after the Indian judiciary yielded on its previously inflexible protection of private
property rights and the blocking of important socio-economic legislations including
amendments to the Constitution. It was only in 1973 that the Indian Supreme Court
recognized that a constitution “is an organic document which must grow and must take
stock of the vast socioeconomic problems.” Bharati v. Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461
(India), available at http://indiankaoon.org/dc/1294854.
287 S.P. Gupta v. President of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149 (India), available at
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1294854. In this case, Justice Bhagwati elaborated the
frameworks for “representative standing,” and “citizen standing.” Id. For further details,
see S. P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA: TRANGRESSING BORDERS AND ENFORCING
LIMITS 215 (2003); S. P. Sathe, The Unfinished Agenda: The Constitution at the
Crossroads, 42 J. INDIAN L. INST. 171, 186 (2000).
288 Lavanya Rajamani, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in India: Exploring
Issues of Access, Participation, Equity, Effectiveness and Sustainability, 19 J. ENVT’L.
L. 93, 293 n.4 (2007).
289 Id.
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India.”290 PIL emerged precisely at the moment of the collapse of
the nationalist development project.
Progressive PIL decisions by the courts brought major
changes in, among other things, the state of urban life. These
actions included removal and relocation of large urban industries
to outside city limits,291 the conversion of all public transport and
private commercial transport to the use of compressed natural
gas,292 ridding the River Ganges of effluents,293 and removal of
garbage from the cities.294 The courts’ involvement extended into
oversight of implementation of their directives.295 Encouraged by
judicial pronouncements, in 1990, the Indian Law Commission
recommended a new law to give statutory basis to a right of
slum-dwellers to resettlement, preceding destruction of their
homes.296 No such law was ever enacted. Similarly, an attempt
to amend the Constitution to make the right to housing a
fundamental right failed. Neoliberalism had arrived to change
not only the rules of the game, but the game itself.
B. Encroachers in the Showcase City
PIL may well have stayed on its path, had not the global
rules of the game changed so markedly with the neoliberal turn.
In its new iteration, PIL was used by the courts to assume the
role of policy maker and policy enforcer with the backing of the
urban professional-managerial classes, who, under the spell of
ideologies of corporate capital, have turned away from the state
as the primary orchestrator of change. The judiciary, the nonpolitical branch of government, became an instrumentality to depoliticize political questions of distribution, equity, access, and
opportunity.
As neoliberal deregulation of the economy, down-sizing of the
public sector, and “free market” ideologies became entrenched,
the courts took a dramatic turn. Judicial activism in the interest
290 Upendra Baxi, The Avatars of Indian Judicial Activism: Explorations in the
Geography of [In]justice, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA: ITS GRASP AND
REACH 156, 157 (S. K. Verma, Kusum & A.S. Anand eds., 2000) (emphasis added).
291 M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, Petition No. 13381 (Taj Trapenzium Case 1984).
292 M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, Petition No. 13029 (Dehli Vehicular Pollution Case
1985).
293 M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. 3727 (Ganges Pollution Case
1985).
294 Almitra Patel v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. 888 (Garbage Removal Case
1996).
295 See Rajamani, supra note 288, at 315. In this regard, the courts were not only the
arbiters of law and justice, but also functioned as parallel administrative and executive
bodies in matters of urban affairs.
296 LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-EIGHTH REPORT ON
LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION FOR SLUM AND PAVEMENT DWELLERS 26 (1990).
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of the marginalized, seen as “chemotherapy for the carcinogenic
body politic,”297 quickly turned lethal. With the neoliberal turn,
the pace of evictions and demolitions of extra-legal settlements
accelerated dramatically.298 Significantly, these eviction and
demolitions were not mandated by any public planning directive
or state action. Rather, they were ordered by the courts in
response to PIL actions initiated by trade and non-poor resident
welfare associations. In a dramatic switch, PIL, a weapon
designed for the marginalized, was now wielded by the
privileged.299 The privileged could use PIL because questions at
hand, on their surface, involved use of public lands and did not
implicate the protection of privately held property or the
violation of any individual right.300 Evictions and demolitions
were sought in public interest in urban solid waste management
and the enforcement of urban master plans.301 Indian courts now
turned PIL into a tool to monitor and direct the exercise of state
power in tune with the neoliberal schema; the “free market” was
to address the substantive interests of the poor and the
marginalized.302 By a reconstruction of “public interest,” a process of “dispossession by law”303 at the service of accumulation by
dispossession304 was set in motion. An analyst summarized the
trend:
There was a time when courts would provide relief from the harsh and
arbitrary actions of the executive reflected, in say the grant [of] stay of
demolition of slums on the grounds of the lack of a rehabilitation plan

297 Upendra Baxi, Preface, in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA ix, xvi (S. P. Sathe ed., 2d
ed. 2002).
298 For example, in Delhi, while between 1990–2003, 51,461 dwellings were
demolished under “slum clearance schemes,” between 2004 and 2007, more than 45,000
dwellings were demolished. Bhan, supra note 246, at 128. Less than twenty-five percent
of those evicted in the latter period received alternative resettlement sites. Id.
299 Analysts view the “clique” of public interest litigators and petitioners who filed
hundreds of PIL petitions covering almost every aspect of collective life, as being “public
spirited” and as bringing “a distinct view based on particular sensibilities.” Rajamani,
supra note 288, at 305–06.
300 It has been rightly observed that after the neoliberal turn, the Indian courts
“emerge[d] as the standard bearers of a whole new transformation of common
sense. . . . [seeking] to reduce democracy, rather, to redefine it, as a set of abstract rules
sans politics and people.” MENON AND NIGAM, supra note 228, at 13.
301 Okhla Factory Owners’ v.Gov’t of Nat’l Capital Territory of Delhi, CWP No. 4441/
1994 (Nov. 29, 2002), available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/; Pitampura Sudhar Samitii
v. Gov’t of Nat’l Capital Territory of Delhi, CWP 4215/1995 (Nov. 29, 2002), available at
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1927946; Bhan, supra note 246, at 134.
302 See Radha D’Souza, The ‘Third World’ and Socio-legal Studies: Neo-Liberalism
and Lessons from India’s Legal Innovations, 14 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 487, 504–06 (2005).
303 MENON & NIGAM, supra note 228, at 69.
304 See supra notes 79–107 and accompanying text.
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or the hardship of monsoons or school examinations. Today, demolitions of slums are being directed on the orders of the courts.305

How did the courts accomplish this sharp turn in a very
short span of time? This was accomplished by deploying the
whole array of neoliberal values, priorities, and prescriptions
related to urban policy. Having mandated resettlement and
alternate housing for those evicted in earlier decisions, when
again faced with the question the Supreme Court articulated a
newfound interest in fiscal responsibility of the state, and linked
it with implied irresponsibility of the urban poor.306 In 1993, the
Supreme Court expressed a concern that “the public exchequer
has to be burdened with crores [tens of millions] of rupees for
providing alternative accommodation to [those] who are
trespassers on public land,” and directed that where resettlement
was done, the resettled should not be given new land on
leasehold, but on license.307 The short rope of a revocable license
would keep the “irresponsible” disciplined and controlled.
The next step was to braid fiscal responsibility with a desire
for a clean city, and graduate the “irresponsibility” of the poor
into criminality. In 1996, the Supreme Court ordered that
hazardous industries be moved outside the city limits and that
cities be cleaned up.308 The Delhi High Court was quick to fall in
line and ordered eviction of all squatters in Delhi because it “is a
show window to the world of our culture, heritage, traditions and
way of life. It cannot be allowed to degenerate and decay.”309 The
Supreme Court picked up the pace in 2000, bemoaning that while
Delhi was a “showcase of the country,” yet “no effective initiative
of any kind” had been taken for “cleaning up the city.”310 The
Court characterized slums as “large areas of public
land . . . usurped for private use free of cost,” and a plan to
provide the free land for resettlement was rejected as “a proposal
which attracts more land grabbers. Rewarding an encroacher on
public land with an alternative free site is like giving a reward to
a pickpocket.”311 Giving garbage priority over the destitute, the
305 Rakesh Shukla, Rights of the Poor: An Overview of Supreme Court, ECO. & POL.
WKLY. 3755, 3757 (2006).
306 See Usha Ramanathan, Illegality and the Urban Poor, 41 ECO. & POL. WKLY.
3193, 3194 (2006).
307 Id.
308 M.C.
Mehta v. Union of India, (1996) 4 S.C.C. 750, available at
http://www.nlsenlaw.org.; B.L. Wadhera v. Union of India, (1996) 2 S.C.C. 594 (India),
available at http://www.ielrc.org/content/e960.pdf.
309 Samitii, CWP 4215/1995, at 128 (emphasis added).
310 Almitra Patel v. Union of India, (2000) 2 S.C.C. 679, 684–85 (India) (emphasis
added).
311 Id. (emphasis added). The Delhi High Court endorsed this language: “One cannot
but use the expression as stated in the said [Almitra] judgment.” Wazirpur Barton
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Court, while castigating provision of adequate housing for the
poor, mandated that public land be provided free of cost for
garbage disposal.312 In holding slums responsible for the solid
waste problem, the Court completely ignored the fact that per
capita solid waste generation in Delhi runs along class lines.313
For good measure, the Court retreated from the supervisory role
in urban affairs that it had aggressively assumed in the earlier
phase.314 The solid waste management rules adopted in response
to the Court’s direction, while providing opportunities for private
companies and incinerators, dealt a blow to the related informal
sector.315 In Delhi there are an estimated one million waste
pickers, of which ninety-four percent belong to “backward and

Normata Sangh v. Union of India, MANU/DE/2140/2002 C.W. 2112 of 2002, Order dated
Nov. 29, 2002. The Supreme Court articulated the rationale:
Establishment or creating of slums, it seems, appears to be good business and
is well organized. The number of slums has multiplied in the last few years by
geometrical proportion. Large areas of public land, in this way, are usurped for
private use free of cost. It is difficult to believe that this can happen in the
capital of the country without passive or active connivance of the land owning
agencies and/or the municipal authorities. The promise of free land, at the
taxpayers cost, in place of a jhuggi [shack], is a proposal which attracts more
land grabbers . . . The department of slum clearance does not seem to have
cleared any slums despite its being in existence for decades. In fact more and
more slums are coming into existence. Instead of “Slum Clearance” there is
“Slum Creation” in Delhi. This in turn gives rise to domestic waste being
strewn on open land in and around the slums. This can best be controlled at
least, in the first instance, by preventing the growth of slums. The authorities
must realize that there is a limit to which the population of a city can be
increased, without enlarging its size. In other words the density of population
per square kilometer cannot be allowed to increase beyond the sustainable
limit. Creation of slums resulting in increase in density has to be prevented.
What the slum clearance department has to show, however, does not seem to
be visible. It is the garbage and solid waste generated by these slums which
require to be dealt with most expeditiously and on the basis of priority.
Almitra Patel, 2 S.C.C. at 3–4 (emphasis added).
312 Patel v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1256, 1260–61 (India).
313 Per capita solid waste generation in Delhi is 420 grams for the high income group,
240 grams for middle income groups, 150 grams for lower middle income group, and 80
grams for those in slums and shacks. Rajamani, supra note 288, at 302. See also Patel v.
Union of India, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1256, 1259 (India).
314 The Court took the position that:
We believe it is not for this Court to direct as to how the municipal authorities
should carry out their functions and resolve difficulties in regard to the
management of solid waste. The Court, in fact, is ill-equipped to do so.
Without doubt the governmental agencies including the local authorities have
all the powers of the State to take action and ensure that the city remains
clean. They only have to wake up and act.
Patel v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1629, 1633 (India).
315 C.P. Jomit, The Impact of Privatization of Solid Waste Collection and
Transportation in Delhi: The Impact on the Informal Recycling Sector, ARTICLESBASE,
June 24, 2009, http://www.articlesbase.com/education-articles/the-impact-of-privatizationof-solid-waste-collection-and-transportation-in-delhi-the-impact-on-the-informalrecycling-sector-990546.htm.
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tribal castes,” and an estimated fifty thousand are children.316
The livelihoods of these workers, who provide “an
unacknowledged subsidy to the waste producer, the consumer
goods and packaging industry, and the legal waste owner—the
municipal body”317—was severely impacted. In tune with the
rapidly unfolding, “decisive embourgeoisement of the Indian
city,”318 a gentrified city, one that was pleasing to the eye with no
garbage or slum-dwellers in sight, now stood as the judicially
endorsed image of urban development.
Having removed “pickpockets,” the Supreme Court now put
some content in the “show window to the world of our culture,
heritage, traditions and way of life.”319
It condoned the
construction of the Akshardham religious theme park in Delhi on
the Yamuna River floodplain that encroached on an area
designated in the city’s master plan as an ecological zone.320 In
2009, the Court cited this decision while approving the
construction of Commonwealth Games Village adjacent to the
Akshardham Temple, which the Delhi High Court had found
“would affect ecological integrity of the ‘riverbed’ besides causing
irreversible damage to the ‘flood plain.’”321 Coincidently, fire
“broke out” in the slums adjoining the construction site gutting
seven shanty clusters,322 further clearing the grounds to facilitate
global solidarity through the sports festival.
Responsibilities of the state and fundamental rights brought
to light only a few years ago remained to be dealt with. In 2002,
the Delhi High Court struck down a resettlement policy for
squatters, and directed that they be removed expeditiously and
that no alternative sites needed to be provided for removal of

316 RAVI AGARWAL ET AL., RECYCLING RESPONSIBILITY: TRADITIONAL SYSTEMS AND
NEW CHALLENGES OF URBAN SOLID WASTE IN INDIA 35–37 (2002); Rajamani, supra note
288, at 306.
317 AGARWAL ET AL., supra note 316, at 35.
318 John & Deshpande, supra note 233, at 84.
319 Almitra Patel v. Union of India, (2000) 226 S.C.C. 679, slip op. at 1632 (India),
available at www.elaw.org/system/files/JDESA-Part-4.doc; Pitam Pura Sudhar Samiti v.
Union of India & Ors., CWP 4215/1995, slip op. at 4 (India 2002), available at
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/842898/.
320 Charu
Soni,
Killing
Delhi’s
Lifeline,
TEHELKA,
Sept.
9,
2010,
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main18.asp?filename=Cr081906Killing_Delhi.asp; Sanjay
Srivastava, Urban Spaces, Disney-Divinity and Moral Middle Classes in Delhi, 44 ECON.
& POL. WKLY. 338, 338–39 (2009).
321 D.D.A. v. Rajendra Singh & Ors., 161 D.L.T. 330, slip op. at 2 (India 2009),
http://www.nlsenlaw.org/water/case-laws/supreme-court/appellants-d-d-a-vs-respondentrajendra-singh-and-ors-decided-on-30-07.2009-1/; No Bar on Games Work, Orders
Supreme Court, THE HINDU, July 31, 2009, available at http://www.thehindu.com/2009/
07/31/stories/2009073157570100.htm.
322 Fire in Delhi Slum near Commonwealth Games Village, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Jan. 9,
2010, available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print/495495.aspx.
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those squatting on public land.323 While recognizing the “duty of
the Government authorities to provide shelter to the underprivileged,” it argued that the failure to do so does not mean that
the state should be required to take up an “arbitrary system of
providing alternative sites and land to encroachers on public
land.”324 The judicially recognized fundamental right to adequate
housing evaporated into thin air. Now the Court told squatters
facing imminent removal: “[I]f you are occupying illegal land, you
have no legal right, what to talk of fundamental right, to stay
there a minute longer.”325 The specter of anarchy and breakdown
of order was raised to deny any relief to squatters: “If
encroachments on public land are to be allowed, there will be
anarchy.”326
To guard against the specter of anarchy, the courts started to
cast a shadow on citizenship rights of the urban poor and slumdwellers. Two classes of citizens emerged—those rightfully
entitled to protections of the law, and those who had surrendered
such rights on account of being poor. Now courts distinguished
between slum-dwellers who were designated “unscrupulous
citizens,” and the “honest citizens who have to pay for land or a
flat.”327 And, of course, finance capital and developers were to be
given a complete run of the field. In 2006, the Delhi High Court,
while refusing to stop slum-demolitions without any alternative
site for resettlement, argued that the land had “other uses that
cannot be denied,” and expressed the frustration that the more
extra-legal settlers are removed, the “more they come.”328
Deploying a discourse of epidemics and pathology to characterize
squatters and slum-dwellers, the Court argued that “their”
numbers were “growing and growing,” and hence urgent steps
must be taken to “deal with the problem.”329 The ultimate
prescription was rather simple: “If they cannot afford to live in
Delhi, let them not come to Delhi.”330
Then there are those who can “afford” it all and merit
deference by the law and the courts. In the middle of demolition
and clean-up drives, the Supreme Court allowed the construction
of a shopping mall, which was being built illegally, to continue.331
323 Okla. Factory Owners’ Ass’n v. Gov’t of Nat’l Capital Territory of Delhi & Ors.,
108 D.L.T. 517, slip op. at 13 (India 2002), http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1143856/.
324 Id. at 11.
325 Ramanathan, supra note 306, at 3197 (emphasis added).
326 Id. (emphasis added).
327 Bhan, supra note 246, at 135 (emphasis added).
328 Id. (emphasis added).
329 Id. (emphasis added).
330 Id. (emphasis added).
331 ROY, supra note 260, at 134.
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The rationale for disparate treatment of corporate capital was
articulated:
Had such parties inkling of an idea that such clearances were not
obtained by DDA [the builders], they would not have invested such
huge sums of money. The stand that wherever constructions have
been made unauthorizedly [sic] demolition is the only option cannot
apply to the present cases . . . [especially] when they . . . are corporate
bodies and institutions and the question of their having indulged in
any malpractices in getting the approval or sanction does not arise.332

The Supreme Court also used the “huge sums of money”
rationale in the Vedanta Group Case, where bauxite mining
operations in Niyamgiri, Orissa, an environmentally fragile area
home to indigenous tribal groups, were approved despite multiple
irregularities and strong objections of residents of the area.333
Emboldened by this judicial posture, the Delhi Laws (Special
Provisions) Act 2006 was adopted, which provides for demolition
of unauthorized structures, “whether in pursuance of Court
orders or otherwise.”334 This Act gave license for the removal of
slums where “clearance of land is required for specific public
projects,” and “the Central Government may, from time to time,
issue such directions to the local authorities as it may deem fit,
for giving effect to the provisions of this Act and it shall be the
duty of the local authorities to comply with such directions.”335
The end result of judicial, legislative, and executive actions is
increased “segregation of economic classes” in Delhi.336
A
“develop-ment pornography”337 has flourished where slumdwellers and squatters are held responsible for “pressure on civic
amenities, crime, social imbalances, economic exploitation,
332 Id. (quoting the Writ Petition Against Vasant Junj Mall, Oct. 17, 2006, judgment
of Justices Arijit Pasayat and S. H. Kpadia) (emphasis added). This pattern led to the
observation that “it is members of the so-called civil society who break laws with impunity
and who demand that the rules be waived for them, whereas members of political society
strive to become legal, to gain recognition and entitlements from the state.” Amita
Baviskar & Nandini Sundar, Democracy versus Economic Transformation?, 43 ECON. &
POL. WKLY. 87, 88 (2008).
333 Rahul Choudhary, Environmental Clearance: A Farce Played by MoEF—The
Vedanta Case, RADICAL NOTES JOURNAL, Sept. 24, 2007, available at
http://radicalnotes.com/journal/2007/09/24/the-vedanta-case/.
334 The Delhi Laws (Special Provisions Act, 2006 (No. 22 of 2006)), available at
http://www.delhi.gov.in/DoIT/Finance/PDF/Acts%20and%20Rules/specialprovisionalAct.p
df. See also Ramanathan, supra note 306, at 3197.
335 The Delhi Laws (Special Provisions Act, 2006 (No. 22 of 2006)), available at
http://www.delhi.gov.in/DoIT/Finance/PDF/Acts%20and%20Rules/specialprovisionalAct.p
df. See also Ramanathan, supra note 305, at 3197.
336 Nikhil Joseph & Pascal Goodman, On the Outskirts of Legality: Policy and Legal
Aspects of Slum Resettlement in Delhi 19 (2008) (unpublished working paper) (on file with
the Centre for Civil Society), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1325962.
337 Rotimi Sankore, Behind the Image: Poverty and “Development Pornography,”
PAMBAZUKA NEWS (Apr. 21, 2005), http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/27815.
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unplanned growth, deterioration of city beautification, culture,
environmental setback to city development in a planned manner
etc.”338 Abdication of public responsibility for housing today
stands enshrined in the Delhi Master Plan 2021, which envisages
private developers catering to the housing needs of the “urban
poor and the economically weaker sections in the form of houses
of two rooms or less.”339 The turn from a welfare state to coercive
facilitator of capital accumulation stands completed.340 Slums
and slum-dwellers were left at the turn, with profound
implications for the place and role of the law.
The neoliberal transition did not only shape judicial
philosophy of the Indian high courts regarding the questions of
poverty and shelter, it also appears to have compromised the
integrity of the judges. This is put into sharp relief by the stillunfolding corruption and conflict of interest scandal that erupted
in 2007, and centered on Y. K. Sabharwal, Chief Justice of the
Indian Supreme Court from 2000–2007.341
Chief Justice
Sabharwal took the lead role in the Supreme Court’s denial to

338 Joseph & Goodman, supra note 336, at 13 (quoting Detailed Project Report:
Construction of Four Storied E.W.S. Housing for Slum Dwellers at Savdha Ghevra Phase
III under INNURM, Slum and JJ Department, Municipal Corporation of Delhi (Jan.
2008)).
339 Id. at 19 (quoting Master Plan for Delhi with the perspective for the year 2021,
Ministry of Urban Development (February 2007)).
340 Evictions, removals, and demolitions of the housing and livelihood of the urban
poor were not the only areas that were impacted by this judicial turn. In the area of
workers’ rights, during the progressive PIL phase, the courts had set up principles of
“equal pay for equal work,” “regularization of contract workers performing work of a
permanent nature,” and “[r]einstatement with back wages.” Randhir Singh v. Union of
India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 879 (India); Shukla, supra note 305, at 3757. With the neoliberal
turn, the courts diluted the “equal pay” and “regularization” rules and adopted a posture
of non-interference in cases of harsh and disproportionate punishments like dismissal of
employees for minor infractions. State of N.C.T. of Delhi v. Sanjeev, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 2080,
2084–87 (India);; D. P. S. Rural Reg’l Bank v. Munna Lal Jain, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 584, 589
(India). Concerns of irreparable environmental harm and dislocation of indigenous tribal
communities were pushed to the side as the court approved the construction of a megadam as part of the largest river valley project in India. Narmada Bachao Andholan v.
Union of India & Ors., A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 3751, 3752–55, 3782 (India). “The dam is neither
a nuclear establishment nor a polluting industry . . . [I]t will not be correct to presume
that the construction of a large dam like Sardar Sarovar will result in ecological disaster.”
Id. at 3753. As for the displacement of tribal communities, the court took the position
that at the rehabilitation sites “there will be better facilities than in the tribal hamlets,”
and the tribal communities will be “gradually assimilated in the mainstream of society.”
MENON & NIGAM, supra note 228, at 74. In the Networking of Rivers Case, the Supreme
Court used Public Interest Litigation to intervene in inter-state and federation-state
relations, and tilted the balance of power in favor of the central government while
brushing aside environmental and federalism concerns. D’Souza, supra note 302, at 488,
506.
341 Sanjay Dubey, Office for Profit: A Stink You Should Smell. TEHELKA, Aug. 18,
2007,
available
at
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main33.asp?filename=
Ne180807Officefor.asp; Former Chief Justice of India Y.K. Sabharwal—Biography,
http://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/judges/bio/yks.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2010).
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provide any relief against demolition and sealing of thousands of
“illegal” commercial units operating in areas reserved for
residential use by Delhi’s city plans.342 The sealing impacted
thousands of peoples’ lives, and violent protest erupted.343 A
bench headed by Chief Justice Sabharwal insisted that the
sealing continue.344
Within months of his retirement, an
investigative report was published detailing that two sons of the
Chief Justice, who ran three companies from their father’s house,
made millions as a result of the sealing drive that forced scores of
businesses to move to shopping malls and commercial complexes
in which the sons had financial interests.345
Corporate
developers had rushed into partnerships with the sons as the
sealing drive gathered speed.346 While the Chief Justice suffered
some embarrassment, the four journalists who published the
account were found guilty of criminal contempt of court by the
Delhi High Court.347 This is not the only scandal to implicate
India’s high courts.348
The Supreme Court of India had long recognized that, “it is
an accepted fact of constitutional interpretation that the content
of justiciability changes according to how the Judge’s value
preferences respond to the multi-dimensional problems of the
day.”349 Indeed, the Court deemed “inevitable that the social
philosophy and the scale of values of the judges participating in
the decision should play an important part” in their decisionmaking.350 As for the “social philosophy” and “value preferences”
of the judges, it has been argued that their shared class
affiliation and residing in Delhi makes them sympathetic to the
middle class sensibilities about urban issues.351 This affiliation
342 For details of the affair, see ROY, supra note 331, at 1132. For details of the
charges, see Prashant Bhushan, Contempt of Judicial Power, OUTLOOK INDIA, Sept. 19,
2007, http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?235601.
343 Arundhati Roy, Scandal In the Palace, OUTLOOK INDIA, Oct. 1, 2007, available at
http://www.outlookindia.com/printarticle.aspx?235689.
344 Id.
345 Dubey, supra note 341.
346 Id.
347 Binod Ringania, Journalists Sentenced for Uncovering Corruption, WORLD PRESS,
Sept. 25, 2007, http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/2941.cfm.
348 Prashant Bhushan, Judging the Judges, OUTLOOK INDIA, Jan. 21, 2009, available
at http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?239534.
349 Rajamani, supra note 288, at 301 (quoting State of Rajasthan v. Union of India,
(1977) 3 S.C.C. 592, 648 (India)).
350 State of Madras v. V. G. Row, (1952) 1957 S.C.R. 597, slip op. at 8 (India),
http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/554839.
351 Rajamani, supra note 288, at 301. See also Partha Chatterjee, Are Indian Cities
Becoming Bourgeois at Last? Or, If You Prefer, We Could Exclaim: Are Indian Cities
Becoming Bourgeois, Alas?, in CONTESTED TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 35, at 113, 113–
14 (Mary E. John et al. eds., 2006);; Janaki Nair, ‘Social Municipalism’ and the New
Metropolis, in CONTESTED TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 35, at 125, 125.
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and sympathy makes for not only substantive outcomes of these
cases but also the modes of resolving them that signal a new
modality of functioning of the state, whereby policy making
increasingly becomes the preserve of professional and
technocrats immune from political control. In the Solid Waste
Management Case, the Court was quick to set up a committee of
experts to design rules and guidelines for waste management.352
This committee, like others the Court had set up for similar
issues, for example, in the Delhi Pollution Case,353 consisted of
technocrats, bureaucrats, and repre-sentatives of NGOs, without
any mechanism to represent the interests of those who would be
impacted by the decisions—the squatters and slum-dwellers.354
The process was not “structured to be participative” and was
“neither consultative nor democratic.”355
Activists note the “technology focus” of the courts’ agenda
and that the solutions devised and recommended were driven by
a priority for “leaner municipalities and greater efficiency.”356
Decisions about whom to consult were “ad hoc and
discretionary . . . . Not all stake holders were identified and
consulted, and no avenues for wider public consultation were
explored.”357 The non-participatory process resulted in the
absence of equity, fairness, and justice.358 In its new guise, PIL
was unhinged from citizen mobilization and yoked with the
interests of those with social power. A device fashioned to give
access to the marginalized, now became a “tremendous practical
hurdle[] limiting the access of the poor to the Court, and
therefore restricting the range of views before the Court.”359 The
well-heeled groups are using “their leverage with the Court” to
ensure conversion of “one strain of opinion into policy, while
annihilating all others.”360 Such machinations are dictated by
the neo-liberalism whereby “in the current period, legitimate
human rights can be defined only as that set of rights that
require government abstention from acts that violate the
individual’s freedom to innovate and to invest time, capital, and

352 Okla. Factory Owners’ Ass’n v. Gov’t of Nat’l Capital Territory of Delhi, (2002) 108
D.L.T. 517, slip op. at 4 (India), available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1143856/.
353 M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 4016 (India), available at
http://www.ielrc.org/content/e0409.pdf.
354 See generally Rajamani, supra note 288, at 296–301.
355 Id. at 304.
356 Id.
357 Id. at 304–05.
358 Id. at 305.
359 Id. at 306.
360 Id. at 305–06.

Do Not Delete

54

12/12/2010 7:34 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 14:1

resources in processes of production and exchange.”361 For
example, in Mumbai, an emerging middle class has teamed up
with property developers and select bureaucrats and politicians
to create a “powerful neoliberal lobby [of] . . . building
boomers.”362 The emergence of the “upwardly mobile middle and
elite class . . . [with an] anti-slum agenda is . . . one of the most
significant changes in the Indian urban landscape.”363
With these neoliberal judicial pronouncements, extra-legality
stands bifurcated: that of the “unscrupulous,” “pickpockets,” and
“encroachers” and that of “honest citizens;” that of “who cannot
afford to live in Delhi” and that of those with “huge sums of
money.”364 Law is supposed to discipline the extra-legality of the
first set, while not even raising “the question” about the extralegality of the latter. On the grounds of this divide, sovereignty
emerges as a decision on the exception—setting up zones beyond
the reach of the law.365 This divide implicates the very concept of
citizenship by reconstituting the grounds of recognition of a
citizen. The characterizations deployed by the courts may well
be essentialist categories reinforcing stereotypes, but “categories . . . are not meant to describe the world accurately but to
organize and classify it symbolically.”366 The language about
slum and pavement dwellers that took hold of Indian judicial

361 Tony Evans, Citizenship and Human Rights in the Age of Globalization, 25
ALTERNATIVES 415, 416 (2000).
362 Nainan, supra note 198, at 30.
363 Amita Bhide, Shifting Terrains of Communities and Community Organizations:
Reflections on Organizing for Housing Rights in Mumbai, 44 CMTY. DEV. J. 367, 375
(2009).
364 Bhan, supra note 246, at 135–39.
365 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 19 (Daniel
Heller-Roazen trans., 1998). Agamben takes as his point of departure Schmitt’s claim
that “[s]overeign is he who decides on the exception.” CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL
THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 5 (George Schwab trans.,
Mass. Inst. of Tech. 1985). Agamben argues that the formation of a political community is
based not on inclusion but on exclusion. See generally Jenny Edkins, Sovereign Power,
Zones of Indistinction and the Camp, 25 ALTERNATIVES 3 (2000). He deploys the figure of
homo sacer from Roman law to identify a zone where law suspends itself, rendering the
zone not merely of exclusion but also of abandonment—the space of the exception. Id. For
a critical reading, see generally Peter Fitzpatrick, Bare Sovereignty: Homo Sacer and the
Insistence of Law, in POLITICS, METAPHYSICS, AND DEATH: ESSAYS ON GIORGIO AGAMBEN’S
HOMO SACER 49 (Andrew Norris ed., 2005); GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION
(Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2005). Creation of a space on exception is a
question of the boundaries and borders of law, in that the sovereign decision and the
exception are “never decisively placed within or without the legal system, as they are
precisely the moving border between the two.” Andrew Norris, The Exemplary Exception, in
119 RADICAL PHIL. 6, 10 (2003) (emphasis added). The critical result is that those placed
in the zones of exception are included as objects of power but excluded from being
subjects.
366 TERESA P.R. CALDEIRA, CITY OF WALLS: CRIME, SEGREGATION, AND CITIZENSHIP IN
SAÕ PAULO 33 (2000).
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pronouncements since the 1990s, is that of illegality.367 The
courts appear mindful that in a constitutional liberal republic “in
order, ethically, to justify denying a national citizen his textbased rights, it becomes necessary to make the informal settler
into an ‘improper’ citizen.”368 The courts have done just that by
characterizing slum and pavement dwellers as dishonest,
unscrupulous, polluters, and predatory encroachers. Rendered
an “improper citizen,” the “encroacher” can now be denied the
protections of rights of citizenship.369 The political economy of
slum production stands erased, the slum and the slum-dweller
emerge as a space and a body without history, and
responsibilities of the state stand vitiated. This is the legacy of
neoliberalism in India.
Is there a way out for urban slums and slum-dwellers? We
turn now to examine the prescriptions that hold the field.
V. “WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?”370
A. Slums and Remedial Prescriptions
By the 1970s it was apparent that in the global South, even
in the face of persistent urban unemployment, rural-urban
migration was accelerating and so was slum growth.371 The
urban bias of development plans, deeper penetration of the
markets into rural areas, restructuring of the agricultural sector
by WTO trade regimes, and increased capital-intensive nature of
agricultural inputs combined to dispossess and uproot increasing
numbers of rural farmers.372
Actual and perceived wage
differentials lure rural workers to urban centers, where they
cannot all be absorbed in the sector with a “politically determined
wage that is substantially higher than . . . [that of] the
agricultural sector.”373 Consequently, increasing numbers of the
367 See Usha Ramanathan, Illegality and Exclusion: Law in the Lives of Slum
Dwellers, in 4 KEY TEXTS ON SOCIAL JUSTICE IN INDIA 263, 281–82 (2009).
368 Bhan, supra note 246, at 139.
369 Id.
370 I adopt this from MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS
OR COMMUNITY? (1967), where Dr. King focuses on questions of class and poverty.
371 John R. Harris & Michael P. Todaro, Migration, Unemployment and Development:
A Two-Sector Analysis, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 126, 126 (1970). See also SANYAL, supra note
77, at 197.
372 See Carlos Oya, Sticks and Carrots for Farmers in Developing Countries: Agrarian
Neoliberalism in Theory and Practice, in NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL READER, supra note
108, at 127, 127–131; JAN BREMAN, OF PEASANTS, MIGRANTS, AND PAUPERS: RURAL
LABOUR CIRCULATION AND CAPITALIST PRODUCTION IN WEST INDIA XVII, XX (1986); PETER
M. ROSSET, FOOD IS DIFFERENT: WHY WE MUST GET THE WTO OUT OF AGRICULTURE XV–
XVII (2006); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, Food Security, and the
Environment: The Neoliberal Threat to Sustainable Rural Development, 14 TRANSNAT’L.
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 419, 470–71 (2004).
373 SANYAL, supra note 77, at 197.
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urban poor joined the informal sector set apart from the formal
labor market, characterized by formal contracts and statutory
regulations.374 In little time it was recognized that:
[T]he informal sector now stands out ‘as a potential provider of
employment and incomes to millions of people who would otherwise
lack the means of survival’ or ‘as a breeding ground for
entrepreneurship on a mass scale’ . . . . [T]he informal sector can
significantly improve itself, practically in each aspect of its
functioning, if only the past policy biases, under which it is denied
access to the advantages (e.g., availability of credit, foreign exchange,
and tax concessions) offered to the formal sector, are removed.375

Divergent views about the nature of the informal sector fall
into three main schools of thought: the dualist school, the legalist
school, and the structural school.376 The dualist and legalist
schools furnish the scaffoldings of mainstream prescriptions for
the informal sector. Assumptions drawn from the Fordist era in
the global North view the informal sector “as a waiting room, or
temporary transit zone: newcomers could find their feet there
and learn the ways of the urban labour market.”377 In the
meantime, abysmal wages in the informal sector are expected to
be mitigated by traditional support networks.378 The informal
sector, however, grew exponentially as neoliberal globalization
gathered speed with flexible production, outsourcing, fiscal

374 The vagueness and plurality of views of informality are so pervasive that, by one
account, “formal and informal are better thought of as metaphors that conjure up a
mental picture of whatever the user has in mind at that particular time.” MARC
BACCHETTA ET AL., GLOBALIZATION AND INFORMAL JOBS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 40
(2009).
375 INT’L LAB. ORG., JOB CREATION IN URBAN INFORMAL SECTOR IN INDIA: ISSUES AND
POLICY OPTIONS 4 (A. S. Oberai & G. K. Chadha eds., 2001) (emphasis added).
376 The dualist school posits that the informal sector is comprised of marginal
activities—distinct from and not related to the formal sector—that provide income for the
poor and a safety net in times of crisis. Chen, supra note 113, at 4, 6–7. Accordingly, the
persistence of informal activities is due largely to the fact that not enough modern job
opportunities have been created to absorb surplus labor, due to a slow rate of economic
growth and/or to a faster rate of population growth. Id. The legalist school subscribes to
the notion that the informal sector is comprised of microentrepreneurs who choose to
operate informally in order to avoid the costs, time, and effort of formal registration. Id.
It posits that microentrepreneurs will continue to produce informally so long as
regulations in the formal sector are cumbersome and costly, and thus stifle private
enterprise. Id. The structuralist school, one that is in tune with my position, sees the
informal sector as subordinate economic units and workers that serve to reduce input and
labor costs, and thereby increase the competitiveness of large capitalist firms. Id. In the
structuralist model, in marked contrast to the dualist model, different modes and forms of
production are seen not only to co-exist but also to be inextricably connected and
interdependent. Id. According to this school, the nature of capitalist development, rather
than a lack of growth, accounts for the persistence and growth of informal production
relationships. Id.
377 Breman, supra note 151, at 34.
378 Id. at 35.
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austerity, and structural adjustment of economies.379 While the
Wall Street Journal expected the informal sector to serve as “one
of the last safe havens . . . a critical safety net as the economic
crisis spreads,”380 a detailed study finds that “incomes have
declined, days of work available decreased, prices have fallen and
livelihoods disappeared.”381
World Bank prescriptions play a defining role in shaping the
policies of governments, other development agencies, and
technocratic consultants.382 The new orthodoxy in urban policy
speaks of improving rather than replacing slums.
The
prescription offered for housing needs of the poor is “self-help” in
combination with privatization of housing supply across the
board. The populist and seemingly benign mantra of “helpingthe-poor-to-help-themselves” furnishes a smokescreen for the
abandonment of the obligation of the states to relieve poverty
and homelessness, and turns attention away from structural
changes at the state and global levels necessary for sustainable
urban and housing policies that may ensure secure housing with
dignity for all.383 Slogans like “people’s participation” become
thinly disguised euphemisms for the abdication by the state of its
fundamental responsibilities toward its citizens. While some
have demonstrated that “self-housing” is a myth as far as paid
artisans and skilled labor is involved,384 others have documented
that due to “cost-recovery” provisions of World Bank lending for
low-income housing, the bottom thirty to sixty percent of the
population was unable to meet the financial obligations of such
loans.385 ILO’s experts concluded that the World Bank’s slum
upgrading had failed to have any substantial impact.386

379 BACCHETTA ET AL., supra note 374, at 40; Alan Gilbert, Love in the Time of
Enhanced Capital Flows: Reflections on the Links Between Liberalization and Informality,
in URBAN INFORMALITY, supra note 176, at 33, 33–34, 37; Patralekha Chatterjee, Shadow
Lives:
Urban
India’s
Informal
Economy,
5:3
HABITAT DEBATE
(1999),
http://ww2.unhabitat.org/mdg/documents/asia/Vol5_No3_urban_indias_informal_economy
.doc.
380 Patrick Barta, The Rise of the Underground, WALL ST. J., March 14, 2009, at W1.
381 We Are Self Employed, SELF-EMPLOYED WOMEN’S ASSOCIATION OF INDIA (SEWA,
Gujarat, India) May 15, 2009, available at http://www.ifwea.org/news/2009/
affiliateAnnounce/090604SEWAnewsletter.pdf.
In the case of waste collectors in
Ahmedabad, the city used by the WSJ to draw examples, between April 2008 and January
2009 incomes fell to between thirty-seven and seventy percent. Id.
382 See Ramin Keivani & E Werna, Modes of Housing Provision in Developing
Countries, 55 PROGRESS IN PLANNING 65, 86 (2001).
383 See SEABROOK, supra note 175, at 196–97.
384 Kavita Datta & Gareth Jones, From Self-help to Self-Finance: The Changing
Focus of Urban Research and Policy, in HOUSING AND FINANCE IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 3, 11–12 (Kavita Datta & Gareth Jones eds., 2000).
385 See generally Lisa Peattie, Affordability, in 11 HABITAT INT’L 69, 69–76 (1987).
386 OBERAI, supra note 5, at 122.
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The “self-help” prescription is complemented by the World
Bank’s calls for a “market-enabling” strategy: curtail direct
public intervention in housing and lift restraints from private
land and housing market to let commodity circulation penetrate
into lower-income groups.387 The prescription has simply not
worked. Experts conclude that
the market-enabling approach neglects urban poor because it
overemphasizes the formal market process to the detriment of other
existing modes of provision, it lacks specific consideration of informal
markets and their particular requirements and it fails to consider who
benefits from the increased market efficiency.388

The market-enabling approach is inappropriate for housing
needs of the urban poor in the global South because formal
markets do not respond adequately to rapid urban growth,
poverty, chaotic economic conditions, and the deficiencies of
infrastructure and services.389 More often the result is excessive
speculation and monopoly behavior for maximizing profits, which
drive up land and housing prices without significant access to
mortgage or building finance by low-income groups.390 One
affected resident asks: “Whose problem does it solve?”391
At this juncture the myth of the informal worker as
entrepreneur was born.392 This was also the point of entry of the
legalist school which viewed the informal sector as constituted by

387 WORLD BANK, HOUSING: ENABLING MARKETS TO WORK 1–2 (1993); G. A. Jones and
K. Datta, Enabling Markets to Work: Housing Policy in the ‘New’ South Africa, 5:3 INT’L
PLANNING STUD. 393, 395–97 (2000); R. Harris and C. Giles, A Mixed Message: The Agents
and Forms on International Housing Policy, 1945-1973, 27 HABITAT INT’L 167, 174, 176–
78 (2003); WORLD BANK, URBAN POLICY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN AGENDA FOR
THE 1990S 6–7 (1991); A. Jones and P. E. Ward, The World Bank’s ‘New’ Urban
Management Program: Paradigm Shift or Policy Continuity?, 18 HABITAT INT’L 33, 35
(1994).
388 Ramin Keivani, Michael Mattingly and Hamid Majedi, Public Management of
Urban Land, Enabling Markets and Low-Income Housing Provision: The Overlooked
Experience of Iran, 45:9 URBAN STUDIES 1825, 1827 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
389 See V. Mukhija, Enabling Slum Redevelopment in Mumbai: Policy Paradox in
Practice, 16:6 HOUSING STUDIES 791, 791 (2001); V. Mukhija, The Contradictions in
Enabling Private Developers of Affordable Housing: A Cautionary Case from Ahmerabad,
India, 41 URBAN STUDIES 1, 3 (2004).
390 See R. Keivani and E. Werna, Modes of Housing Provision in Developing
Countries, 55 PROGRESS IN PLANNING 65, 69 (2001); R. Keivani and E. Werna, Refocusing
the Housing Debate in Developing Counties from a Pluralist Perspective, 25 HABITAT INT’L
191, 201 (2001); R. BAKEN AND J. VAN DER LINDEN, LAND DELIVERY FOR LOW INCOME
GROUPS IN THIRD WORLD CITIES 12, 45 (1992). See generally W. P. Strassmann,
Oversimplification in Housing Analysis, with Reference to Land Markets and Mobility, 11
CITIES 377 (1994).
391 See generally Priscilla Connolly, Uncontrolled Settlements and Self-Built: What
Kind of Solution? The Mexico City Case, in SELF-HELP HOUSING: A CRITIQUE 141 (Peter
M. Ward ed., 1982).
392 See Rebecca B. Galemba, Informal and Illicit Entrepreneurs: Fighting for a Place
in the Neoliberal Economic Order, 29:2 ANTHROPOLOGY OF WORK REVIEW 19, 19 (2008).
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voluntary micro-entrepreneurs, who were a reservoir for future
growth if only regulatory reforms would lower the cost of entry
and operation in the formal sector. It was claimed that those
who work in the informal sector do so “because they choose to be
self-employed, using skills acquired in the formal sector to
establish themselves as independent producers or traders.”393
The premise is that they are there “not because they were
redundant to the formal sector but because they chose to be selfemployed.”394 However, the reality is that far from choosing to do
so, those in the informal sector are shut out or ejected from the
formal sectors though a combination of global, national, and local
impacts of neoliberal structuring of public policies and the
introduction of “flexible production,” whereby capital seeks to
engage labor located outside the regimes of formal contract, labor
rights, and public regulation.395 The result is “immiserisation of
the laboring poor.”396
Given the rising value of increasingly scarce land in and
around urban areas, squatting usually operates through an
invisible and informal real estate market.397 Calling informal
subdivision settlements “extra legal rather than illegal,” analysts
point out that often those shut out of the formal housing market
buy lots from entrepreneurs who acquire tracts of undeveloped
land and subdivide it without conforming to any regulations, and
the area is incrementally upgraded, yielding ever-increasing
returns for the land owners.398
This model of privatized
urbanization is also, in effect, the privatization of squatting. In
some instances, owners of nonresidential tracts even encourage
squatters to organize themselves as a land invasion in the
expectation that the state may be forced to regularize the
settlement and develop infrastructure.399 In another model,
squatters purchase the “right” to dwell on state-owned land from
corrupt politicians and bureaucrats. Often it is middlemen who
secure possession, provide protection against eviction, and supply

HAROLD LUBELL, THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN THE 1980S AND 1990S 112 (1991).
Id.
See Jan Breman, An Informalized Labor System: End of Labor Market Dualism,
36:52 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 4804, 4807 (2002); N. Neetha, Flexible Production,
Feminisation and Disorganisation: Evidence from Tiruppur Knitwear Industry, 37:21
ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2045, 2049–51 (2002).
396 Breman, supra note 395, at 4813.
397 See generally Paul Baross, Sequencing Land Development: The Price Implications
of Legal and Illegal Settlement Growth, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAND SUPPLY
SYSTEMS IN THIRD WORLD CITIES 69 (Paul Baross & Jan van der Linden eds., 1990).
398 RAKESH MOHAN, UNDERSTANDING THE DEVELOPING METROPOLIS: LESSONS FROM
THE CITY STUDY OF BOGOTA AND CALI, COLUMBIA 152–53 (1994).
399 DAVID KEELING, BUENOS AIRES: GLOBAL DREAMS, LOCAL CRISES 107–08 (1996).
393
394
395
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water and transport facilities.400 The result is an informal extralegal economy and the commercialization of slums.401
The heralded guru of the legalist school, Hernando de Soto,
posits that the solution for cities of the global South is the
granting of property rights to slum-dwellers, which will turn
their extralegal holdings into liquid capital thus alleviating the
need for external capital investments for job creation.402 He
asserts that “trillions of dollars, [are] ready to be put to use if
only the mystery of how assets are transformed into live capital
can be unraveled.”403 Citing the failures of the legal system in
Peru, de Soto recommends legalization of extralegal landholdings
coupled with deregularization of the economy including
housing.404 Contra to de Soto’s prescription about the injection of
400 AKHTER HAMEED KHAN, ORANGI PILOT PROJECT: REMINISCENES AND REFLECTIONS
72 (1996).
401 Ayse Yonder, Implications of Double Standards in Housing Policy: Development of
Informal Settlements in Istanbul, in ILLEGAL CITIES: LAW AND URBAN CHANGE IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 55, 61–62 (Edesio Fernandes & Ann Varley eds., 1998)
[hereinafter ILLEGAL CITIES].
402 See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE ECONOMIC ANSWER TO
TERRORISM 159–60 (1989) [hereinafter DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH]; HERNANDO DE SOTO,
THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS
EVERYWHERE ELSE 37 (2000) [hereinafter DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL]. Heralds
of capitalism were quick to endorse De Soto’s recipe. See Why the Poor Need Property
Rights: Want to Make the Poor Less Poor? Give Them Title to What They Own,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 31, 2001. The World Bank adopted his recommendations too. WORLD
BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005: A BETTER INVESTMENT CLIMATE FOR
EVERYONE (2004). De Soto’s career as a protégé of Friedrick Hayek, and his grooming and
promotion by the Free Market Project at the University of Chicago, Mont Pelerin Society
of neoliberal intellectuals, and the Atlas Foundation for Economic Research is well
documented. See, e.g., Timothy Mitchell, The Work of Economics: How a Discipline Makes
its World, in XLVI:2. ARCHIVES EUROPEENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE 297, 304–09 (2005)
[hereinafter Mitchell, The Work of Economics]. At the urging of Hayek, the Atlas
Foundation helped set up and fund de Soto’s Institute for Liberty and Democracy, one of
the first neoliberal think tanks of the global South. While he grew up in Geneva, started
his career at GATT, and was the head of the International Council of Copper Exporting
Countries, his credibility came to depend on his identity as a neoliberal from the South.
The Center for International Private Enterprise, set up by the Reagan Administration
started funding de Soto’s Institute in the 1980s. De Soto became the principal political
advisor for Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori in 1990 and presided over the drastic
neoliberal restructuring of Peru’s economy that resulted in a deep recession whereby
within two years wages fell by forty percent and the proportion of Peruvians living in
poverty increased by fifty-four percent. See Kenneth M. Roberts, Neoliberalism and the
Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case, 48 WORLD POLITICS 82,
96 (1996). De Soto’s Institute started its pilot titling program in Lima. In 1996 The
Peruvian government adopted a law on poverty formalization, and in 1998 the World
Bank started funding the program. However, research funded by the World Bank showed
that property titling had produced no increase in credit to the poor, the primary goal of
the program. See Mitchell, The Work of Economics, supra note 402, at 308 (2005).
403 DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 402, at 37. For a critical analysis
of de Soto’s ideas, see Mitchell, The Work of Economics, supra note 402, at 299; Ann
Varley, Private or Public: Debating the Meaning of Tenure Legalization, 26 INT’L J. URB. &
REGIONAL RES. 449, 449–50 (2002).
404 DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 402, at 177, 182, 255–58.
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the law into the informal sector, the informal and extra-legal
sector is not separate and apart from the formal and legal one. It
is produced by operations of the market and the state that have
the “power to determine . . . what is informal and what is not,
and to determine what forms of informality will thrive and which
will disappear.”405
De Soto’s claim that the global South is “exactly where
Europe, Japan, and the United States were a couple of hundred
years ago,”406 utterly glosses over the colonial encounter and its
impact. He ignores the “process of primitive accumulation that
force[s] people into the cities,” and sidesteps questions about who
owns capital now, and how it is deployed.407 He seeks to research
“folk conventions” around property rights to be incorporated into
the modern property regimes.408 Others also celebrate the
multiplicity of informal legal norms that animate property
relations in extra-legal urban housing.409 But, all informal
normative orders are not born equal. While some values and
desires are inherent to a community, others are fashioned as
tactical responses to threatening forces. Many customary norms
in the global South emerged after initial separation of native
peoples from the commons and colonial inventions of tradition.410
Many norms of the informal sector emerged in response to
predatory capitalist markets. While signifying ingenuity and resistance of impacted groups, these norms presuppose hostile and
overarching legal regimes that dispossess and marginalize them.
We must remain mindful that colonial and postcolonial
coexistence of modes of production is not a horizontal articulation
of different modes. Imperatives of capitalism demarcate the
conditions of possibility of non-capitalist modes. As a result, the
informal sector remains “locked in an asymmetrical relation” of
“subordination” to the accumulation economy.411 Recognition of
porous legality and plurality of legal frames does not necessarily

405 Ananya Roy, Urban Informality: Towards an Epistemology of Planning, 71 J. AM.
PLAN. ASS’N 147, 149 (2005). See also Ray Bromley, Power, Property, and Poverty: Why De
Soto’s “Mystery of Capital” Cannot Be Solved, in URBAN INFORMALITY, supra note 176, at
271, 277–83.
406 DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 402, at 181.
407 Moore, supra note 92, at 98–99.
408 DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 402, at 179.
409 For a thoughtful analysis of the theoretical questions involved and examples of
informal property norms, see Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, Extralegal Property, Legal
Monism, and Pluralism, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 213, 214 (2009).
410 See generally Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa, in
THE INVENTION OF TRADITION 260–62 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1992)
(discussing how traditions in Africa developed).
411 SANYAL, supra note 77, at 220.
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imply that resistive norms of the marginalized furnish adequate
grounds for alleviation of their predicaments.
Evidence from the global South suggests that regularization
of slum ownership without radical changes in larger public
policies has marginal positive impact at best, and has more often
aggravated the condition of slum-dwellers.412 In tune with de
Soto, the neoliberal apothecary, the World Bank’s 2003 report
prescribes private property as the answer to the land question.413
However, even a World Bank working paper acknowledged that
“it would be dangerous to promote formal titling as the sole
solution necessary to solve the problems of the urban poor . . . .
[W]here the capital markets are underdeveloped and a spectrum
of ownership structures exist, titling alone will not ‘unlock’
capital.”414 De Soto claimed that in “developing countries much
of the teeming mass does not consist of oppressed legal
proletarians but of oppressed extralegal small entrepreneurs.”415
Labeling those marooned in the informal sector “entrepreneurs,”
however, does not change their condition of life. Most slumdwellers are renters of land “owned” by powerful criminal and
political interests. For such owners, regularization is a bonanza,
but for tenants this often amounts to ejection from any form of
housing. Tax collectors, municipal utility charges, fracturing of
intra-slum solidarities and slums within slums quickly became
visible as a result of commodification and real estate submarket
consolidation that issues from deregulation.416
A recent study that interrogates de Soto’s panacea of
legalization of extra-legally occupied dwellings in the light of the
experience of Bogota, finds claims about the dynamics of housing
market informality and the benefits of formal title wanting.417
The experience of other countries and cities confirms this

412 See Geoffrey Payne, unpublished report, quoted in ALAN GILBERT & ANN VARLEY,
LANLORD AND TENANT: HOUSING THE POOR IN URBAN MEXICO 4 (1991); Suzana Taschner,
Squatter Settlements and Slums in Brazil, in HOUSING THE URBAN POOR 215, 216–19
(Brian Aldrich & Ravinder Sandhu eds., 1995).
413 DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 402, at 67; KLAUS DEININGER,
LAND POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION xvii–xxi (2003).
414 Robert M. Buckley & Jerry. Kalarickal, Shelter Strategies for the Urban Poor:
Idiosyncratic and Successful, but Hardly Mysterious 22–23 (World Bank Policy Research,
Working Paper No. 3427, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/
39291.pdf?abstractid=625305&mirid=1.
415 DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 402, at 216.
416 Donald A. Krueckeberg, The Lessons of John Locke or Hernando de Soto: What If
Your Dreams Come True?, 15 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 1, 3–4 (2004).
417 Carmen G. Gonzalez, Squatters, Pirates, and Entrepreneurs: Is Informality the
Solution to the Urban Housing Crisis?, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 239, 239–51,
(2009).
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conclusion.418 A landmark study of slums points out that the de
Sotoian “semi-utopian view of the informal sector, however,
grows out of a nested set of epistemological fallacies.”419
In tune with the recommendations of the legalist school, an
adverse possession model has been attempted sporadically in
some counties.420 In the 1990s, Peru instituted this mode
through the Formalization Commission of Informal Property
(COFOPRI).421
The model suffers from various problems.
Squatters must continue to bear the costs of acquiring and
occupying land that they do not own for a long time, giving rise to
violence and protection rackets.422 This model also does not
address the fact that squatter settlements are often located on
marginal and ecologically vulnerable lands.423 Neither does it
address provision of services and public health issues, or deter
future squatting and continued cycles of remedial responses. It
has marginal impact on wealth disparity between occupants of
extra-legal settlements and legal property owners because titling,
on average, increases value of untitled property by a mere

418 See Brian R. Roberts, From Marginality to Social Exclusion: From Laissez Faire to
Pervasive Engagement, 39 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 195, 195–97 (2004); PETER WARD, MEXICO
CITY 193 (1998); Taschner, supra note 412, at 217–19; Jean-Louis Van Gelder, Tales of
Deviance and Control: On Space, Rules, and Law in Squatter Settlements, 44 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 239, 262 (2010).
419 DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS, supra note 39, at 179. These include the failure to
distinguish between micro-accumulation and sub-subsistence, and between informal petty
bourgeoisie and informal proletariat. Id. at 180. “[M]ost participants of the informal
economy directly or indirectly work for someone else.” Id. There is growing inequality
within the networks of exploitation of the informal sector. Id. at 181. Informality
increases the exploitation and abuse of women and children. Id. Rather than generating
new jobs, the informal sector fragments existing work and subdivides incomes. Id.
Gambling, lotteries, pyramid schemes, and even quasi-magical and spiritual promises of
wealth proliferate in the informal sector. Id. at 183. Reform of the informal sector has
little impact on structural inequities of the economy and resulting poverty. Id. Increased
competition within the informal sector rapidly depletes the collective social capital of the
marginalized and dissolves self-help networks and political solidarities among the urban
poor. Id.
420 Common law typically provides a statute of limitations “fixing the period of time
beyond which the owner of land can no longer bring an action, or undertake self-help, for
the recovery of his land from a person in possession of the land.” Winter King, Illegal
Settlements and the Impact of Titling Programs, 44 HARVARD INT’L L. J. 433, 448 (2003)
(quoting RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 91.01 (Michael Allen Woe ed.,
2003)). For such a claim to be ripe, “the possession [must] be (1) actual, (2) open and
notorious, (3) exclusive, (4) continuous, and (5) hostile under a claim of right.” Id. Most
civil law jurisdictions have similar provisions; for example, usucapiao in Brazil and
prescripcion adquisitiva in Peru. As opposed to common law, usucapiao or prescripcion
adquistiva can be used against vacant public land. Id. at 449. See also EDESIO
FERNANDES, LAW AND URBAN CHANGE IN BRAZIL 118 (1995).
421 King, supra note 420, at 449.
422 Id. at 450.
423 Id. See also JORGE E. HARDOY & DAVID SATTERTHWAITE, SHELTER: NEED AND
RESPONSE 232–33 (1981).
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23.5%.424 Fearful that new owners will promptly sell their titles
for profit, states often prohibit transfer of title and subdivisions
for substantial periods of time or indefinitely.425 Finally, requirement of public and notorious possession encourages
settlements in ecologically vulnerable areas.426
Another legalization model grants titles on a case-by-case
basis. This was done, for example, in Peru as a once-for-all
regularization under a 1961 law, and in India and Mexico at
various stages.427 Ruling parties generally deploy this model
close to elections to gain political support and votes.428 The adhoc nature of the model and its dependence upon whims of
political authorities makes this an unstable and unpredictable
mode of regularization. Furthermore, it does not address issues
of squatting costs, lack of services, environmental concerns, and
intra-slum divides.
The dominant result has been that
“[s]peculative rises in the price of land and the costs imposed on
residents both directly and indirectly (in the form of service
charges and property taxes) lead to the displacement of the
original population. Rather than increasing security of tenure,
regular-ization actually diminishes it.”429 Indeed, regularization
is often misused by landowners to their profit by using squatters
for their ends. The case of Lima is illustrative:
Very often landowners and private developers have manipulated the
squatters into forcing portions of the land onto the real estate market,
by obtaining from the authorities some urban infrastructure for the
squatters, thus enhancing the land value and opening the way for
profitable housing construction. In a second phase, the squatters are
expelled from the land they have occupied and forced to start all over
424 Jean O. Lanjouw & Philip I. Levy, Untitled: A Study of Formal and Informal
Property Rights in Urban Ecuador, 112 ECON. J. 986, 988 (2002). This data is based on a
study of Guayaquil, Ecuador.
425 King, supra note 420, at 446.
426 See Lee J. Johnson et al., A Model of Rural Conflict: Violence and Land Reform
Policy in Brazil, 4 ENV’T. & DEV. ECON. 135, 157–58 (1999); Arild Angelsen, Playing
Games in the Forest: State-Local Conflicts of Land Appropriation, 77 LAND ECON. 285, 291
(2001).
427 See Alain Durand-Lasserve, Law and Urban Change in Developing Countries:
Trends and Issues, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 401, at 157, 234; Kenneth A. Manaster,
The Problem of Urban Squatters in Developing Countries: Peru, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 23, 42–
43 (1968). In the case of Mexico this also involved extra-legal subdivisions and
development of ejodi lands—a form of collectively owned communal property developed
after the Mexican revolution. The community could not alienate its ejido property, nor
lose it through prescription. The land was set aside for agriculture with strict restrictions
on development. Antonio Azuela de la Cueva, Low Income Settlements and the Law in
Mexico City, 11 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 522, 530–31 (1987).
428 Antonio Azuela & Emilio Duhau, Tenure Regularization, Private Property and
Public Order in Mexico, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 401, at 157, 168; Azuela de la
Cueva, supra note 427, at 526; Ann Varley, The Political Uses of Illegality: Evidence from
Urban Mexico, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 401, at 172–75.
429 Azuela & Duhau, supra note 428, at 163.
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again on the frontier of a city which has expanded as a result of their
efforts.430

A more productive model is the “state as developer” model,431
with direct state planning, intervention, and investment in “sites
and services” projects.432 While this model was only marginally
successful in Mexico and Peru,433 there is the relatively
successful and “[o]verlooked [e]xperience in Iran.”434
The
revolutionary government of Iran inherited exploding urban
growth, concentration of land ownership, and a choke-hold of
landed interests over land and housing policies.435 A series of
laws introduced between 1979 and 1992 aimed to regulate the
urban land market and urban housing with the objective of
“acquisition of excess urban land above a defined limit and its
direct allocation for housing [through public channels], cooperatives and the private sector.”436 Islamic law was deployed
whereby the state could rightly acquire undeveloped land for
distribution without compensation.437 The impact on direct land
430 MANUEL CASTELLS, THE CITY AND THE
OF URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 191 (1983).

GRASSROOTS: A CROSS-CULTURAL THEORY

431 King, supra note 420, at 458. This study used seven criteria for comparison
between the various models utilized to deal with the problem of extra-legal settlements,
and it found that “state as developer” model comparatively most effective. The criteria
are: prevention of violence, prevention of the use of unsuitable land, public services, entry
into the formal sector, rule of law, discourage further extra-legal settlements, increase of
wealth, and viable alternative to extra-legal settlements. Id. at 447. This study also finds
the model, as practiced in Iran, to be the most attractive alternative. Id. at 460–61, 466.
432 Peter M. Ward, Land for Housing the Poor: How Can Planners Contribute?, in
LAND FOR HOUSING THE POOR 34, 39 (Shlomo Angel et al. eds., 1983). Ward defines “sites
and services” as state “sponsorship of land subdivisions in which a basic service network
was installed from the outset.” Id.
433 See generally King, supra note 420, at 468; Ann Varley, The Relationship Between
Tenure Legalization and Housing Improvements: Evidence from Mexico City, 18 DEV. &
CHANGE 463 (1987).
434 Ramin Keivani et al., Public Management of Urban Land, Enabling Markets and
Low-income Housing Provision: The Overlooked Experience of Iran, 45 URB. STUD. 1825,
1848 (2008). A comprehensive comparative study also finds the “state as developer”
model, as practiced in Iran, the most attractive alternative. King, supra note 420, at 458–
61. See also Mohammad Mehdi Azizi, The Provision of Urban Infrastructure in Iran: An
Empirical Evaluation, 32 URB. STUD. 507, 520–21 (1995); Mohammad Mehdi Azizi, The
User-Pays System in the Provision of Urban Infrastructure: Effectiveness and Equity
Criteria, 37 URB. STUD. 1345, 1348–49 (2000); Mohammad Mehdi Azizi, Evaluation of
Urban Land Supply Policy in Iran, 22 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 94, 103 (2002);
Mohammad Mehdi Azizi, Provision of Urban Public Facilities through the Development of
Public Commercial Land in Iran, 19 HABITAT INT’L 269, 276–77 (1995) [hereinafter Azizi,
Provision of Urban Public Facilities].
435 Keivani et al., supra note 434, at 1832. In 1978, about eighty-five percent of land
within Tehran belonged to the royal family and a few others. Id. Ninety percent of the
eighty million square meters of land on the outskirts of Tehran belonged to ten percent of
the landowners. Id. The land in Tehran increased by five hundred percent between 1971
and 1976. Id.
436 Id.
437 See, e.g., Mehrdad Valibeigi, Banking and Credit Rationing Under the Islamic
Republic of Iran, 25 IRANIAN STUD. 51, 64 (1992).
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provision and the land market was dramatic.438 Within a ten
year period 85,557 hectors of urban land was acquired by the
Urban Land Organization (ULO).439 Seventy-seven percent of
the land was allocated for housing, and the rest for commercial,
industrial and public service purposes.440 The land reserved for
commercial projects was sold and thirty percent of the profit was
given to municipalities to provide services, giving priority to
green spaces, schools, clinics, and health centers.441 Until 1985,
the focus was on the public sector provision of infrastructure to
new residential areas.442 The program was expensive and was
plagued with inefficiency. In 1985, a revised plan aimed at
addressing the problem ex ante.443 The state acquired land close
to cities, laid out infrastructure—roads, electricity, and sewer
systems—and allotted housing plots to applicants on a user-pay
financing basis. The fees for the development were paid by
future occupants either before or after occupation.444 By selecting
land for acquisition, urban migration was steered to mid-sized
cities in addition to areas around large metropoles.445 Cost recoupment ratio was satisfactory, and where payments exceeded
development costs, the surplus was plowed back into additional
services like hospitals and schools.
In a ten year period land was transferred to 422,864 families
through direct allocation (234,000), housing cooperative societies
(131,000) and public and private developers (58,000).446 Between
1976 and 1986, the housing stock doubled, increasing from
2,377,586 to 4,685,666.447 Even the World Bank was constrained
to acknowledge that provision of public land had “play[ed] an
important role in attracting developers to invest in low-income
housing and in rental accommodations,” and that this approach
“should be explored as part of a housing policy concerned
particularly with provision of low-income housing.”448 Analysts
conclude that:
Iran substantially expanded the stock of low-income urban
housing . . . by directly providing land . . . effectively by-passing urban
land and housing markets and their shortcomings [through policies]

438 See Keivani et al., supra note 434, at 1833–40 (detailing the statistical data that
evidences this impact).
439 Id. at 1833.
440 Id. at 1836.
441 Azizi, Provision of Urban Public Facilities, supra note 434, at 273, 277.
442 King, supra note 420, at 459.
443 Id.
444 Id.
445 Id.
446 Keivani et al., supra note 434, at 1825, 1836.
447 Azizi, Provision of Urban Public Facilities, supra note 434, at 271.
448 Keivani et al., supra note 434, at 1841.
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designed specifically to benefit a large section of low and middleincome sectors that would otherwise be excluded land and housing
markets.449

As practiced in Iran, the state as developer and sites and
services models address the extra-legal settlement problem ex
ante, and avoid social and human costs of squatting.450 Planned
selection of settlement sites helps preclude environmentally
fragile and hazardous landscapes.451 Provision of services before
occupation avoids public health issues.452 Land bearing legal
title enters the market through the state, thus avoiding
transaction costs of regularization.453 Concerns remain that
user-pay financing may keep such housing out of the reach of the
destitute.454 However, if the state were to subsidize the cost of
occupation for the poor, this model can become an effective
means of redistributing wealth and directing public resources to
alleviate a critical social problem, i.e., housing for the urban poor.
Sustained governmental foresight and a political commitment
toward the urban poor are the key ingredients of this model.
The experience of Iran substantiates that housing for the
urban poor is primarily a political problem, one that requires
political will that issues from composition of the power-bloc.
Note that the primary social base of political support for the
revolutionary regime in Iran was provided by the urban poor and
the lower middle classes.455 Due to the early legitimacy of the
revolution, any backlash from other interest groups toward the
policy to house the urban poor was not powerful enough to derail
the program.456 As merchant groups gained ascendency within
the power-bloc in the 1990s Iran yielded to the pressures and
temptations of neoliberal restructuring, and land and housing
policy were increasingly influenced by supply-side policies.457
449 Id. at 1848. Similar public interventions in the housing market have produced
desirable results in Sweden. See S. S. Duncan, House Building, Profits and Social
Efficiency in Sweden and Britain, 1 HOUS. STUDIES 11, 13 (1986); James Barlow,
Controlling the Housing Land Market: Some Examples from Europe, 307 URB. STUD.
1129, 1133 (1992). See also MICHAEKL BALL, HOUSING POLICY AND ECONOMIC POWER:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OWNER OCCUPATION 4 (1983).
450 Keivani et al., supra note 434, at 1848–49.
451 Id. at 1827.
452 King, supra note 420, at 450–51.
453 Sheila R. Foster, Urban Informality as a Commons Dilemma, 40 U. MIAMI INTERAM. L. REV. 261, 278 (2008).
454 Keivani et al., supra note 434, at 1844.
455 See Charles Kurzman, The Qum Protests and the Coming of the Iranian
Revolution, 27:3 SOC. SCI. HIST. 287, 299–300 (2003); NIKKI R. KEDDIE, MODERN IRAN:
ROOTS AND RESULTS OF REVOLUTION 232 (2006).
456 Keivani et al., supra note 434, at 1849.
457 Id. at 1832. Policies shifted toward commercial allocation and full cost recovery,
reduction of individual land allocation, and increased reliance on mass housing provision
by private developers. Id.
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The negative impact was quick. The housing situation in urban
areas worsened progressively, going through several cycles of
boom and bust.458 Housing prices escalated and, feeling political
pressure, the government was recently forced to announce new
measures of land allocation and subsidized housing in new
housing projects.459 Even with its substantial success, the
challenge remains whether the “state as developer” model can be
replicated in the global South beyond Iran. All social formations
of the global South are not commensurable; certainly not in
regard to their power-blocs. What is needed is an overarching
conceptual principle that can guide suitable remedial strategies
in diverse settings.
B. Toward the Right to the City
Injecting extreme competition in the already impoverished
and exploitative informal sector as prescribed by neoliberalism is
to “simply grease the skids to a Hobbesian hell.”460 A promising
path out of this Hobbesian hell may be the incipient right to the
city. The concept, first introduced by Henry Lefebvre in the late
1960s,461 and characterized as “one of the most precious yet most
neglected of our human rights,”462 is playing an influential role in
urban politics in Latin America and international efforts to
develop a “World Charter on the Right to the City.”463
Lefebvre saw the right to the city not as a natural or
contractual right, but as one that issues from the entitlement to
urban space “of the whole society and firstly of all those who
inhabit.”464 Lefebvre’s point of departure is that while the scope
of human rights has expanded as a result of social movements
and political struggles, the rights of the citizen largely remain
the same as stipulated in the Declaration of the Rights of Man
and Citizens of 1789.465 Therefore, an expansion of the rights of
Id. at 1849.
Id.
DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS, supra note 39, at 185.
See HENRI LEFEBVRE, WRITINGS ON CITIES 6 (Eleonore Kofman & Elibeth Lebas
eds., 1996).
462 Harvey, The Right to the City, supra note 60, at 23.
463 Edesio Fernandes, Constructing the ‘Right to the City’ in Brazil, 16:2 SOC. &
LEGAL STUD. 201, 201–02 (2007). For detailed explication of Lefebvre’s construct of the
right to the city, see Mark Purcell, Excavating Lefebvre: The Right to the City and its
Urban Politics of the Inhabitant, 58 GEOJOURNAL 99, 100 (2002); DON MITCHELL, THE
RIGHT TO THE CITY: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGHT FOR PUBLIC SPACE 19 (2003); David
Harvey, The Right to the City: From Capital Surplus to Accumulation by Dispossession, in
ACCUMULATION BY DISPOSSESSION, supra note 180, at 17.
464 HENRI LEFEBVRE, WRITING ON CITIES, supra note 461, at 158.
465 The scope of international human rights has moved beyond civil and political
rights to include economic and social rights and collective solidarity rights. See Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10,
458
459
460
461
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the citizen is needed to address new relations between
individuals and society in modern urban life.
He linked
reconfiguration of citizenship rights with democratic governance
of cities, the primary zone of modern collective life.466 Rather
than rejecting classic liberal political rights, Lefebvre aimed to
build upon them to include the right to information, the right to
culture, the right to identity in difference and in equality, the
right of democratic control of the economy and politics, the right
to public services, and above all, the right to the city.467 The
right to the city consists of the right of all city-dwellers to fully
enjoy urban life with all its services and advantages—the right to
habitation, as well as playing a direct role in the management of
cities. This calls for an emphasis on use value of all things urban
in order to redress the social imbalances that issue from
excessive emphasis on exchange value, the hallmark of the
production of urban space under capitalism. Besides a claim
upon adequate urban services and management, it includes full
use of space by those who inhabit the city, including the right
against segregation and expulsion from social life.
Most
importantly, it seeks an active participatory role in “all circuits of
decision-making leading to the control and development of the
organization of social space,” in order to resist the control of
space by the state and capital.468
The right to the city can compliment constructs of political
citizenship with a broader notion of “urban citizenship.”469 It
signals legitimization of collective struggles to transform the
“power relations that underlie the production of space,
fundamentally shifting control away from capital and the state
and toward urban inhabitants.”470 It not only expands the
eligibilities of those traditionally considered members of the
1948);; Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966);; Int’l Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, GA Res. 2200, 21 UN GAOR Supp. No. 16, UN Doc. A/6316
(1966).
466 See LEFEBVRE, WRITINGS ON CITIES, supra note 461, at 140–41. This is in tune
with his general theory about the mutually constitutive role of space and the social, he
argues that “[g]roups, classes or fractions of classes cannot constitute themselves, or
recognize one another as ‘subjects’ unless they generate (or produce) a space.” HENRY
LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 416 (Donald Nicholson-Smith trans., 1991).
467 Liette Gilbert & Catherine Phillips, Practices of Urban Environmental
Citizenships: Rights to the City and Rights to Nature in Toronto, 7 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 313,
317 (2003).
468 M. R. Martins, The Theory of Social Space in the Work of Henry Lefebvre, in
URBAN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL THEORY 160, 183 (R. Forrest, J. Henderson & P.
Williams, eds., 1982).
469 See Eugene McCann, Space, Citizenship, and the Right to the City: A Brief
Overview, 58 GEOJOURNAL 77, 78 (2002); ENGIN ISIN, Democracy, Citizenship and the
City, in DEMOCRACY, CITIZENSHIP AND THE GLOBAL CITY 1, 14 (2000).
470 Purcell, supra note 464, at 101–02.
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political community, i.e., citizens, but could bring refugees,
asylum seekers, and the undocumented within the zone of
eligibilities and entitlements on account of their spatial
presence.471 Of course, we have to be mindful that “the number
of rightless peoples also grows even as human rights norms and
standards proliferate.”472 We also have to note the critique of the
classic discourse of rights for its formalism, questionable claims
of universality, limited scope, and failures in implementation.473
Furthermore, framing all issues and strategies in the language of
rights may itself impede their realization.474 The right to the city
is amenable to readings that may restrict it and simply add to
the portfolio of individual liberties best suited for the interests of
the powerful political and economic elites. If it is to challenge
hegemonic liberal political and neoliberal market constructs, this
right has to be envisaged as more than an individual liberty to
access urban resources, and seen instead as a collective right to
reshape the process of urbanization.
The right would be
meaningful only if it entails democratic control over deployment
of surplus, and management of urban development. It is
imperative that counter-hegemonic social movements remain the
drivers of this right which is essentially a solidarity right. Only
then will it become an effective instrument to address the
inequities of urban life. David Harvey has called for the adoption
of the right to the city both as a slogan and a political project
because
it focuses on the question of who commands the necessary connection
between urbanization and surplus production and use.
The
democratization of that right, and the construction of a broad social
movement to enforce its will is imperative if the dispossessed are to
take back the control which they have for so long been denied, and if
they are to institute new modes of urbanization.475

A productive model is furnished by the struggle for the right
to the city as it has unfolded in Brazil.476 It rests on the principle
471 See Chris Butler, Sydney: Aspiration, Asylum and the Denial of the Right to the
City, in LAW AND THE CITY 205, 217 (Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos ed., 2007).
472 UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS viii (2002).
473 See TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY
148, 151–58 (2003).
474 See, e.g., David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the
Problem? 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 101 (2002).
475 Harvey, The Right to the City, supra note 60, at 40.
476 See LEONARDO AVRITZER & BELO HORIZONTE, URBAN REFORM, PARTICIPATION,
AND THE RIGHT TO THE CITY IN BRAZIL 3 (2007). For social movements in Brazil, see
Maria Helena Moreira Alves, Sao Paulo: The Political and Social Transformations
Wrought by the New Labor Movement, in WORLD CITIES BEYOND THE WEST:
GLOBALIZATION, DEVELOPMENT AND INEQUALITY 299, 300–01 (Josef Gugler ed., 2004). See
also Ulrich Brand and Marcus Wissen, Neoliberal Globalization and the
Internationalization of Protest: A European Perspective, 37 ANTIPODE 9, 10 (2005); AMORY

Do Not Delete

2010]

12/12/2010 7:34 PM

“Surplus  Humanity”  and  the  Margins  of Legality

71

that regulation of urban development is a public matter that
cannot be reduced to either individual or state interests. The
right is then seen as an ensemble of rights of all residents of the
city—the right to housing, the right to urban planning, the right
to environmental preservation, the right to capture surplus
value, and the right to regularize informal settlements. A
landmark in this context was the enactment of Federal Law No.
10.257, entitled “City Statute,” in Brazil on July 10, 2001.477 The
statute aims to regulate the framework of urban policy
introduced by the 1988 Federal Constitution that explicitly
recognized a collective right to the city, affirmed a central role for
local governments, and declared that representative democracy
be reconciled with participatory political process.478 The City
Statute provides the frame of interpretation of the constitutional
principle of the social function of urban property and the city,
lays down a regulatory framework for the construction and
financing of urban development by municipalities, prescribes the
design of democratic management of cities, and identifies legal
modalities for comprehensive regularization of informal settlements in private and public urban areas.479
Another promising development is the proposal for a “World
Charter for Human Rights in Cities,” first proposed at the VI
Brazilian Conference on Human Rights in 2001.480 It was
inspired generally by the international instruments on civil,
political, social, cultural, and environmental rights, and in
particular by the European Charter for Safeguarding of Human
Rights in the City,481 and by the Treaty for Democratic, Equitable
and Sustainable Cities, Towns and Villages.482 The World Social

STARR, NAMING THE ENEMY: ANTI-CORPORATE MOVEMENTS CONFRONT GLOBALIZATION 88
(2000).
477 THE POLIS INSTITUTE, THE STATUTE OF THE CITY: NEW TOOLS FOR ASSURING THE
RIGHT TO THE CITY IN BRAZIL 11 (2002), available at http://polis.org.br/obras/
arquivo_163.pdf.
478 Id. at 28. For details, see EDESIO FERNANDES, LAW AND URBAN CHANGE IN BRAZIL
68 (1995).
479 THE POLIS INSTITUTE, supra note 477, at 27.
480 See Enrique Ortiz, Towards a World Charter for the Right to the City, HABITAT
INTERNATIONAL COALITION, http://www.hic-net.org/articles.php?pid=2296 (last visited
Sept. 2, 2010). For English text of the World Charter, see DISABLED PEOPLE’S
INTERNATIONAL, http://v1.dpi.org/lang-en/events/details.php?page=124 (last visited Sept.
2, 2010).
481 Leticia Osorio, The World Charter on the Right to the City, in INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC DEBATES: URBAN POLICIES AND THE RIGHT TO THE CITY 107, 107 (2005). This was
presented in Saint-Denis in May 2000, and has since been adopted by over four hundred
European cities. Id.
482 Id. This was approved in 1992 at the World Environment Summit in Rio de
Janeiro. Id.
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Forum, the umbrella “movement of movements,”483 has been the
primary vehicle to elaborate the World Charter and to design
strategies for its adoption by the United Nations.484 In 2005, UNHABITAT and UNESCO launched a joint initiative entitled
“Urban Policies and the Right to the City” aimed at social
mobilization for the World Charter.485 The objective of the World
Charter is to recognize and to establish legal mechanisms to
enforce the right to the city in its social, economic, cultural, and
political dimensions.486 It seeks to redesign international norms
of economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights in a more
clearly defined framework of the right to the city.487 If approved
by the United Nations, the World Charter would confer
legitimacy to social movements of the urban poor and slumdwellers. It would help develop international legal norms for
human rights to guide public, community, and private agents to
ensure equitable and sustainable distribution and use of urban
land and resources. In this role, it could serve as a useful
instrument in the struggle of slum-dwellers and the urban
poor.488 The right to the city can facilitate recovering the original
meaning of the city—the body of citizens, and the community.
We have to recognize, however, that general declarations of
rights are important but not sufficient.
Effective social
movements and locus standi for individuals and social
movements to enforce those rights through the courts are
essential for the realization of such a right.
Even the
enforcement of this right at the level of the cities may remain
largely symbolic if international and national economic and

483 See A MOVEMENT OF MOVEMENTS: IS ANOTHER WORLD REALLY POSSIBLE? x (Tom
Mertes ed., 2004).
484 JEREMY BRECHER, Global Self—Organization From Below, ZNET (May 10, 2002),
http://www.zcommunications.org/global-self-organization-from-below-by-jeremy-brecher1.pdf. For a detailed exposition of the origins and career of the World Social Forum, see
JACKIE SMITH ET. AL., GLOBAL DEMOCRACY AND THE WORLD SOCIAL FORUM 30, 131
(2008); Ahmed Allahwala & Roger Keil, Introduction to a Debate on the World Social
Forum, 29 INT’L J. URB. & REG’L RES. 409, 409 (2005). See also GLOBALIZATION AND THE
POLITICS OF RESISTANCE 9 (Barry K. Gills ed., 2001); WALDEN BELLO, DEGLOBALIZATION:
IDEAS FOR A NEW WORLD ECONOMY 234 (2002); NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE SOUTH:
EMPOWERING THE PEOPLE 234 (Ponna Wignaraja ed., 1993); JEREMY BRECHER, TIM
COSTELLO & BRENDAN SMITH, GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: THE POWER OF SOLIDARITY
129 (2000).
485 Urban
Policies,
UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-humansciences/themes/social-transformations/urban-development/urban-policies/ (last visited
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urban policies remain imprisoned in the straitjacket of the global
rule of capital, particularly its neoliberal reincarnation.
CONCLUSION
The persistence and growth of slums is perhaps the most
eloquent testimony of the failures of the capitalist world order.
Machinations of global capital, managerial designs of global
management, national policies imprisoned in bankrupt
development models, and the absence of comprehensive social
movements remain hurdles in any road to dignity and full
participation in political and socio-economic life for marginalized
populations. It is a particular burden of scholars to devise
strategies to reverse this state of affairs. Correct diagnosis
remains indispensible to productive prescriptions. The primary
intellectual challenge is to cut through the ideological fog that
envelops the operations and effects of socio-economic orders
procreated by the rule of unbridled capital accumulation. We
have to contest and interrogate propositions that phenomena like
slums, urban poverty, and human misery are accidental,
incidental, or a mandate of the natural scheme of things. The
connection between accelerating urban poverty in the global
South and global accumulation of capital has to be clearly
understood, along with the supporting roles of global managers,
national policy makers, and local administrators. Legal scholars
face a particular challenge to interrogate the role of law in this
context. Our theories of citizenship, class, identity formation,
and social change must take into account the rhythms of lived
experiences of the urban poor. Only then can transformative
prescriptive designs be imagined and implemented. To address
this historic agenda, we will do well to learn from and build upon
the daily struggles and resistive ingenuities of slum-dwellers. In
an evocative scene of Slumdog Millionaire, while torturing the
slum-dweller protagonist, a police officer inquires: “What can a
slumdog possibly know?” The protagonist responds: “The
answers!”489
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Slumdog Millionaire, supra note 13.

